Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies for the Way Forward. CEPS Paperbacks. July 2006 by Egenhofer, Christian et al.
Policy Coherence for Development 
in the EU Council 
Strategies for the Way Forward 
 
 
Project Leader 
Christian Egenhofer 
 
Authors 
Louise van Schaik 
Michael Kaeding 
Alan Hudson 
Jorge Núñez Ferrer 
 
With expert contributions by 
Sergio Carrera 
Meng-Hsuan Chou 
David Kernohan 
Andreas Schneider 
Lorna Schrefler  
Marius Vahl 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
BRUSSELS 
 The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy 
research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical 
research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe 
today. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a 
personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other 
institution with which the authors are associated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 92-9079-653-7 
© Copyright 2006, Centre for European Policy Studies 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 
e-mail: info@ceps.be 
internet: http://www.ceps.be 
 CONTENTS 
PREFACE................................................................................................................................. i 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................................................................................iii 
PART I. MAIN REPORT...........................................................................................................1 
1.  Introduction..................................................................................................................1 
2.  The Context of Policy Coherence for Development................................................3 
3.  A Brief History of PCD in the EU ..............................................................................6 
4.  Analysing EU Policy-Making and PCD in 12 Policy Areas....................................8 
4.1  Commission-led vs member state-led policies............................................10 
5.  Strengthening PCD in the EU Council....................................................................12 
5.1  The European Council matters......................................................................16 
5.2  The EU presidency as an important source of leadership .........................17 
5.3  Ensuring coherence at the ministerial formations ......................................20 
5.4  Opportunities for member states and coalitions of member states..........21 
5.5  Coreper: Spider in the web?...........................................................................22 
5.6  Senior Council preparatory committees and working parties: 
Doing most of the work on their own?.........................................................22 
5.7  Council Secretariat: The neutral assistant? ..................................................26 
5.8  A brief analysis of PCD in the European Commission ..............................27 
6.  Drivers for Change.....................................................................................................34 
6.1  Political will, commitment, leadership.........................................................34 
6.2  Strategies...........................................................................................................35 
6.3  Institutional capacity.......................................................................................35 
6.4  Awareness and organisational culture.........................................................37 
6.5  Accountability..................................................................................................37 
7.  Conclusions: A Strategy for Strengthening PCD in the Council .........................39 
7.1  Six proposals for structural reform...............................................................42 
7.2  Specific recommendations for improving the potential for PCD in the 
Council’s policy-making processes...............................................................46 PART II. SECTORAL FICHES AND CASE STUDIES.................................................................50 
1. Fiche on EU Trade Policy.............................................................................................51 
Case Study on EU External Trade Policy: Economic Partnership Agreements........62 
2. Fiche on EU Environment Policy................................................................................67 
3. Fiche on EU Climate Change Policy...........................................................................76 
Case Study on Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation.........87 
4. Fiche on EU Security Policy.........................................................................................91 
Case Study on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports .........................................98 
5. Fiche on EU Agricultural Policy................................................................................104 
Case Study on the Reform of the EU’s Sugar Regime................................................113 
6. Fiche on EU Fisheries Policy......................................................................................118 
Case Study of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements................................................124 
7. Fiche on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, Employment and 
Decent Work....................................................................................................................130 
8. Fiche on EU Migration Policy....................................................................................137 
Case Study on EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Human Resources 
for Health in Developing Countries.............................................................................147 
9. Fiche on EU Research Policy......................................................................................152 
10. Fiche on EU Information Society Policy.................................................................162 
11. Fiche on EU Transport Policy..................................................................................170 
12. Fiche on EU Energy Policy.......................................................................................177 
REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING..............................................................................187 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS.....................................................................197 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.  The policy-making process in Commission-led policy areas: 
The Community method of decision-making.............................................12 
Figure 2.  The policy-making process in member state-led policy areas: 
The intergovernmental method of decision-making..................................12 
Figure 3.  Overview of the Council bodies....................................................................14 
List of Tables 
Table 1.  Chronology of EU key events on PCD...........................................................8 
Table 2.  Balancing interests in the EU: Key actors in the EU institutions................9  
PREFACE 
t is widely recognised that aid alone cannot solve the problems of 
development in poor countries. Many other policy areas have an impact 
on living standards and economic opportunities, and their formulation 
and implementation therefore need to be closely coordinated. This study 
aims to contribute to the growing debate on ‘policy coherence for 
development’ (PCD), a concept elaborated upon in the European 
Commission’s April 2005 Communication on policy coherence for 
development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals – and the Council Conclusions on policy coherence for 
development of May 2005. It is intended to complement other research in 
this field. The study was carried out by CEPS with financial support 
provided by  the UK Department for International Development. CEPS 
would particularly like to thank the numerous officials and experts who 
were consulted or interviewed in the course of the study, DG Development 
of the European Commission for its cooperation, as well as members of the 
Committee on Development Cooperation (CODEV) and the informal PCD 
network. Nevertheless, the authors alone are responsible for its content. 
I would like to extend particular thanks to all those both within and 
outside CEPS who contributed to this study and made it possible. My 
appreciation goes first to Michael Kaeding of both Leiden University and 
CEPS, who efficiently coordinated the project while also contributing to the 
empirical parts of the study (i.e. the sectoral fiches) as well as the analysis 
i n  P a r t  I .  A l a n  H u d s o n  f r o m  t h e  O v erseas Development Institute (ODI) 
provided the heart of the development expertise and was the author of all 
six case studies. My CEPS colleague Louise van Schaik acted as lead author 
for the analytical and prescriptive sections in Part I and was also 
responsible for significant portions of the sectoral analyses in Part II. I 
would also like to mention the special contribution of Jorge Núñez Ferrer, 
also of CEPS, not only for his constructive comments on several versions of 
the report but also for his valuable input of key sections. Finally, this report 
would not have been possible without the additional contributions to the 
sectoral studies by several other CEPS research fellows, namely Sergio 
Carrera, Meng-Hsuan Chou, David Kernohan, Andreas Schneider, Lorna 
Schrefler and Marius Vahl.  
Christian Egenhofer 
Project Leader 
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Policy Coherence for Development 
 in the EU Council: 
 Strategies for the Way Forward 
A Special CEPS Report 
Executive Summary 
id alone cannot meet the needs of the poor in developing countries. 
The European Union is increasingly aware that many of its policies 
outside of official development assistance have a decisive impact 
on those living in third world countries. In recognition of that fact, the EU 
has made policy coherence for development (PCD) a central pillar in its 
concerted efforts to realise the UN Millennium Development Goals. 
This study focuses on the policy-making processes in the Council of 
the EU (sometimes also referred to as the Council of Ministers). Since EU 
policies are generally (co-)decided in the Council, this institution is of vital 
importance for ensuring policy coherence in general and PCD in particular. 
We analyse whether the policy-making processes in the EU Council allow 
for ‘development-related’ inputs and where these processes are found to be 
wanting, we put forth policy recommendations on how PCD could be 
strengthened. In addition, where relevant, the role of other institutions, 
notably the European Commission, is examined.  
Studies were conducted in each of the 12 thematic areas identified in 
the May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD: trade, environment, climate 
change, security, agriculture, fisheries, the social dimension of 
globalisation, employment and decent work, migration, research and 
innovation, the information society, transport and energy. For each of these 
policy areas, a ‘fiche’ has been prepared that describes in detail the EU 
policy-making process and how – if at all – development-related inputs are 
introduced into this process. An accompanying organigram diagrams the 
process and the relationship of the principal players. In addition, six in-
depth case studies were carried out in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, 
trade, climate change, migration and security. The fiches and case studies 
can be found in Part II of this report. 
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Key findings 
General observations 
1.  Policy coherence in general, and by extension, policy coherence for 
development, are easier to ensure in the policy-making processes in the 
European Commission than in the EU Council. The main reason is that 
decisions are ultimately taken by the Commission as a whole, thereby 
allowing all interests to be represented and cleared at the central level, 
i.e. the college of Commissioners, whereas decision-making in the 
Council must navigate the nine sectorally-divided ministerial 
formations and numerous subordinate bodies, where the majority of 
decisions are taken.  
2.  PCD depends on many factors, including which directorate-general 
(DG) in the European Commission assumes the lead in drafting 
proposals; which Council working party, Coreper and Council 
formation are in charge; and the extent to which the European Council, 
the EU presidency and the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) actively promote the consideration of development 
implications in the decision-making process.  
Strengthening PCD in EU policy-making processes 
A. Council of the European Union  
3.  The European Council, reinforced at times by the EU presidency, has 
played a significant role in promoting PCD. Of particular benefit to 
PCD is the fact that all ministerial Council formations can provide 
input, via the GAERC, to the preparatory groundwork for summits and 
the subsequent presidency conclusions. However, only a minority of 
issues is covered by the European Council. 
4.  Several EU presidencies have been instrumental in promoting PCD. The 
presidency chairs and sets the agenda of Council meetings and 
represents the EU Council vis-à-vis the other EU institutions and 
externally.  
5.  The study has identified the importance of single member states or 
coalitions of member states to advance the case of PCD at the EU level.  
6.  The GAERC is another important advocate for PCD, although its 
performance on PCD has been uneven. The more intensively the 
GAERC deals with policy coherence for development, the more POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| v 
CODEV (Committee on Development Cooperation), as its preparatory 
body on these matters, is obliged to concentrate on PCD matters.  
7.  Coreper is very important for PCD, given that the work of the various 
sectoral working parties for most policy files comes together in this 
body, before being channelled up to the relevant Council formations. 
Coreper is in a key position as it not only prepares the decisions for the 
Council but it also can reach agreement itself by issuing ‘A points’, 
which are adopted at the ministerial level without further discussion. 
Nevertheless, our study indicates that Coreper has yet to realise its 
potential significance for policy coherence for development. Moreover, 
the division of labour between Coreper I and Coreper II poses further 
challenges in ensuring coherence.  
B. European Commission 
8.  When non-development DGs are in the lead, it can be a challenge to 
ensure that the development implications of a proposal are properly 
understood and taken into account.  
9.  Legitimate concerns expressed by civil society, developing countries or 
other stakeholders in the course of consultations have not always been 
incorporated in the final decisions.  
10. Inter-service consultation and integrated impact assessments on policy 
proposals are two crucial tools for bringing development concerns 
forward to DG Development, but to date these have been insufficiently 
employed.  
11. Relevant cabinet members, supported by DG Development, and 
notably the Commissioner for Development, have a particular 
responsibility to promote PCD.  
12. As the guardian of the treaties, the Commission is obliged to ensure 
that policy proposals respect EU laws and policy priorities, including 
PCD. Accordingly, within Council negotiations, the European 
Commission has the ability to advance the case for PCD.   
Six proposals for structural reform  
This study outlines six concrete proposals for reinforcing PCD in the 
decision-making processes in the EU Council, as follows: 
1.  Strengthen the accountability of ministers in the Council formations, 
including their stance on PCD and how EU PCD objectives are 
incorporated in EU policy, by requiring more explicit reporting to the vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
GAERC and more independent studies on development implications of 
decisions taken. 
2.  Strengthen existing expert groups and create several new ones to focus 
on the link between a particular sectoral policy and development. These 
PCD expert groups would report to both the sector-specific working 
party and to CODEV. 
3.  Appoint independent PCD observers to take part in the meetings of the 
senior preparatory committees, where sectoral interests are found to be 
particularly salient. The PCD observers would report to CODEV and 
Coreper II, and if appropriate to the GAERC. 
4.  Require periodic and public reporting by the Council Secretariat and its 
Legal Service to Coreper and the GAERC on the progress made in 
ensuring that relevant conclusions and decisions on PCD are respected, 
notably in non-development policies.  
5.  Significantly expand the capacity in DG Development and other DGs to 
ensure that development concerns are fully taken into account and are 
made explicit in Commission proposals in such a way that is 
understandable to non-development specialists as well.  
6.  Require all decisions taken by Comitology Committees1 with external 
implications in the 12 policy areas identified in the May 2005 Council 
C o n c l u s i o n s  o n  P C D  t o  b e  r e p o r t e d  t o  D G  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( E u r o p e a n  
Commission) and the PCD expert groups.  
Specific recommendations for improving the potential for PCD 
Below we specify more specific recommendations, or courses of action for 
the Council of the EU and the European Commission. We further 
distinguish between immediate and longer-term action, acknowledging 
that the latter will require more complex structural changes.  
 
 
                                                      
1 Comitology committees oversee the implementation of EU legislation and are 
made up primarily of national officials and experts, and chaired by the European 
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For immediate action  
Council of the EU 
1.  The EU presidency should use its power for assigning files to the 
appropriate Council formation, irrespective of where the file has been 
handled in the European Commission (the study has shown that it 
matters for PCD which Council formation is responsible). 
2.  When PCD-related issues of significant political weight are at stake, the 
presidency should consider establishing a ‘Friends of the Presidency 
group’ to handle a file in a genuinely cross-cutting way.  
3.  The GAERC should better utilise its coordination role within the 
Council with regard to PCD and be actively engaged in all 12 policy 
areas listed in the Council Conclusions on PCD. It should particularly 
ensure that the bi-annual PCD Work Programme is of sufficient 
substance before adoption and ensure its implementation afterwards.  
4.  Council formations dealing with issues covered by the PCD Council 
conclusions should report periodically and publicly to the GAERC on 
how PCD has been taken into account in relevant decisions. For 
instance, these reports should coincide with GAERC discussions on the 
PCD Work Programme.  
5.  Coreper should pay more attention to PCD and ensure that the work 
between its two formations is better coordinated, for instance by 
introducing PCD as a standing concern in the Mertens and Antici 
Groups, which prepare the meetings of Coreper. 
6.  Even in cases where the senior Council preparatory committee has 
resolved most of the substantive points on a file, Coreper should still be 
in a position to review the file in the light of PCD.  
7.  Special PCD observers should be appointed to monitor the work of the 
senior preparatory committees, which have a particularly strong focus 
on sectoral interests. 
8.  PCD expert groups should be created to advise the sector-specific 
working parties and CODEV on the links between non-development 
and development policies.2 In instances where expert groups are 
                                                      
2 For example, 12 such groups could operate corresponding to the areas specified 
in the Council Conclusions. They already exist for trade (the trade and 
development expert group) and climate change (the developing countries expert 
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insufficiently involved, CODEV should report to Coreper II and if 
necessary, to the GAERC. 
9.  CODEV and DG Development should agree that the latter reports 
regularly (e.g. four times a year) to CODEV on policy proposals and on 
draft negotiating mandates in the making that are relevant for PCD.  
10. The Council Secretariat should regularly and publicly report to the 
GAERC on its efforts to ensure the coherence of Council conclusions, 
and hence their consistency with the Council conclusions on PCD and 
other GAERC conclusions on the link between policies and 
development. 
European Commission 
11. The European Commission should offer specific training courses on 
development implications to improve capacity and skills to deal with 
the development implications of policy proposals and existing EU 
legislation.  
12. Decisions of comitology committees with external implications, 
including all decisions affecting conditions for exporting to the EU’s 
internal market, should be notified to DG Development and CODEV (or 
to the newly created Expert Groups on PCD.) 
For the longer term 
Council of the EU 
13. European Council presidency conclusions should regularly reiterate the 
importance of PCD in order to give the concept sufficient political 
weight in EU decision-making. PCD should be discussed in the 
European Council at least once a year.  
14. EU presidencies should give high priority to policy coherence in 
general, and to PCD in particular. They must ensure that PCD has a 
prominent place in the multi-annual strategic programmes that are 
developed by subsequent presidencies, sponsor presidency workshops 
devoted to PCD-related topics, include PCD concerns in their external 
                                                                                                                                       
group). For some areas, the groups could be combined, for instance alongside the 
Council formations. They could all be labelled as PCD expert groups to give 
explicit visibility to their PCD function.  POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| ix 
representation activities and use their agenda-setting power to ensure 
that development implications are taken into consideration. 
15. Coalitions of member states interested in PCD should develop 
initiatives to promote PCD in EU policies. These initiatives could 
include position papers, conferences, workshops, studies and support 
of development NGOs that are active at the European level.  
16. The EU presidency should actively seek the involvement of the 
informal network on PCD to facilitate regular contact among 
development experts to discuss PCD.  
17. The GAERC should actively promote PCD during European Council 
preparations by ensuring that development implications have been 
made explicit and that those implications are taken into account in the 
deliberations.  
18. Development ministers should be enlisted to provide more weight to 
PCD via their participation in more meetings of the GAERC, notably 
when trade and other external policies with development implications 
are concerned. 
19. CODEV should devote sufficient time to PCD and actively emphasise 
the importance of PCD in dialogue with other Council bodies.  
20. The Council Secretariat should give special attention to improving 
awareness and provide training for officials to deal with issues that cut 
across two or more sectors, such as PCD.  
21. Regular rotation of staff in the Council Secretariat should also be 
motivated by increasing awareness and understanding of policy 
coherence, including policy coherence for development. 
22. As accountability and stakeholder involvement can be expected to 
increase with scrutiny by the European Parliament, areas that are 
currently not subject to co-decision, such as agriculture and fisheries, 
should become so. 
European Commission 
23. DG Development in the European Commission should provide 
sufficient resources to monitor policy developments in non-
development DGs and to strengthen input in development-relevant 
files where DG development is not in the lead.   
24. DG Development should pay particular attention to ensure that there 
are a sufficient number of officials with adequate skills and authority 
responsible for monitoring policy developments in non-development x | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
DGs and to participate in inter-service consultation and impact 
assessments. 
25. DG Development should be more assertive in promoting the interests 
of PCD during the inter-service consultation, and not shy away from 
blocking proposals that ignore the development side. Such 
assertiveness is important to raise the awareness of PCD within all 
levels of the Commission.  
26. DG Development should consider the Commission’s Legal Service as 
an ally on PCD, in the context of its responsibility to verify the 
consistency of new proposals with existing EU legislation and the EU 
treaties. 
27. DG Development should strive to make development aspects and 
possible impacts of all development-relevant policies more explicit in 
Commission proposals, and to do this in such a way that it is 
understandable to non-specialists as well. 
28. The European Commission should also consider strengthening the 
capacity of non-development DGs to ensure that policy coherence and 
by extension PCD is taken into account. Capacity and awareness will 
depend on the number, seniority and skill level of the officials tasked 
with policy coherence or PCD. 
29. The Commission should incorporate development criteria in the 
Extended Impact Assessments of development-relevant policy 
proposals, as well as in other policy impact assessments and 
evaluations. DG Development should establish such criteria in close 
cooperation with other DGs. 
30. The Commissioner for Development, supported by his or her cabinet 
and DG Development, should emphasise the development aspects of 
proposals where DG Development has not been in the lead, as these 
impacts are not always considered automatically by other 
Commissioners.  
31. The Commission should promote PCD in a more pro-active manner in 
EU Council negotiations. 
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PART I. MAIN REPORT 
1.  Introduction 
Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
developing countries is not only determined by development cooperation 
policies, which tend to be centred on official development assistance 
(ODA), but also by policies implemented in other areas, such as agriculture, 
trade and migration. Initiatives in these latter fields can have a profound 
impact on living standards in poor countries, but they often work at cross-
purposes. In recognition of this fact, the European Union, the governments 
of its member states and a number of international institutions, such as the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), have 
affirmed ‘policy coherence for development’ (PCD) as an important 
principle for achieving more effective development cooperation.  
Initial work in this area has mainly concentrated on ensuring 
consistency across policies within one single country (intra-governmental 
coherence) or on efforts in one particular area by a number of different 
countries (inter-governmental coherence). Hardly any attention has been 
paid to ‘multilateral’ coherence for development, especially at the EU level 
and in the EU Council in particular.  
In 2005, the EU and its member states provided 53% of all official 
international development assistance.1 Aside from the magnitude of its 
assistance to poor countries, there are other reasons why the EU, and 
notably the EU level of governance, is important for policy coherence for 
development. Many of the policies affecting development objectives are 
developed, formulated and finally decided at EU level. The provisions of 
the EC Treaty are directly applicable in all member states, and Community 
law takes precedence over national law. Moreover, the EU is an important 
                                                      
1 The share of the EU 15 member states, all of which are also OECD members, is 
$55.7 billion. In addition, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have reported a 
total of $470 million in ODA to the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC). With total ODA figures in 2005 of $106.5 billion, this brings the EU’s share 
to about 53% (see http://www.oecd.org/ document/40/0,2340,en_2649_34485_ 
36418344_1_1_1_1,00.html).  2 | MAIN REPORT 
player internationally, both for development cooperation and for its role in 
international fora, e.g. in the WTO or climate change negotiations.  
This project breaks new ground as it investigates how policy-making 
processes in the EU Council influence PCD. Since EU policies are generally 
(co-)decided in the Council, this institution can play an important role in 
ensuring policy coherence in general and PCD in particular. In addition, 
where appropriate, the influence of notably the European Commission is 
taken into account as it initiates most policies decided upon in the Council 
and is an important participant in its meetings. The study also 
acknowledges the importance of the European Parliament and the member 
states, but as these institutions were outside the terms of reference, we only 
refer to other literature or specific examples of the contribution of these 
actors to PCD efforts.  
The objective of this study is to examine whether policy-making 
processes in non-development policy areas accommodate ‘development-
related’ inputs, thereby ensuring that these policies in these areas do not 
undermine development objectives. The aim is to identify concrete ways to 
enhance PCD. The analysis concentrates on 12 thematic areas identified in 
the May 2005 Council Conclusions on policy coherence for development: 
trade, environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social 
dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, migration, 
research and innovation, information society, transport and energy.  
This study presents a ‘fiche’ for each of these 12 policy areas, 
describing in detail the EU policy-making process and how – if at all – 
development-related inputs are introduced into this process. In addition, 
in-depth case studies provide further analysis of specific policy-making 
processes in six of the 12 policy areas: agriculture, fisheries, trade, climate 
change, migration and security. The geographical focus of the case studies 
is sub-Saharan Africa, where over 40% of the population is still living 
below the poverty line and whose share of world trade diminished from 
4% in 1987 to less than 2% in 2001 (OECD, 2003: 2). The information 
contained in both the fiches and the case studies is drawn from a review of 
the literature; face-to-face and telephone interviews with representatives 
from the member states participating in the EU Council bodies, Council 
Secretariat staff members and European Commission officials; as well as 
consultations with the ‘informal PCD network’, an informal forum to share POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 3 
 
ideas and analysis on PCD.2 The fiches and case studies can be found in 
Part II of this study. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: section 2 
outlines the main studies and international initiatives undertaken on policy 
coherence for development and section 3 sets out the principal EU 
initiatives taken so far. Section 4 discusses how interests, including 
development interests, are balanced in the EU institutions and introduces 
the analytical distinction between Commission-led and member state-led 
policies. Section 5 analyses decision-making processes in the Council and 
the European Commission. Section 6 subsequently identifies key drivers for 
change, and section 7 concludes with a strategy for improving PCD and 
recommendations. 
2.  The Context of Policy Coherence for Development  
Interest in PCD has grown since the mid-1990s, notably as a result of 
globalisation and the expansion of the development agenda. Alongside 
traditional objectives, such as promoting economic development and 
meeting basic social needs, other goals relating to governance, democracy, 
respect for human rights, gender equality and environmental sustainability 
became part of development cooperation. In 2000, the United Nations 
agreed on a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at 
alleviating poverty, illiteracy, hunger, discrimination against women, 
unsafe drinking water and a degraded environment, among others.3 
Subsequently, the Doha Development Agenda for trade launched in 
November 2001, the Monterrey Consensus on development financing 
established in March 2002 and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development held in August 2002 provided additional initiatives for 
                                                      
2 Established in 2003, the informal PCD network is open to all EU member states 
and the Commission. It is not intended to provide a parallel structure to the 
Council’s Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) nor does it have 
any formal decision-making power. 
3 The eight MDGs are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal 
primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce the 
mortality rate of children; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global 
partnership for development.   4 | MAIN REPORT 
dialogue and renewed impetus to achieve policy coherence for 
development. 
The OECD has been especially concerned with PCD. Its Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), which includes most EU member states4 and 
the European Community, has held donor countries responsible for 
ensuring a systematic promotion of mutually-reinforcing policy actions 
across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards 
achieving development objectives. The DAC Guidelines on Poverty 
Reduction state that “we should aim for nothing less than to assure that the 
entire range of relevant industrialized country policies are consistent with 
and do not undermine development objectives” (OECD, 2001: 90). These 
guidelines also contain a detailed section entitled “Towards Policy 
Coherence for Poverty Reduction”.  
In 2003, the OECD published a policy brief, which signalled a 
renewed effort to improve policy coherence for development in OECD 
countries. In 2005, it collected several OECD governments’ experiences in 
enhancing policy coherence for poverty reduction (OECD, 2005a) and 
launched a new publication series, called ‘The Development Dimension’, 
which analyses the development aspects of non-development policies 
ranging from macroeconomic policy to migration (OECD, 2005b-h).  
Within the EU, several member states have also undertaken special 
efforts: the UK published two White Papers on Eliminating World Poverty 
(DFID, 1997 & 2000); the Netherlands focused on ‘de-
compartmentalisation’ to create synergies within and across all parts of the 
government; and a German ministerial regulation aimed at ensuring the 
systematic examination of all new legislation for its coherence with 
development policy. 
  Three other studies are worth mentioning. Ashoff’s (2005) study 
Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development: Justification, Recognition and 
Approaches to Achievement, commissioned by the German Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, should be seen as a complement 
to the OECD 2005 report. It considers the justification for, the recognition 
and scope of and the limits to the goal of enhancing policy coherence for 
development. It focuses exclusively on national experiences in selected EU 
member states (the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). Ashoff 
                                                      
4 All EU15 member states belong to the DAC, but it does not include the 10 new 
member states that joined in 2004.  POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 5 
 
argues that PCD is a complex management task that is subject to 
constraints (e.g. a shortage of staff in ministries). He underlines the 
importance of political will and leadership, arguing that progress towards 
PCD depends to a considerable extent on the political weight and the 
commitment of the members of cabinet responsible for development 
cooperation. The study calls explicitly for increased international 
cooperation on the issue of PCD, for instance in the context of the G-8, the 
UN, the OECD as well as the EU Council.  
A study by Hoebink (2005), entitled “The Coherence of EU Policies: 
Perspectives from the North and the South”, focuses on the effects of 
existing EU policies, in particular in two countries, Morocco and Senegal. It 
discusses in detail the concept of policy coherence for development and the 
policies most related to it and suggests inter alia that the European 
Commission should pay more attention to PCD in the next generation of 
Country Strategy papers it produces.5 
Yet another study on PCD was carried out by the European Centre 
for Development Policy Management and the Instituto Complutense de 
Estudios Internacionales (ECDPM & ICEI, 2005), entitled EU mechanisms 
that promote policy coherence for development. While it devotes a chapter to the 
European institutions along with others about the member state’s efforts in 
policy coherence, it tries to reduce complexity by collapsing the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament into one 
unitary actor. Such treatment does not fully capture the reality that the 
three European institutions have different legislative and executive powers 
and that the institutional balance between them differs from one policy 
field to another, depending on the extent of EU competencies and the 
decision-making procedure that applies.  
The ECDPM is currently carrying out a follow-up study analysing in 
more detail specific mechanisms to promote policy coherence at the 
member state level. Sponsored by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the study is part of an evaluation process conducted by the Heads of 
External Assistance Evaluation Services of the EU member states and is one 
                                                      
5 The study was part of the European Union’s Poverty Reduction Effectiveness 
Programme (PREP). For further information, visit the website http://www.ec-
prep.org. 6 | MAIN REPORT 
of the six joint studies monitored by this group. The study is due to be 
completed in the second half of 2006. 
3.  A Brief History of PCD in the EU 
In early 1990s, development policy was incorporated in the EU Treaty at 
Maastricht in 1992, which entered into force in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty 
introduced the principles of coherence, coordination and complementarity 
(the ‘3 Cs’) as the basis for the Treaty’s application (Hoebink, 1999). In 
particular, Art. 178 of the EC Treaty stipulates that “the Community shall 
take account of the objectives referred to in Art. 177 (on development 
cooperation) in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries”.  
In 2003, the Netherlands took the initiative to establish a PCD 
network. In 2005 – in the light of the mid-term review of the MDGs – PCD 
was firmly established on the EU agenda. On 12 April 2005, the 
Commission adopted three Communications on the MDGs, one of which 
focused entirely on PCD.6 With this Communication, the Commission 
made an important step forward as it looked beyond the borders of 
development cooperation centred on ODA. The Communication identifies 
policy areas where there is a large potential to achieve synergies among 
various development policy objectives. For each of these policy areas the 
Communication proposed ‘PCD Commitments’ and a series of specific 
actions intended to contribute to accelerating progress towards the MDGs.  
On 24 May 2005, the EU Council in its General Affairs and External 
Relations formation, after a long and intensive debate, followed the 
Commission’s new development approach and adopted ground-breaking 
Council Conclusions on policy coherence for development.7 The 
Conclusions stipulated that the “Council will assess existing internal 
procedures, mechanisms and instruments to strengthen the effective 
                                                      
6 The other parts of the package aimed at accelerating progress towards the MDGs 
by increasing the volume and effectiveness of the development aid provided by the 
European Commission and member states and by making more explicit the focus 
on the Least Developing Countries in Africa.  
7 It decided to focus on three main issues in EU development cooperation: 1) 
increasing the quantity and quality of development finance, 2) strengthening 
policy coherence for development and associating non-aid policies with the MDG 
agenda and 3) expending extra efforts in support of Africa.  POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 7 
 
integration of development concerns in its decision-making procedures on 
non-development policies”. The Ministers in particular agreed 12 policy 
areas needing particular attention in terms of PCD, recognising the 
importance of non-development policies for assisting developing countries 
in achieving the MDGs. The policy-making process in these areas are 
analysed in Part II of this study.  
In December 2005, the Council, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament jointly adopted the so-called ‘European Consensus on 
Development’ (OJ 2006/C46/01), which was subsequently discussed by the 
European Council, i.e. at the level of heads of state or government. The 
document reflects the EU’s willingness to make a decisive contribution to 
the eradication of poverty in the world in general, and advancing policy 
coherence for development in particular. For the first time, a common 
vision and set of objectives, values and principles for all EU development 
work were provided, which centred on the achievement of the MDGs. A 
particular emphasis was placed on the need for coherence among external 
EU policies that affect developing countries. In the ‘Consensus document’, 
PCD is defined as “... ensuring that the EU takes account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely 
to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives” (see paragraph 9). 
Last but not least, on 16 April 2006, the Council invited member 
states and the Commission to prepare a Work Programme 2006-07 for 
Policy Coherence for Development. The Work Programme is to set out 
steps to be taken by the Commission, the member states and the Council’s 
Working Party on Development (CODEV). This study aims at contributing 
to ongoing discussions in CODEV and the informal PCD network on the 
P C D  W o r k  P r o g r a m m e  a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h o s e  f o c u s i n g  o n  C o u n c i l  
procedures,8 as well as to future discussions on PCD, such as in relation to 
the first PCD biennial report, due in 2007.  
                                                      
8 This issue was mentioned in the May 2005 Council Conclusions as cited above 
and repeated in the April 2006 Council Conclusions that called for a review and 
improvement of “the Council’s decision-making processes to ensure effective 
integration of development concerns in EU decisions in full compliance with 
existing competence and procedures, after preparation by Coreper”, as a priority 
for action on PCD.  8 | MAIN REPORT 
Table 1. Chronology of EU key events on PCD 
Year Key  events 
1993  Maastricht Treaty enters into force and establishes an explicit 
treaty basis for policy coherence for development 
2000  Member states adopt the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) 
2003  Establishment of informal network of policy coherence for 
development 
2005 (April)  Commission  Communications on accelerating progress 
towards attaining the MDGs, including a Communication on 
PCD 
2005 (May)  Council Conclusions on PCD adopted by the GAERC 
2005 (December)  EU Consensus on Development adopted by European Council, 
Commission and European Parliament 
2006 (March)  Commission  staff  working paper on PCD work programme 
2006-07 
2006  (April)  Council Conclusions on PCD Work Programme 2006-07 
adopted by the GAERC 
 
4.  Analysing EU Policy-Making and PCD in 12 Policy Areas 
The EC Treaty requires EU policies to be consistent (Art. 3). As with all 
advanced governance structures, however, EU policy-making cannot be 
done by one omniscient entity. In order to grasp the complexity of policy 
problems, to set policy objectives, to consider solutions and instruments 
and to ensure the democratic legitimacy of policy-making, an elaborate 
division of labour is necessary. In the EU we can find a complex system of 
governance based on the principal institutions (i.e. the Council, the 
Commission and the European Parliament) in which various sector-specific 
bodies represent different interests (e.g. Council formations, directorates 
general and committees). This has led to a compartmentalisation of policy-
making and policy decisions and hence risks undermining policy coherence 
(Peterson, 2001: 302).  
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Table 2. Balancing interests in the EU: Key actors in the EU institutions  
  Primary interest focus 
  Sector-specific General  Development 
European 
Commission 
Sector DG  Secretariat General & 
other DGs  
DG Development 
& DG AIDCO 
 Portfolio 
Commissioner  
Commission President 
and other 
Commissioners 
(gathering in the 
College of 
Commissioners) 
Commissioners for 
Development and 
Humanitarian Aid 
 Cabinet  member 
of portfolio 
Commissioner  
Cabinet members of 
Commissioners  
Cabinet member 
responsible for 
development 
cooperation 
 Sector-specific 
interest groups, 
comitology 
committees and 
advisory bodies  
Other interest groups 
that are being consulted 
(e.g. consumer 
associations, labour 
unions, NGOs)  
Actors being 
consulted focusing 
on development 
issues (e.g. 
development 
NGOs) 
European 
Parliament 
Lead Committee   Other committees, 
rapporteur, shadow 
rapporteurs, political 
groups when balancing 
interests 
Development 
Committee 
EU Council  Sectoral Council 
formations 
GAERC 
European Council 
GAERC 
  Coreper I or II 
(sometimes by-
passed) 
 Coreper  II 
 Specific  Working 
Party 
 CODEV 
 MS  representative 
responsible for 
dealing with the 
issue at stake 
Colleagues from other 
ministries 
Colleagues from 
the development 
sector 
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From a legal, societal and efficiency point of view, however, it is 
undesirable for policies to contradict one another. Governance structures 
therefore generally foresee a number of administrative mechanisms 
intended to work towards coherence. In addition, inviting the participation 
of a plurality of actors should ensure that key aspects will not be 
completely overlooked. In general, there is a mix of actors who pursue 
either ‘sector-specific’ or ‘general’ interests. It is furthermore expected that 
ultimately interests are balanced and prioritised in the final decisions taken 
by democratically-chosen politicians who bear the responsibility and can be 
held accountable by the electorate.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the key actors in each of the three 
major EU institutions, depending upon whether sector-specific policy, 
general or development interests are at stake. There are mechanisms in 
place to ensure that the interests of all these actors are taken into 
consideration in the decision-making process. At the Commission level, 
these include the inter-service consultation, which is intended to ensure the 
involvement of all relevant DGs in policy proposals, the impact 
assessments being made and the vote by simple majority taken in the 
College of Commissioners on all policy proposals (see also section 5). In the 
European Parliament, the most important mechanism to balance interests is 
the vote in plenary, as well as the reports made by committees that are not 
in the lead on a particular dossier. In the EU Council, as will be further 
elaborated upon in section 7, mechanisms are less developed, as it is 
argued that coordination of interests should take place ‘at home’, i.e. they 
are to be incorporated in the national position that member state 
representatives bring to the Council meetings.  
4.1  Commission-led vs member state-led policies 
For analytical purposes, one can distinguish between ‘Commission-led 
policies’ and ‘member state-led policies’. The difference between the two is 
that the European Commission plays a more important role in the former 
in shaping policy and by extension ensuring coherence, whereas in the 
latter the EU member states in the Council and notably the EU presidency 
have a more prominent role in steering policies.  
In general where there is an EC competence, policies are 
Commission-led (i.e. the pillar 1 policies). In many areas, however, the EC’s 
competence is not exclusive, meaning that EU policies are complemented 
by policies at the national level or only exist to the extent that they are 
allowed by member states. Examples are environmental policy, where 
competences are shared, or research, social and employment policy, where POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 11 
 
the EC only has a complementary competence.9 It should also be noted that 
external action in areas where the EU does not have an exclusive 
competence is usually member-state led.10 
Many policies in the areas we have analysed for this study can be 
coined ‘Commission-led’, as they are initiated by the Commission and are 
otherwise strongly influenced by activities in the Commission (comitology, 
monitoring enforcement, etc.). This is particularly the case for the areas of 
trade, agriculture and fisheries where the European Community has an 
exclusive competence. Also in the areas of environment, climate change, 
transport, energy (in so far as it is linked to the internal market), 
information society, research, employment and social policy and migration, 
many policies are initiated by the Commission, although national policies 
also exist in these areas and external action is usually member-state led.11 
Security policy is clearly dominated by the member states. Although 
the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, with its supporting policy unit, plays an increasingly important role 
on CFSP issues, its role is not comparable to that of a supranational entity 
like the European Commission. Another area that is member state-led is 
Justice and Home Affairs, but here some issues, including migration, have 
been transferred to the Community pillar and hence have become 
Commission-led. Generally speaking, the Community method of decision-
making is used for Commission-led policies (see Figure 1), while the 
intergovernmental method of decision-making applies to member state-led 
policies (see Figure 2).  
                                                      
9 We do not analyse the use of the open method of coordination as used in the field 
of research and social and employment policy. For a specific analysis of how this 
method contributes to PCD, please see the relevant fiches.  
10 In areas where competences are shared between the European Community and 
the member states, it is up to the member states to decide whether to grant the 
Commission the authority to represent them. Usually they do not grant this 
authority to the Commission and decide that the EU presidency is to represent 
them as well as the European Community (see Eeckhout, 2004 and Dutzler, 2002). 
For further details on the reach of the Commission’s activities, please see the fiches 
and the case studies. 
11 Ibid.  12 | MAIN REPORT 
Figure 1. The policy-making process in Commission-led policy areas: 
The Community method of decision-making 
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Figure 2. The policy-making process in member state-led policy areas: 
The intergovernmental method of decision-making 
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5.  Strengthening PCD in the EU Council 
The input of EU member states to the Council bodies is intended to reflect a 
coordinated national position, thereby ensuring policy coherence. Research 
indicates, however, that in reality sectoral interests dominate in many of 
the sector-specific Council formations (e.g. Environment, Agriculture and 
Fisheries) and notably in the subordinate bodies where allegedly most of 
the decisions are actually being taken (it is estimated that 70% of the issues POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 13 
 
are solved at the WP level and 15% at the Coreper level, leaving only 15% 
for the Ministerial level).12 
For instance, Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace (2006: 44) argue that in the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Councils, Ministers seem to have more in 
common with each other, in spite of national differences, than with their 
colleagues in national cabinets, with whom they compete for resources and 
priority. The common orientation appears to be even stronger at the lower 
levels where specialists prepare decision-making or consider 
implementation measures in comitology13 committees (Beyers & Trondall, 
2004, Puetter, 2004, Dehousse, 2003 and Egeberg et al., 2003). Moreover, 
studies have pointed to the dominance of issue networks surrounding EU 
decision-makers, composed of specialists and interest groups, which 
reinforce sectoral interests (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999, Kohler-Koch & 
Eising, 1999, Daugbjerg, 1999 and Richardson, 2000), sometimes to the 
detriment of coherence.  
A number of mechanisms are in place to ensure policy coherence in 
the various Council formations. The principal formation is the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which coordinates the 
work in other Council formations. Cross-cutting topics, especially of high 
political significance such as the Lisbon agenda, security or long-term 
climate change strategy, are often guided by the European Council. In 
addition, the rotating EU presidency maintains oversight of the business 
dealt with in the Council. All files pass through Coreper, with the aim of 
attaining a balance of interests, although its oversight role is undermined 
by its division into two entities: Coreper I and Coreper II.14 In addition, 
Coreper as a whole may lack sufficient detailed knowledge to ensure PCD.  
                                                      
12 See Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace (2006) for a comprehensive overview on the EU 
Council of Ministers. 
13 It is disputed whether comitology committees fall within the remit of the 
Commission (as it chairs them) or the Council (since the committees are installed 
by Council decisions and composed of member states’ representatives). 
14 Coreper I consists of the deputy permanent representatives and covers most of 
the files related to the EU’s internal market. Coreper II consists of the permanent 
representatives and covers the more politically sensitive issues, such as foreign 
policy, finance, etc. (see also Figure 3 and the organigrams in the fiches in Part II).  
Figure 3. Overview of the Council bodies  
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It is furthermore possible to bring together sectoral interests by 
organising combined Council working party (WP) meetings, but there is a 
risk that the meetings would become unmanageable. It is already difficult 
to reach agreement just among sectoral specialists. Joint meetings would 
add substantially to the number of people present at Council meetings and 
might lead to situations where two or more officials from one member state 
bring forward different positions. This would contradict the character of 
the Council as the EU institution where the interests of member state 
governments are to be represented. That being said, a so-called ‘Friends of 
the Presidency Group’1 has recently been established for the review of the 
Sustainable Development Strategy in which member states were asked to 
send delegations comprising a variety of sectoral specialists. Since the 
Friends of the Presidency group is seldom used and studied, it is difficult to 
draw conclusions on its actual and potential contribution to policy 
coherence.  
Since the Council structure is composed of several levels (see Figure 
3) we distinguish in our analysis between various layers: the European 
Council, the rotating EU presidency, the various Council formations 
existing at the ministerial level, Coreper, the senior committees, the 
working parties and the Council Secretariat. An analysis is also made of the 
European Commission, both of its internal policy-making processes and of 
its role in the Council, as well as of the comitology committees. 
5.1  The European Council matters 
In recent years, the European Council has become increasingly important in 
providing direction and brokering trade-offs on major issues. Although its 
formal and informal summits and decisions are for the most part not 
legally binding – its so-called ‘Presidency Conclusions’ have considerable 
political weight for EU developments.  
In the various fiches, we have seen that the European Council, 
reinforced at times by the EU presidency, has played a significant role in 
promoting PCD. For example, it played an important role in ensuring a 
comprehensive approach to migration, climate change, energy and 
                                                      
1 Formed at the initiative of the EU presidency, such groups aim to tackle specific 
policy issues that are difficult to address within existing preparatory bodies. Its 
membership is also determined by the presidency, hence the name. POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 17 
 
sustainable development (see the relevant fiches and case studies). The 
European Council furthermore emphasised the importance it attaches to 
PCD by explicitly acknowledging the European Consensus on 
Development.  
The European Council is particularly influential in setting the policy 
framework with regard to the CFSP, as it agrees the Common Strategies 
(the instruments used to pursue foreign policy aspirations). In undertaking 
this task, development concerns are taken into account in connection with 
discussions on countries with which the EU has extensive development 
cooperation ties, e.g. Africa (see the fiche on EU security policy).  
Since PCD is a cross-cutting issue and since non-development EU 
policies can at times have significant impact on developing countries, it 
would seem a relevant topic for the European Council to discuss 
periodically.  
5.2  The EU presidency as an important source of leadership 
The EU presidency can be an important source of leadership in the EU, and 
member states see their turn at the helm as a chance to leave their imprint 
on the EU agenda. The presidency chairs and sets the agenda of the Council 
meetings and represents the Council vis-à-vis other EU institutions and 
externally. Since it oversees the work in the Council, it takes the final 
decision of which Council formation deals with an issue and is therefore for 
instance in a position to establish high-level working parties (HLWPs). 
Although working on the basis of the well-established norm of neutrality, 
presidencies have been known to steer negotiations away from their worst 
alternative towards their preferred outcome (Tallberg, 2004). Various recent 
presidencies have given the issue of PCD due attention. Finland, which 
holds the helm in the second half of 2006, in particular has emphasised the 
importance it attaches to PCD.  
Setting the agenda provides the presidency with considerable power 
to promote PCD. In line with the 2004-06 multi-annual strategic 
programme for the six forthcoming presidencies, it was the Irish and Dutch 
Presidencies, for example, that pushed for the Action Plan to mainstream 
climate change into the EU’s programme of development cooperation (see 
the case study on climate change). The Dutch (2004) and Austrian (2006) 
Presidencies were successful in placing the energy-development interface 
on the agenda by organising presidency conferences (see the fiche on 18 | MAIN REPORT 
energy). Another example was the Dutch Presidency Conference on "Brain 
Drain, the Loss of the Skills and Knowledge of Well-Trained People who 
Migrate to the Western World". The conference concluded that sub-Saharan 
Africa would be particularly vulnerable to losing its educated citizens to 
the Western world and argued for the establishment of a targeted 
cooperation programme (see fiche on EU research policy and migration 
case study on the crisis in human resources for health in developing 
countries). A reference to the conclusions of the conference was made in the 
Council Conclusions. The migration fiche provides another example where 
presidencies were crucial with regard to the importance attached to 
development concerns. Whereas the Spanish Presidency in 2002 focused 
mostly on restricting migration, the Greek Presidency in 2003 emphasised 
the potential role of migration as a tool to achieve development goals. 
Presidencies can furthermore establish formal or informal groups to 
monitor specific topics or ask existing Council bodies to pay extra attention 
to an issue. The High-Level Working Group on Immigration and Asylum, 
for example, was asked by the UK Presidency to draft a set of conclusions 
regarding migration and external relations in general and policy coherence 
for development in particular (see migration fiche). These conclusions were 
adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 21 
November 2005, with an eye to the Commission’s Communication on a 
Policy Plan on Legal Migration.  
The UK Presidency (2005) established the so-called ‘Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) Expert Group’, consisting of representatives 
from member states, DGs Trade and Development and chaired by the 
European Commission. In addition, it established an informal EPA 
network of EU development and trade officials to facilitate informal 
dialogue and to closely coordinate action among the EU member states. 
Furthermore, the EPAs were discussed at the first meeting of EU directors-
general of trade and development chaired by the Commission, and at the 
informal meeting of EU development ministers during the UK Presidency 
in 2005. The sharper focus on development that resulted from these 
initiatives led, for example, to the European Commission’s Communication 
on Trade and Development Aspects of the EPA Negotiations published in 
November 2005, as well as in the EU-Africa strategic partnership agreed at 
the European Council in December 2005 (see case study on trade). Since 
then, member states have agreed with the Commission that they will jointly 
work to coordinate the bilateral and multilateral development assistance 
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With regard to the Sustainable Development Strategy, the Austrian 
Presidency had asked all Council formations to answer questions in 
preparation for the June European Council and some Council formations 
were asked to respond to specific questions. Moreover, it established a 
‘Friends of the Presidency Group’ to prepare the meeting at the Council 
Working Party level (see below). In this group, environment and 
development interests have been represented among others (see the 
environment fiche).  
Furthermore, the EU presidency exercises a key role in many 
international negotiations where it is the EU’s main representative, usually 
in the context of the ‘troika’.2 For instance, the presidency is in the lead in 
most environmental negotiations, except for those that are clearly trade-
related or of a bilateral nature, in which case the Commission takes the 
lead. In the negotiations, the EU presidency negotiates on behalf of the EU 
member states and the European Community on the basis of a mandate 
from Council meetings or ‘EU coordination’3 taking place at the 
international negotiations.  
It is important to mention that it is usually the EU presidency that 
drafts the initial version of the negotiating mandate for the negotiations at 
which it is the Union’s main representative. This strongly influences how 
the topic is framed and whether development aspects are incorporated 
from the start. Since this drafting is not subject for instance to an inter-
service type of process, which is done by the Commission on its draft 
negotiating mandates, there is a risk that development aspects are not 
sufficiently integrated. On the other hand, as the officials in charge usually 
have little experience with drafting positions for international negotiations, 
                                                      
2 Only in fields where the European Community has an exclusive competence does 
the Commission negotiate on behalf of the EU (e.g. in trade negotiations). In other 
areas, it is up to the EU member states to decide whether to grant the Commission 
authority to represent the EU. They often decide not to mandate this authority, 
thereby leaving the EU presidency the task of handling external representation. 
Many court cases have been fought over whether the EC has exclusive competence 
(Eeckhout, 2004). 
3 In the course of negotiating international agreements, it is common practice for 
EU representatives to sit together on a daily basis to coordinate a common 
position. In fact, these can be considered Council meetings on location. 20 | MAIN REPORT 
they tend to seek advice from foreign ministries and notably the Council 
Secretariat (which is responsible for ensuring coherence of all activities of 
the Council, as elaborated below). In preparing the fiches and case studies, 
we encountered no instance where a presidency flagrantly ignored 
development aspects when leading EU negotiations. On the other hand, 
some concern was expressed by observers that insufficient attention was 
being paid by the Commission to development implications, but this might 
have to do with the issues it covers being more susceptible to development 
interests (e.g. trade, agriculture).  
5.3  Ensuring coherence at the ministerial formations 
The Council of the European Union, meaning the 9 formations in which the 
Ministers participate, is formally responsible for all decision-making (in 
many cases together with the European Parliament). Therefore the EU 
Council is often referred to as the ‘Council of Ministers’. Which Council 
formation deals with a file influences to a large extent how the issue is 
discussed and which aspects are prioritised. Hence, the ministerial level 
and its structure need to be taken into account when discussing coherence 
and PCD.  
Following successive reforms in 1999 and 2002, the number of 
formations has been scaled back from 21 to nine. The Council of 
Development Ministers, for example, was absorbed by the GAERC. In 
order to keep the agendas manageable, however, some Council 
configurations meet in sub-configurations (e.g. only transport ministers 
meet when transport issues are discussed in the Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy Council). This contradicts the aim of the 
reform, which was to curb the sector-specific focus in the Council.  
The GAERC configuration is particularly important for PCD because 
of its coordinating role. It has been argued that the GAERC has lost some of 
its coordinating powers in the last decade, due to the increased time it 
spends on EU external relations (see Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). In 
carrying out research for some of the fiches, however, we have seen 
substantial contributions by the GAERC. For example, in the areas of 
climate change, energy and trade, there were Council Conclusions that 
explicitly addressed development cooperation. Involvement of the GAERC 
formation furthermore justifies involvement by CODEV since it prepares 
PCD files for the GAERC. In general, from a PCD perspective, it seems 
beneficial that the GAERC both looks at external relations and 
development, and coordinates Council activities.  POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 21 
 
The GAERC is also important because it is the primary body that 
prepares the meetings of the European Council. The preparation of 
European Council meetings provides opportunities for the GAERC to 
ensure the incorporation of the development perspective in presidency 
conclusions. Sustainable development and climate change strategies are 
two areas where the GAERC is clearly involved in a substantive way. 
Another Council configuration that influences cross-cutting policies is 
the Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) Council. Our research found 
some instances where ECOFIN was marginally involved with regard to 
compensation measures being paid to developing countries (see in 
particular the case studies on sugar and the fisheries partnership 
agreements). A conclusion was that when financing decisions are taken at 
fora where development interests are poorly represented (e.g. the 
Agriculture and Finance Working Party), then decisions will take little 
account of development.  
The Constitutional Treaty proposes the appointment of a Foreign 
Minister who would chair the GAERC, but it remains uncertain whether 
this treaty will ever enter into force. It is also unclear whether this official 
would eventually focus on further integration of development concerns in 
the EU’s external relations.  
5.4  Opportunities for member states and coalitions of member 
states  
The fiches and case studies indicate the importance of single member states 
or coalitions of member states in shaping PCD at the EU level of 
governance. Some member states have been strong in pursuing the PCD 
agenda even when not holding the EU presidency. A good example is the 
Netherlands, which established the informal Policy Coherence for 
Development Network in the autumn of 2003. Another example is Poland’s 
position paper on the effects of the European Partnership Agreements in 
developing countries (see case study on trade).  
Some member states can wield a de facto veto power, at least in some 
policy areas, which can undermine policy coherence and PCD. For 
example, countries with major fishing fleets (e.g. Spain and France) seem to 
exert a preponderant influence over fisheries policy. In this particular case, 
other member states seem to have been particularly concerned with the 
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fisheries policy. Similarly, security policy tends to be dominated by the 
three big member states (Germany, France and the UK) – partly as a result 
of their military capacity. When they agree on a security issue, it is highly 
unlikely that any of the other member states will oppose their proposed 
action (see security fiche). In trade, notably France and Germany exercise a 
de facto veto position (see the trade fiche).  
5.5  Coreper: Spider in the web?  
In most policy areas, the work of the various sectoral working parties 
comes together in Coreper, before being channelled up to the relevant 
Council formations. Coreper is in a key position as it can agree ‘A points’, 
which are issues on which Coreper has reached agreement and that are 
therefore usually adopted by the Council without further discussion. 
Indeed, it can easily be argued that Coreper is the best point in the Council 
system where a broad overview of the entire range of EU business exists. 
This important function for the Council and the European Council’s agenda 
offers important scope for improving PCD.  
With regard to policy coherence for development, the differentiation 
between Coreper I and Coreper II is problematic as their division of tasks 
prevents coordination. Whereas Coreper I prepares a large number of 
special Council meetings (e.g. employment, internal market, industry, 
energy, etc.), the Councils that discuss politically sensitive areas – external 
relations and notably development issues (GAERC, ECOFIN, JHA) – fall 
w i t h i n  t h e  c o m p e t e n c e  o f  C o r e p e r  I I .  T h i s  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  c o u l d  b e  
considered a missed opportunity for using existing institutional settings to 
improve policy coherence for development or at least poses the question of 
whether the two Corepers coordinate well with each other.  
In carrying out the research for the fiches and the case studies, we 
saw no evidence of Coreper emphasising the need for policy coherence, let 
alone policy coherence for development. Nor did we identify instances 
where the Mertens and the Antici Group, which coordinate the work of 
Coreper I and II respectively, played an explicit role in ensuring policy 
coherence.  
5.6  Senior Council preparatory committees and working parties: 
Doing most of the work on their own?  
To help in preparing the Council’s work, Coreper can set up preparatory 
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studies as defined and approved in advance by Coreper (Council Rules of 
Procedure, Art. 19.3.). Research indicates that there is often a considerable 
rivalry between those who sit in Coreper and those in working groups. 
Working group members, and particularly those sent from capitals, are 
generally unwilling to pass on files to Coreper out of fear that the limited 
knowledge on the part of the permanent representatives will dilute the 
quality of decision-making (Fouilleux et al., 2005). This is fuelled by a 
recurrent criticism on Permanent Representations that their diplomats ‘go 
native’ in Brussels.  
A) Senior Council preparatory committees 
Between the Coreper and working group structure, we find 12 senior 
preparatory committees for coordinating Council activities in specific fields 
(see Figure 3). Typically, they are composed of senior officials, normally 
carrying significant responsibility in their home ministry. 
The senior Council preparatory committees have no formal decision-
making powers, but as the natural forum for coordinating work, their 
influence can be considerable. If they are effective, most or all substantive 
points will have been resolved before the dossier comes to Coreper, before 
being in turn submitted to the Council, with little or no need for Coreper 
subsequently to reopen discussion (as illustrated in the fiche on the social 
dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work). 
The Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), which covers both 
agriculture and fisheries, has even obtained the right to directly submit ‘A 
points’ to the Agriculture and Fisheries (Agfish) Council on most of the 
topics under its remit. Although Coreper’s involvement is still required on 
politically sensitive and budgetary issues, many decisions with key 
implications for the agricultural sector in developing countries are taken 
without its involvement (see the agriculture fiche and the case study on 
reform of the EU’s sugar regime). Hence, Coreper’s horizontal overview of 
issues in the field of agriculture is eroded. 
The same holds true for the Political and Security Committee (PSC). 
The PSC is the main preparatory body on security issues in the Council. 
Formally, the PSC reports to Coreper II, but in practice, Coreper II has 
allowed security issues to be handled in the Council by the PSC. Coreper II 
becomes involved only when financial issues are at stake (see the security 
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independent power than for example the SCA. Whereas many important 
dossiers discussed in the SCA are passed on to the Agfish Council because 
no agreement could be found, most security issues are agreed upon in the 
PSC and do not even go on to the GAERC (see the security fiche). 
Moreover, the Article 133 Committee4 at times seems to have an 
independent life of its own. At international trade negotiations, it sidelines 
Coreper, as the negotiating mandate is adjusted in the course the 
negotiations without the involvement by Coreper. In comparison to other 
senior committees, the European Commission’s role is more pronounced in 
the Article 133 Committee, meaning DG Trade.  
B) Council Working Parties 
It is estimated that around 250 working parties are in place to prepare the 
work of the Council (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). Some working 
groups are permanent, while others are ad hoc and disappear after tackling 
a specific question. Their relative autonomy – illustrated by the estimation 
that they solve some 70% of all Council work without further discussion at 
Coreper or the ministerial level – jeopardises coherent coordination among 
the policy areas (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). The frequency of 
meetings varies from one working group to another. Some meet only once 
or twice a month, e.g. the climate change formation of the WP International 
Environment Issues (IEI), whereas others meet up to four times a month, 
e.g. the environment and information society working groups.  
There is by no means a standing operating procedure for the 
interaction between CODEV and the other working groups covering non-
development policy areas. There is little evidence of contact, for example, 
between CODEV and the Working Party on Sugar and Iso-glucose. In the 
sugar case study, the former focused on the accompanying measures, and 
the latter on the nature of the EU’s internal reform, two strongly related 
issues, but little coordination took place between them. CODEV is also not 
an integral participant in core trade policy debates (see the trade fiche). 
Although CODEV and the ACP WP attended the meetings on the EPAs 
(Economic Partnership Agreements) of the Article 133 Committee in May 
                                                      
4 Named after the article in the EC Treaty covering trade policy, the Article 133 
Committee is a special advisory body of the Council. See the fiche on trade policy I 
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2005, they only played a limited role (see case study on the EPAs). It is also 
very rare for officials from development agencies to attend meetings of 
COARM (Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Experts), and the 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has reportedly not been discussed 
within CODEV (see the security case study). 
On the other hand, CODEV was officially in the lead on the Climate 
Change Action Plan as it was the expert group the GAERC had envisaged 
(in its December 2003 Council Conclusions) to further discuss this 
document (see case study). The International Environmental Issues WP and 
particularly its subordinate Developing Countries expert group, given their 
expertise, were asked by CODEV to take care of most of the preparatory 
discussions on the Action Plan. This feature of the process, i.e. involving 
working parties from development and non-development streams, is 
particularly noteworthy and provides a significant contrast to, for instance, 
the case study on fisheries.  
In energy, too, CODEV has been involved with regard to the Council 
Conclusions on ‘integrating energy interventions into development 
cooperation’ that were adopted by the GAERC on 10 April 2006 (see the 
fiche on energy).  
The ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group has largely been dormant, but it 
can be brought to life whenever the presidency needs help with a specific 
issue. The group, whose membership is agreed upon by the EU presidency, 
was started during the Portuguese Presidency in the spring of 2000, in the 
context of food safety. In 2004, the Dutch Presidency established a Friends 
of the Presidency group on the question of the start of accession 
negotiations with Turkey. It appointed a number of special representatives 
(‘Friends of the Dutch presidency’) to convince certain member states to 
reach agreement (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006).  
Recently the Austrian presidency established a ‘Friends of the 
Presidency’ group to prepare the June 2006 European Council discussion 
on the EU’s renewed ‘Sustainable Development Strategy’ (see the 
environment fiche). It was particularly important that the group 
represented a broad set of interests, including environmental and 
development concerns, among many others. Its character has furthermore 
been quite different from for instance the Friends of the Presidency group 
the Dutch had established, in that all member states were participating and 
in a position to identify their delegates. 26 | MAIN REPORT 
5.7  Council Secretariat: The neutral assistant?  
The secretariat underpins the entire Council hierarchy. Its tasks include 
being a negotiations ‘manager’, a political counsellor to the presidency, a 
‘good offices’ mediator and a political secretariat for the Secretary-
General/High Representative, as well as assuming an executive role in 
planning and organising military and civilian crisis-management 
operations. According to the Council’s Rules of Procedure (Art. 23.3), the 
Secretariat is responsible for “organising, coordinating and ensuring 
coherence of the Council’s work” (emphasis added). 
A particular role of the Council Secretariat is to provide support to 
the EU presidency in conducting the rotating term. It tracks the preferences 
and negotiating positions of all member states, provides information about 
EU decision-making procedures and the formal instruments available to 
the presidency, and is a source of expertise on the content of dossiers under 
negotiation (Tallberg, 2004). The importance of the Council Secretariat for 
each presidency varies significantly, however, depending on the 
presidency itself. While some actively seek such suggestions, other 
presidencies prefer to manage the agenda with less assistance from the 
Secretariat.  
The Council Secretariat is expected to act in a politically neutral way 
in order to gain the confidence of the EU member states. It is therefore 
particularly unusual for Council Secretariat staff to emphasise a specific 
viewpoint, such as arguing for a more explicit integration of development 
concerns into a policy. Nevertheless, the Council Secretariat can play a role 
for example by ensuring that the Council Conclusions on PCD, are taken 
into account in relevant decisions.  
In the field of the CFSP, the Council Secretariat has a special role as 
its Secretary-General is the High Representative for the CFSP. While major 
policy initiatives from the Secretariat meet with criticism, the Secretariat 
has become increasingly influential through a series of smaller more 
modest initiatives (see the security fiche). This is reflected in the 
considerable decline in the number of proposals submitted by the member 
states, as they prefer to influence the eventual decision through informal 
contacts with the Council Secretariat (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 341). 
Nevertheless, the Council Secretariat is far from being a supranational 
entity for CFSP in the way that the European Commission is in other areas, 
as it has limited capacity, resources and competences. This reduces the 
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5.8  A brief analysis of PCD in the European Commission 
The Commission exerts a strong influence on EU policies and it is therefore 
important that development concerns are taken into account in its policy 
activities, for example when drafting policy proposals, setting technical 
standards or monitoring implementation. As the guardian of the treaties, 
the Commission is also supposed to take due account of policy coherence, 
both with regard to its internal policy-making processes as well as with 
regard to its position in the EU Council. Inside the Commission the prime 
responsibility for PCD resides with DG Development, which drew 
attention to the issue in particular by drafting the Commission’s 2005 
Communication on Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating 
progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals.  
The extent to which the Commission incorporates development 
concerns in its policy formulations has varied over the years. For example, 
the implications for third world countries of EU agricultural, trade and 
fisheries policies have tended in the past to be neglected (see the relevant 
fiches), but this is no surprise, as these were not political priorities at the 
time they were drafted. Changes have occurred, however, as a result of the 
increasing evidence of EU policies impacting on developing countries, a 
deeper understanding of the impact of the EU on world markets, the 
ensuing pressures from civil society and increased demands by developing 
countries in international negotiations. These factors have increased the 
awareness among EU policy-makers and the officials of the European 
Commission. 
The implications for development of other EU policies such as 
information society, transport, energy (for the internal market), research 
and the social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, 
have been less considered. Although one should acknowledge that the 
Commission’s draft proposals in these fields may appear on the surface to 
have a marginal effect on reaching the MDGs,5 they have been identified as 
                                                      
5 Since we did not ‘measure’ the impact of policies in terms of their contribution to 
development, we cannot draw a firm conclusion here, but several of the experts 
whom we interviewed indicated that they did not really see a problem in the 
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relevant policy areas in the Council Conclusions on PCD. The fiches also 
show that there are interfaces with development objectives.6  
Below we briefly outline some of the factors that have been decisive 
for PCD in the European Commission.7 
Choice of lead DG when drafting policy proposals. An important – 
although not surprising – finding in the fiches is that it matters whether a 
non-development DG or DG Development is in the lead for a development-
relevant policy proposal.8 In the circumstance where the non-development 
DG was in the lead, coordination with DG Development has often been 
insufficient, including with regard to the impact assessments and during 
the inter-service consultation. Examples where DG Development was not 
in the lead are trade (DG Trade on the EPAs), fisheries (DG Fisheries on 
FPAs), migration (DG Justice, Freedom and Security on a Communication 
covering the relationship between migration and development) and 
research (DG research still working on the INCO Communication whereas 
FP 7 is already on the table). The reform of the EU’s sugar regime is a case 
where DGs settled for a division of labour: DG Agriculture has been in the 
lead with regard to the proposal to lower subsidies for EU producers and 
DG Development has been in the lead with regard to the compensation 
measures for countries currently profiting from preferential access to the 
EU’s sugar market. The case study illustrates that insufficient 
communication and coordination between the two DGs have been 
detrimental to PCD. In other areas, where DG Development has been in the 
lead under the theme of ‘development first’, e.g. on the Communication on 
Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation and the 
Communication on the EU Energy Initiative, development implications 
have been better integrated (see the climate change and energy fiches).  
The choice of lead DG is furthermore important as it implicitly guides 
the assignment of which Council formation and Working Party will 
                                                      
6 For example, in the field of research, scant attention has been given to problems 
of brain drain and research capacity in the Commission’s proposal for the 7th 
Framework Programme for Research (FP 7), particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (see 
the fiche on research as well as the case study on migration). 
7 Since the fiches and case studies focused mainly on the Council, only tentative 
findings can be drawn from the analysis. 
8 In some cases, the lead of either the sector DG or DG Development could be 
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subsequently deal with the policy proposal, although formally this decision 
is in the hands of the presidency. We have found only one example – 
migration – where a file was assigned to CODEV and the GAERC, while 
not being prepared by DG Development. In all other cases, files were 
assigned to the sector-specific Council formations and Working Party. 
As could be expected, in the circumstances where DG Development 
was in the lead, as shown by the climate change case study, more attention 
was given to the development perspective from the start. However, having 
DG Development in the lead might not be acceptable on all files with a 
development aspect and therefore one could also envisage having officials 
in other DGs monitor whether development implications are taken into 
account. This is already done to ensure that economic and environmental 
implications are taken into account in Commission activities and proposals. 
Moreover, in most DGs, there are already officials responsible for 
developing country issues (e.g. in DG Agriculture) or international 
relations, whose remit is to defend development concerns. Nevertheless, as 
the fiches have shown, their impact is limited, due possibly to their not 
having sufficient authority or numbers within their DG or simply not being 
sufficiently aggressive.  
Early consultation with member states and other stakeholders. The fiches 
demonstrate that various DGs are actively engaged in consultation rounds 
with civil society, business as well as with member states when drafting 
policy initiatives. In some cases, the Commission has also engaged in 
consultations with developing countries. However, the fiches show little 
evidence that legitimate – even if debatable – concerns by developing 
countries or development interest groups, including NGOs, expressed in 
consultation rounds (e.g. sugar reform or fisheries agreements), have been 
sufficiently taken into account by the lead DG in charge. A notable 
exception has been migration (see case study on the brain drain in the 
health sector), which illustrates the successful attempt by a member state, 
in this case the UK, to integrate development concerns into a policy 
proposal by the Commission. Council Working Parties and individual 
representatives from member states seem to plead actively with the 
Commission to take certain issues into account. This confirms other studies 
(e.g. Peterson, 2001) that emphasise that the Commission’s power of 
initiative is in reality diluted by member states, when they attempt to 
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A particular area for initiative by member states or interest groups – 
through formal or informal processes – could be advocacy for new 
Commission proposals, pushing the integration of development and non-
development policies further. Examples we identified were research 
projects in least-developed countries similar to the European and 
Developing Country Trials Partnership (EDCTP) project (see fiche on 
research policy) or Communications covering the little-explored 
relationship between development and transport, information society or 
the social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work. The 
inclusion of these areas in the Council Conclusions on PCD has been a first 
step to increase awareness. Further awareness and understanding of the 
relationship between non-development policies and development 
objectives could be expected by either DG Development prioritising the 
analysis of development aspects of non-development policies, or 
alternatively, other DGs appointing (additional) development liaison 
officers.  
Inter-service consultation on policy proposals. Policy proposals drafted 
by a DG are subject to consultation with other DGs. The process is 
described in the Commission’s rules of procedure.9 The procedure varies 
depending on the nature, scope and urgency of the proposal and is 
relatively flexible to work with. In practice, standing formal and informal 
consultation groups are in place in many areas to ensure coordination 
between the Commission’s services. For example, in the EPA case study, a 
more or less fixed group was identified that looked after the EPA 
negotiations (see the trade case study). For development-related topics, 
usually the officials covering international issues participate in inter-service 
consultation meetings.  
It is relevant to mention here that the Legal Service has a special 
position as it checks consistency with other legislation and with the treaties, 
and is also always present in the meetings of the College of Commissioners 
to explain its legal opinion on a proposal. In some cases, it has not shied 
away from blocking proposals in the inter-service consultation.  
Several of the fiches and notably the case studies (see the examples 
above) suggest that DG Development has played a limited role during the 
inter-service consultation on issues affecting developing countries. It could 
be the case that it was not invited, but the impression was that DG 
                                                      
9 OJ L 308/26 of 8 December 2000. POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 31 
 
Development did not actively pursue its mandate. This is a missed 
opportunity as DG Development’s active involvement in inter-service 
consultations is crucial for PCD.  
It could, for example, (threaten to) block a policy proposal by 
suspending the procedure or by giving a negative opinion when it 
considers that the development aspects have been ignored. Such a negative 
opinion could still be ignored by the College of Commissioners and 
generally, threatening to block a proposal is considered rather exceptional. 
Nevertheless, a more assertive DG Development in cases where 
development interests are at stake would give a strong signal that the 
development aspects of non-development policies are to be taken seriously. 
A more assertive DG Development would almost certainly raise awareness 
on PCD as a whole, impacting far beyond the political level of the 
Commission. 
In addition, it would be important to make development aspects and 
possible impacts on developing countries more explicit in Commission 
proposals, and to do so in a way that is understandable to non-specialists as 
well (particularly with regard to technical files, such as those on food 
standards, fishery stocks, etc.). In order to achieve this, sufficient capacity 
in DG Development to monitor and participate in inter-service 
consultations (i.e. by staff with sufficient skills to master the technical files) 
would be needed. A potential ally for a more critical position in the inter-
service consultation would be the Legal Service, which is bound to ensure 
that EU actions adhere to EU laws and decisions.  
For urgent issues, a ‘fast track’ inter-service procedure is sometimes 
used, where consultation is done at the level of Commissioners and their 
cabinets (by-passing the inter-service consultation). On these, the lead DG 
has a strong influence, as it decides which DGs to consult and the timing of 
the inter-service consultation. However, neglecting an associated DG or 
forgetting to invite a DG can cause the procedure to encounter major 
problems and de facto can block the preparation of the proposal. One 
should also note that this procedure applies only to a minority of proposals 
and from a PCD perspective, should be avoided as much as possible.  
Integrated impact assessments of policy proposals. When considering 
major new policy initiatives, the Commission is mandated to obtain an ex 
post evaluation of the existing policy. Simultaneously and in the run-up to 
the inter-service consultation, the lead DG undertakes an ex ante impact 
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evaluation of the existing situation is often still going on while the new 
proposal has already been drafted, thereby undermining the impact 
assessment tool.  
Recent analyses of the impact assessment process indicate that the 
external dimension of proposals is insufficiently taken into account, if at all 
(Renda, 2006; Opoku & Jordan, 2004). For example, the sustainable 
development aspect of proposals is assessed mainly on the basis of 
environmental criteria and less so on the implications for the economic 
development of developing countries. Several fiches and case studies 
revealed a perception that DG Development is not actively engaged in the 
impact assessment process. Among the potential reasons were that impact 
assessments were not considered a priority or were seen as too difficult to 
follow (i.e. too technical), or that DG Development suffers from a lack of 
resources.  
Such a lack of resources may partly explain why, according to Renda 
(2006), DG Development also underperforms when it comes to making 
extended impact assessments on its own proposals. In any event, several 
activities of the Commission fall outside the scope of the impact assessment 
process. For example, the trade fiche points out that the negotiating 
directives for trade negotiations are only subject to impact assessment after 
they have been tabled, thereby limiting the role of impact assessments in 
changing a proposal. The fisheries fiche suggests that impact assessments, 
which in theory should analyse alternative policy options to select the most 
suitable one, in reality are drafted to support the Commission’s preferred 
course of action. This characteristic of the impact assessment, justifying 
preferred options, was also highlighted by Renda (2006) as one of the main 
constraints to better policy-making. 
Although not strictly belonging to the Commission’s impact 
assessment procedure, the fisheries case study and fiche also highlight the 
importance of having proper policy impact analyses. Since assessments on 
available fish stocks were often of poor quality, it became difficult to 
determine the level of financial compensation offered to the developing 
countries whose fish stocks were depleted by fishing fleets of EU member 
states. 
Approval of Policy Proposals in the College of Commissioners. Commission 
proposals have to be approved by a simple majority in the College of 
Commissioners, which includes the Commissioner responsible for 
Development. In carrying out their assessments of proposals, 
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cabinets has not been examined in the fiches, it is evident from a PCD 
perspective that it would be beneficial if cabinet members responsible for 
development paid attention to non-development policies with indirect 
implications for developing countries. This task is certainly a challenge 
given the limited size of the cabinets, but it could be facilitated if DG 
Development monitored and assessed policy proposals in greater detail. 
Also, the Commissioner for Development and the cabinet should agitate for 
sufficient attention to the development perspective in relevant proposals.  
The Commission in the EU Council. Once a proposal has reached the 
Council, the Commission is involved in the negotiations and is in charge of 
introducing amendments. In that way, the Commission can ensure that the 
draft laws are in line with the EU policy stance on development. The fiches 
and case studies, however, do not provide examples where Commission 
officials participating in Council bodies have emphasised the importance of 
development concerns when member states argued for amendments 
diluting the development focus (e.g. the increased income support level for 
EU sugar producers or the stance on agricultural subsidies in the WTO 
negotiations). On the contrary, we have seen several instances where 
individual member states have pressed the Commission to take account of 
development concerns (see also the previous section on the Council).  
The role of comitology and expert groups chaired by the Commission in 
framing and monitoring policies. In areas such as agriculture, fisheries, 
environment, transport, information society and the social dimension of 
globalisation, employment and decent work, the fiches illustrate the 
influential role of technical committees and expert groups chaired by the 
Commission in shaping the implications of EU directives and regulations. 
Often these groups are the first places where problems with 
implementation of current directives arise and they can therefore be an 
important informal catalyst for policy change. The problem with the 
committees is their primary focus on the technical issue without being able 
to place it in a broader policy context, let alone to examine the implications 
for developing countries. Hence it can happen that a technical committee 
decides on stricter sanitary and phytosanitary standards (e.g. traceability 
obligations) for the EU’s internal market (and presses them at the level of 
the WTO), without realising the implications for producers in developing 
countries already having difficulties with fulfilling existing standards for 
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6.  Drivers for Change 
We have seen in the previous sections that numerous opportunities for 
enhancing PCD exist both in the Council and the Commission. The analysis 
and findings contained in the fiches and the case studies also demonstrate, 
however, that these opportunities are not always used and that dedicated 
structures or actors to monitor PCD still need to be set up or assigned.  
This section discusses drivers for change that could be mobilised to 
ensure implementation of these or other recommendations, ideas and 
insights for strengthening the PCD focus in EU policy-making. We identify 
the following categories of drivers derived from DFID (2003): i) political 
will, commitment and leadership; ii) strategies; iii) institutional capacity; iv) 
awareness and institutional culture and v) accountability.  
6.1  Political will, commitment, leadership 
Leadership provides the overall direction and has the capacity to manage 
change. The analysis reveals that leadership on PCD can be and has been 
undertaken at various levels and by different actors. It can only be 
successfully exercised when backed by overall political will and 
commitment at the highest political level.  
To strengthen the importance attached to PCD in EU policy-making 
processes, support by the European Council is crucial, as it represents the 
highest political level. Thus far, we have seen positive contributions by the 
European Council on the issue of PCD, which could be strengthened, for 
instance by discussing PCD periodically and keeping PCD in mind in 
discussions on the areas mentioned in the Council Conclusions on PCD. A 
second key actor is the presidency, which can (and has) initiate(d) numerous 
formal and informal initiatives to strengthen PCD. A third actor is the 
GAERC. By combining its insights on external relations and development 
with its function of coordinating the business of other Council formations, 
it can contribute much to increasing the awareness of development 
concerns. A fourth actor is the European Commission and in particular DG 
Development.  The Commission can prioritise development concerns in 
relevant proposals and can initiate new policy activities on the relationship 
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6.2  Strategies 
A strategy calls for clarity of vision. It generally consists of a formal mission 
statement and a set of goals, as well as a plan of action for achieving the 
necessary changes to meet those goals.  
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  P C D ,  w e  s e e  v a r i ous well-defined strategies that 
outline the problem and call for action (most of them are relatively recent). 
They include the MDG focus on policy coherence, the priority attached to 
PCD in the European Consensus on Development, the Council Conclusions 
on PCD and the Work Programme that is now under discussion. The 
quality of the latter initiative will be crucial as it will set out the areas for 
further action on PCD.  
In non-development policy areas, we have found different degrees to 
which the relationship with development has been examined. In many 
instances, this relationship has not been framed properly and remains 
sketchy and ad hoc in nature.10 A certain level of understanding, however, 
is essential for being able to identify strategies to improve PCD. Moreover, 
having a clear strategy in place is crucial in order to establish leadership, or 
to provide sufficient institutional capacity and resources. Even in areas 
where the relationship with development cooperation is better defined,11 
there is still not always a comprehensive strategy in place. There is a need 
to increase the understanding of the link between development cooperation 
objectives and the policy areas covered in the Council Conclusions on PCD 
by the European Commission, the various Council bodies, the EU 
presidency and if appropriate the Council Secretariat. This could be 
achieved in several ways, for example, by organising training programmes 
for EU civil servants, or Presidency- or Commission-sponsored workshops 
or by issuing new Commission Communications. 
6.3  Institutional capacity  
Institutional capacity and resources define clear lines of 
accountability/responsibility, i.e. the number of management levels in an 
                                                      
10 Examples include transport, information society, research and social and 
employment policy. 
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organisation, coordination mechanisms, key decision-making, 
communication and control relationships, but also the number of officials 
involved. The issue includes having sufficient skills and knowledge to deal 
with the content of the policy.  
The number of staff members is crucial as well as their authority 
within their organisation and the magnitude of resources placed at their 
disposal. We have seen several instances where capacity seemed 
insufficient, e.g. lack of awareness, late involvement of development 
specialists, inadequate handling of Commission inter-service consultation 
or impact assessments. There is also a question whether the GAERC 
Council devotes enough time and resources to investigate the link between 
development cooperation objectives and non-development policies. 
Discussions on PCD automatically involve CODEV. The informal network 
on PCD could help by providing more input into CODEV, but questions 
remain as to its status and role in driving change in politically sensitive 
areas.  
It requires considerable expertise to cover the relationship between 
development and (the 12) other policy areas. Significant technical 
knowledge is required in order to identify the development component 
(e.g. the impacts of technical agricultural decisions on developing country 
producers), let alone to ensure PCD. Having specialists with the right skills 
is therefore essential when attempting to improve the quality of a proposal 
or an impact assessment. This requires devoting more effort to improving 
the skills of officials at all levels in the Commission, member states 
(including the permanent representation staff) and in the Council 
Secretariat. An analogous programme was recently instituted by the 
European Commission as part of its administrative reform, aimed at 
upgrading the skills of officials at all levels. The system could incorporate 
training for officials on the development implications of EU actions. The 
issues of training and mutual learning could be further investigated in 
studies focusing on improving coordination on PCD at the member state 
level.  
Generally speaking, civil service systems in which officials rotate 
regularly between various DGs and between different ministries are more 
likely to produce better policy coherence. Civil servants who have spent 
time in a variety of DGs can be expected to have a better perception of the 
perspectives of other policy fields. One could also think about exchange 
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from different member states could learn from each others’ knowledge and 
experiences.  
6.4  Awareness and organisational culture 
Organisational culture encompasses the covert and overt rules, values, 
customs and principles that guide the behaviour of the members of an 
organisation. The introduction of consultative/participatory processes in 
the organisation may support or hinder reform by changing this culture. 
Formal and informal consultation procedures shape EU policy-
making within the Council framework. Expert groups or informal 
networks, for example, are created to set the agenda, prepare initiatives and 
build consensus and support. Setting up an expert group can be used as a 
means to invite relevant interests early in the policy-making process to 
conduct a kind of (pre-) negotiation, and hence could be an efficient tool to 
integrate development concerns into policy-making at an early stage.  
A recurring theme in the fiches and case studies is that it is not 
considered appropriate to follow too closely the business of other Council 
formations or working parties. For policy coherence, including PCD, 
however, such sensitivities are not very constructive. Another issue was 
that development specialists tend to devote most of their attention to aid-
related topics, such as compensation measures. This at times seems to have 
distracted attention from the actual policies and proposed policy changes 
that invoke the need for these compensation measures.  
Transparency and access of interest groups and developing country 
representatives to documents and policy-makers might also increase the 
awareness of development aspects in the policy-making process. EU 
actions and policies are still to a large extent non-transparent, if only 
because the governance structure is relatively sophisticated and complex. 
Transparency is difficult to decree by regulation, however, and therefore 
depends heavily on political leadership.  
6.5  Accountability 
Development issues do not directly affect the lives of EU citizens, but many 
are concerned about the poor in this world, as indicated by the results of 
several Eurobarometer surveys and membership enrolment in 
development NGOs. The EU itself also tends to emphasise the importance 38 | MAIN REPORT 
of normative issues in international affairs, including sustainable 
development, poverty reduction and human rights (Manners, 2002; 
Emerson, 2005).  
In practice, however, it appears rather difficult to ensure that the EU 
does what it promises and to ensure, for example, that the viewpoints of 
developing countries are taken into account in internal EU decisions with 
external implications. In general the role of national parliaments as political 
watchdogs, often catalysed by critical reports in the media, is important.  
It is often difficult, however, for parliamentarians to follow what their 
ministers do in Brussels, although in recent years some measures have been 
made to improve the transparency of the Council’s activities (Hayes-
Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). There are also significant differences with 
regard to the extent to which parliaments can control their ministers (Lord, 
2005). It might be interesting to investigate these differences in further 
detail in the context of ensuring PCD at the member state level.  
The European Parliament wields considerable influence on policies 
that are decided by co-decision. Indeed in the relevant areas, the 
Presidency and Council Secretariat devote much of their time in 
consultation with the EP on files that are handled under the rules of co-
decision (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). Nevertheless, there are still 
issues with relevance for PCD (e.g. agriculture, external action) where co-
decision does not apply. Although the EP can still exert some influence in 
these fields through its resolutions, this does not compensate for the lack of 
co-decision powers. Although granting more power to parliaments is no 
guarantee for increased PCD, their involvement would allow political 
choices to be made in a more transparent and accountable way.  
In order to ensure that development concerns remain on the radar 
screen of parliamentarians, it is important to keep them well-informed. 
Information could be provided directly by development specialists from 
the Commission, the member states, independent experts, NGOs and the 
media. Their argumentation would be strengthened when based on 
independent and authoritative reports and evaluations. For instance, the 
Work Programme on PCD (and its successors) could become the subject of 
an external evaluation.  
Implementation and evaluation are keys to accountability. We know 
that member states do not always fully implement policies decided upon in 
the EU into national legislation or do not fully enforce them. When 
implementing EU policies, the PCD aspects should not be neglected by the 
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caught by their fishermen in foreign waters). Also PCD actions decided 
upon in the Work Programme might be an issue to follow closely in the 
future. Implementation of relevant EU legislation is a particular issue that 
would deserve attention when analysing PCD at the national level.  
With regard to accountability vis-à-vis the individual citizens of 
developing countries, it is difficult to make improvements as they by 
definition are excluded from the democratic decision-making processes in 
the EU. Nevertheless, there is longstanding tradition of consultation with 
the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, notably through a Joint 
Council of Ministers, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly. The ACP also maintains a secretariat in Brussels 
to service the relationship on a day-to-day basis. The ACP countries are 
furthermore involved in the administration of the European Development 
Fund (EDF). Such consultation efforts are important since they stimulate 
coherence with national development priorities, improve the quality of 
argumentation used by development specialists and could increase the 
support for and feasibility of implementing measures that are in the EU’s 
interest (e.g. the establishment of higher food safety or environmental 
standards). 
7.  Conclusions: A Strategy for Strengthening PCD in the 
Council 
The main objective of this study has been to examine whether policy-
making processes in the EU Council on non-development policies 
sufficiently allow for ‘development-related’ inputs in order to ensure policy 
coherence with EU development objectives, i.e. to ensure at a minimum 
that domestic EU policies do not undermine development objectives. In 
addition, the study has looked at the policy-making processes in the 
European Commission in its role of initiating and defending most of the 
policies being discussed in the Council.  
It is important to keep in mind that the powers of the Commission 
and the Council vary depending upon the policy area, as a result of varying 
Community competencies and decision-making procedures. Generally 
speaking, achieving coherence in the Commission is similar to achieving 
coherence in a nation state (intra-governmental coherence), whereas 
achieving coherence in the Council requires bringing in line the efforts of 
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coherence in the Council depends to a large extent on the coordination of 
national inputs in the decision-making system. Nevertheless, there are also 
many ways to strengthen policy coherence for development at the Council 
level.  
This study has reviewed the multiple layers of the EU Council 
structure in a broad and non-legal sense, including the European Council, 
the rotating EU presidency, the ministerial formations, Coreper, the senior 
committees, the working parties and the Council Secretariat. We also 
analysed, to a lesser extent, the Commission and its comitology 
committees. 
By and large, the European Council, reinforced at times by the EU 
presidency, has played a significant role in promoting PCD. Of particular 
benefit to PCD is the fact that in the preparation of summits, all Council 
formations through the GAERC and their own conclusions can provide 
input to the groundwork and the subsequent presidency conclusions. 
However, only a minority of issues are covered by the European Council. 
Since PCD is a cross-cutting issue in the external relations of the EU, the 
European Council could consider discussing it as a full agenda item more 
often in the future, for instance once every year or every other year. 
The presidency chairs and sets the agenda of the Council meetings, and 
represents the Council vis-à-vis other EU institutions and externally. In 
particular, the functions of setting the agenda gives the presidency 
considerable power to promote PCD. Presidencies can also establish formal 
or informal groups to monitor specific topics or ask existing Council bodies 
to pay extra attention to an issue. It is important for presidencies to pay 
sufficient attention to PCD in international negotiations.  
In addition, the study has identified the importance of efforts by 
single member states or coalitions of member states to ensure policy 
coherence for development at the EU level. It is important for member 
states to continue to pursue the PCD agenda when they are not in the 
presidency, for instance by emphasising development implications in 
relevant decisions, publishing position papers, commissioning independent 
studies or organising conferences or workshops.  
GAERC’s performance on PCD has been uneven, which calls for 
exploring ways to ensure GAERC’s involvement in PCD in a more 
systematic way. The more intensively the GAERC deals with policy 
coherence for development, the more CODEV as its preparatory body on 
these matters, would be able to concentrate on PCD matters. In a more 
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development is warranted, when it is coordinating Council activities. 
Development ministers could provide more weight to PCD by participating 
in more meetings of the GAERC, notably when trade or another external 
issue with implications for developing countries is discussed.  
Coreper is very important for PCD: as for most policy files, the work 
of the various sectoral working parties comes together in Coreper, before 
being channelled up to the relevant Council formations. Coreper is in a key 
position as it not only prepares the decisions for the ministers but it also 
can reach agreement itself by issuing ‘A points’. In order to achieve greater 
policy coherence for development, more attention needs to be paid to the 
issue and more information needs to be received on development aspects 
of files and disseminated, particularly to Coreper I as it normally does not 
follow development issues. In this respect, it is of crucial importance that 
Coreper receives adequate information by the Council preparatory bodies, 
i.e. the Senior Committees and Working Parties. Among the six structural 
reforms we propose below, two are aimed (see nos. 2 and 3) at increasing 
the information Coreper receives from the preparatory bodies. 
Furthermore, it is important that Coreper does not hesitate to reopen files 
when there are indications that development concerns have not been 
sufficiently taken into account.  
The study has identified five crucial areas affecting policy coherence 
in the European Commission.  
1.  Choice of the lead DG in charge of drafting policy proposals. In the 
circumstances when non-development DGs have been in the lead, 
coordination with DG Development has generally been poor.  
2.  The importance of early consultation with member states and with 
stakeholders. The study demonstrates that the various DGs are actively 
engaged in consultation with civil society, business as well as with 
member states when drafting policy initiatives and in some cases with 
representatives of developing countries. We found little evidence that 
concerns expressed by the latter or development NGOs have been 
sufficiently taken into account by the lead DG in charge. Improvements 
are needed to ensure that the views of all legitimate stakeholders are 
taken into consideration. 
3.  Inter-service consultation and integrated impact assessments on policy 
proposals. In theory, DG Development is consulted on any policy 
proposal that might have implications for developing countries and is 
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proposals. This study has found that DG Development underperforms 
in this area and recommends that DG Development should strengthen 
its efforts to ensure that the development aspect and possible impacts 
on developing countries become more explicit in Commission 
proposals, and that these impacts are expressed in terms that are 
understandable to non-specialists as well.  
4.  Approval of policy proposals in the College of Commissioners. Commission 
proposals have to be approved by a simple majority in the College of 
Commissioners, which includes the commissioner responsible for 
development. The commissioner for development therefore needs to be 
a strong advocate for PCD. As commissioners rely heavily on their 
cabinets, it would be beneficial for cabinet members responsible for 
development to pay close attention to non-aid policies that have 
indirect implications for developing countries. This could be facilitated 
by DG Development monitoring and assessing policy proposals in 
greater detail.  
5.  The Commission in the EU Council. Once a policy proposal is in the 
Council, the Commission is involved in the negotiations, notably by 
introducing amendments. Therefore the Commission has a special 
responsibility to ensure that its policy initiatives stay in line with the 
EU policy stance on development, but this has rarely happened. 
Accordingly, there is a need for the Commission to more actively 
promote PCD during Council negotiations. 
7.1  Six proposals for structural reform 
1.  Strengthen accountability in the Council of Ministers  
A first proposal is to strengthen the accountability of what ministers do in 
the Council formations, including their stance on PCD and how EU PCD 
objectives are incorporated. Accountability in the EU is strengthened by the 
involvement of the European Parliament and transparency requirements. 
While the European Parliament plays a strong role under co-decision, 
many files that are important for PCD (agriculture and external relations) 
are exempted from this procedure. Hence, the European Parliament’s 
leverage is limited. Greater transparency and media involvement would 
also be beneficial for PCD. Although changes in these areas are subject to 
the overall discussion on institutional reform and therefore cannot be 
expected to be influenced in a significant way by PCD concerns, PCD is an 
important example illustrating the need for greater accountability. The POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 43 
 
accountability of ministers on PCD could be strengthened further by asking 
Council formations to periodically and publicly report to the GAERC on 
development implications of decisions taken, for instance linked to 
discussions in the GAERC on the PCD Work Programme. Independent 
studies could also be carried out to monitor the ‘PCD-degree’ of decisions 
taken in the areas mentioned in the PCD Council Conclusions. 
2.  Create and strengthen PCD expert groups  
Although it is important for development concerns to be taken into account 
in the Council’s preparatory bodies, the highly segmented character of the 
senior committee and working party level strengthens the sector-specific 
focus. In general, the higher the seniority of the participants of these bodies 
and the closer they are to their national ministries, the more sectoral 
interests prevail – to the detriment of PCD. Groups could be asked to make 
development aspects more explicit before a file goes to Coreper or to 
involve Coreper II if they find it necessary. Such a system would be hard to 
enforce, however. An alternative arrangement would be to allow CODEV 
to supplement the work of other working parties when it comes to 
development issues. The drawback to such a solution is that it would 
elevate CODEV into a ‘super working party’, which could arouse the 
suspicion of other working parties and interests, aside from the question of 
whether such a move would be politically acceptable. Therefore this study 
proposes the strengthening of existing expert groups and the creation of 
separate new ones focusing on the link between a policy area and 
development. Such expert groups would always need to be involved in 
policy files containing provisions with implications for developing 
countries. The expert group’s role would be to advise the sector-specific 
working party and CODEV or to answer questions from them, for example 
as the expert group on trade and development does today. CODEV could 
subsequently report to Coreper II or the GAERC when it has the 
impression that the expert group is insufficiently involved or that its work 
is not taken into account in the decisions made in the relevant working 
party. This would also improve the accountability of the work of the 
working parties with regard to PCD.  
In practical terms, one could envisage 12 expert groups operating 
alongside the areas covered in the Council conclusions. They already exist 
for trade (the trade and development expert group, the trade, agriculture, 
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developing countries expert group). For some areas, the groups could be 
combined, for instance alongside the Council formations. The groups could 
be explicitly called PCD expert groups to give prominence to their PCD 
function. The role of the informal PCD network should be to identify 
common experiences in the work of the expert groups and to bring 
overarching PCD issues to the attention of CODEV.  
3.  Appoint PCD observers in senior preparatory committees  
Our study has found that PCD receives minimal attention in the senior 
preparatory committees. This neglect, in part, is due to the fact that some of 
these committees (e.g. the Special Committee on Agriculture – SCA) are not 
integrated into the Coreper line of reporting and also because the 
participants are of comparable seniority to those of Coreper and tend to be 
very close to their ministers. As a result, senior preparatory committees not 
only exercise a strong influence, they also tend to over-emphasise the 
prevalence of sectoral interests to the detriment of policy coherence. Our 
proposal is therefore to appoint PCD observers to take part in their 
meetings. These observers would report not only to CODEV, but as well to 
Coreper II directly and even to the GAERC when significant issues are at 
stake. To avoid sensitivities over competences, the PCD observers will need 
to have an independent status (i.e. not be linked to any of the member 
states or any of the sectoral interests). Moreover, in order to have sufficient 
leverage, they need to be of a rather senior level (e.g. former diplomats or 
politicians). At a minimum, they would need to be present in the Art. 133 
Committee, the SCA and the COPS (Comité de politique et 
sécurité/Political and Security Committee), and consideration should be 
given to installing them in the Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), the HLWG on Migration, the EU Scientific 
and Technical Research Committee (CREST) and Employment Committee.  
4.  Council Secretariat to remind of Council Conclusions on PCD 
The Council Secretariat is expected to act in politically neutral way so as to 
inspire complete confidence by the EU member states, and it would 
therefore be inappropriate for Council Secretariat staff to emphasise a 
specific viewpoint, such as a more explicit integration of development 
concerns into a policy under consideration. Nevertheless, when a file could 
have potential impact on developing countries, it is the Council 
Secretariat’s responsibility to refer to relevant Council Conclusions on PCD 
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ensure that this task receives explicit priority, we suggest that the Council 
Secretariat and its Legal Service periodically and publicly report to Coreper 
and the GAERC on efforts put in place internally to ensure that relevant 
Conclusions and Decisions on PCD are respected in all the Council’s 
activities and outputs.   
5.  Strengthen Capacity in the Commission for PCD 
Although increased attention is being paid to development issues, we have 
identified several instances where insufficient attention was given in the 
drafting stage of proposals and during the inter-service consultation and 
impact assessment processes. Therefore we propose a substantial increase 
of skilled staff to pursue PCD objectives in the European Commission, and 
in particular in DG Development. Their function would be to keep relevant 
bodies in the Council and the expert groups informed about development 
implications.  
6.  Impose a PCD assessment in comitology committees  
In many policy areas, detailed implications of EU directives and 
regulations are shaped by technical committees and expert groups chaired 
by the Commission. It is often within these groups, composed of member 
state representatives, that problems with the implementation of directives 
are first encountered and they therefore serve as an important informal 
catalyst for policy change. The problem, however, is that these committees 
primarily focus on the technical aspects of a measure without placing it in a 
broader policy context, let alone look into its implications for developing 
countries. But it can happen that a technical committee’s decision pre-
empts policies that would have been decided otherwise through co-
decision. We propose that all decisions with external implications 
(including all decisions with implications for access to the EU’s internal 
market), notably in the 12 policy areas that have been identified by the 
Council Conclusions, should be notified to DG Development (European 
Commission) and to the (newly installed) Expert Groups on PCD. To make 
such a system enforceable, any decision made in comitology committees in 
the 12 policy areas must be investigated by the European Commission for 
any possible impact on development. The subsequent written assessment 
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7.2  Specific recommendations for improving the potential for PCD 
in the Council’s policy-making processes 
Below we specify more specific recommendations, or courses of action. We 
distinguish between immediate and longer-term action, acknowledging 
that the latter will require more complex structural changes.  
For immediate action  
Council of the EU 
1.  The EU presidency should use its power for assigning files to the 
appropriate Council formation, irrespective of where the file has been 
handled in the European Commission (the study has shown that it 
matters for PCD which Council formation is responsible). 
2.  When PCD-related issues of significant political weight are at stake, the 
presidency should consider establishing a ‘Friends of the Presidency 
group’ to handle a file in a genuinely cross-cutting way.  
3.  The GAERC should better utilise its coordination role within the 
Council with regard to PCD and be actively engaged in all 12 policy 
areas listed in the Council Conclusions on PCD. It should particularly 
ensure that the bi-annual PCD Work Programme is of sufficient 
substance before adoption and ensure its implementation afterwards.  
4.  Council formations dealing with issues covered by the PCD Council 
conclusions should report periodically and publicly to the GAERC on 
how PCD has been taken into account in relevant decisions. For 
instance, these reports should coincide with GAERC discussions on the 
PCD Work Programme.  
5.  Coreper should pay more attention to PCD and ensure that the work 
between its two formations is better coordinated, for instance by 
introducing PCD as a standing concern in the Mertens and Antici 
Groups, which prepare the meetings of Coreper. 
6.  Even in cases where the senior Council preparatory committee has 
resolved most of the substantive points on a file, Coreper should still be 
in a position to review the file in the light of PCD.  
7.  Special PCD observers should be appointed to monitor the work of the 
senior preparatory committees, which have a particularly strong focus 
on sectoral interests. 
8.  PCD expert groups should be created to advise the sector-specific 
working parties and CODEV on the links between non-development POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 47 
 
and development policies.12 In instances where expert groups are 
insufficiently involved, CODEV should report to Coreper II and if 
necessary, to the GAERC. 
9.  CODEV and DG Development should agree that the latter reports 
regularly (e.g. four times a year) to CODEV on policy proposals and on 
draft negotiating mandates in the making that are relevant for PCD.  
10. The Council Secretariat should regularly and publicly report to the 
GAERC on its efforts to ensure the coherence of Council conclusions, 
and hence their consistency with the Council conclusions on PCD and 
other GAERC conclusions on the link between policies and 
development. 
European Commission 
11. The European Commission should offer specific training courses on 
development implications to improve capacity and skills to deal with 
the development implications of policy proposals and existing EU 
legislation.  
12. Decisions of comitology committees with external implications, 
including all decisions affecting conditions for exporting to the EU’s 
internal market, should be notified to DG Development and CODEV (or 
to the newly created Expert Groups on PCD.) 
For the longer term 
Council of the EU 
13. European Council presidency conclusions should regularly reiterate the 
importance of PCD in order to give the concept sufficient political 
weight in EU decision-making. PCD should be discussed in the 
European Council at least once a year.  
                                                      
12 For example, 12 such groups could operate corresponding to the areas specified 
in the Council Conclusions. They already exist for trade (the trade and 
development expert group) and climate change (the developing countries expert 
group). For some areas, the groups could be combined, for instance alongside the 
Council formations. They could all be labelled as PCD expert groups to give 
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14. EU presidencies should give high priority to policy coherence in 
general, and to PCD in particular. They must ensure that PCD has a 
prominent place in the multi-annual strategic programmes that are 
developed by subsequent presidencies, sponsor presidency workshops 
devoted to PCD-related topics, include PCD concerns in their external 
representation activities and use their agenda-setting power to ensure 
that development implications are taken into consideration. 
15. Coalitions of member states interested in PCD should develop 
initiatives to promote PCD in EU policies. These initiatives could 
include position papers, conferences, workshops, studies and support 
of development NGOs that are active at the European level.  
16. The EU presidency should actively seek the involvement of the 
informal network on PCD to facilitate regular contact among 
development experts to discuss PCD.  
17. The GAERC should actively promote PCD during European Council 
preparations by ensuring that development implications have been 
made explicit and that those implications are taken into account in the 
deliberations.  
18. Development ministers should be enlisted to provide more weight to 
PCD via their participation in more meetings of the GAERC, notably 
when trade and other external policies with development implications 
are concerned. 
19. CODEV should devote sufficient time to PCD and actively emphasise 
the importance of PCD in dialogue with other Council bodies.  
20. The Council Secretariat should give special attention to improving 
awareness and provide training for officials to deal with issues that cut 
across two or more sectors, such as PCD.  
21. Regular rotation of staff in the Council Secretariat should also be 
motivated by increasing awareness and understanding of policy 
coherence, including policy coherence for development. 
22. As accountability and stakeholder involvement can be expected to 
increase with scrutiny by the European Parliament, areas that are 
currently not subject to co-decision, such as agriculture and fisheries, 
should become so. 
European Commission 
23. DG Development in the European Commission should provide 
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development DGs and to strengthen input in development-relevant 
files where DG development is not in the lead.   
24. DG Development should pay particular attention to ensure that there 
are a sufficient number of officials with adequate skills and authority 
responsible for monitoring policy developments in non-development 
DGs and to participate in inter-service consultation and impact 
assessments. 
25. DG Development should be more assertive in promoting the interests 
of PCD during the inter-service consultation, and not shy away from 
blocking proposals that ignore the development side. Such 
assertiveness is important to raise the awareness of PCD within all 
levels of the Commission.  
26. DG Development should consider the Commission’s Legal Service as 
an ally on PCD, in the context of its responsibility to verify the 
consistency of new proposals with existing EU legislation and the EU 
treaties. 
27. DG Development should strive to make development aspects and 
possible impacts of all development-relevant policies more explicit in 
Commission proposals, and to do this in such a way that it is 
understandable to non-specialists as well. 
28. The European Commission should also consider strengthening the 
capacity of non-development DGs to ensure that policy coherence and 
by extension PCD is taken into account. Capacity and awareness will 
depend on the number, seniority and skill level of the officials tasked 
with policy coherence or PCD. 
29. The Commission should incorporate development criteria in the 
Extended Impact Assessments of development-relevant policy 
proposals, as well as in other policy impact assessments and 
evaluations. DG Development should establish such criteria in close 
cooperation with other DGs. 
30. The Commissioner for Development, supported by his or her cabinet 
and DG Development, should emphasise the development aspects of 
proposals where DG Development has not been in the lead, as these 
impacts are not always considered automatically by other 
Commissioners.  
31. The Commission should promote PCD in a more pro-active manner in 
EU Council negotiations.  
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1. Fiche on EU Trade Policy 
David Kernohan and Andreas Schneider 
1.  Origins 
The original objective of the 1957 Treaty of Rome was to create a customs 
union between the six founding members of the European Community. 
Hence from its inception, what was then called the Common Market 
became the principal actor on behalf of the member states in international 
trade policy, with the European Commission acting both as an executive 
arm but also to some extent as an originator of policy.  
At the core of the Treaty was the intention to establish a common 
commercial policy based on three principles: a common external tariff, 
common trade arrangements with third countries and the uniform 
application of trade instruments across member states. This implied the 
abolishment of all barriers to intra-Community trade and the establishment 
of a single market for goods and, gradually, services. 
While this internal trade dimension constitutes perhaps the single 
most successful achievement of the European Community, this 
contribution is primarily concerned with the elaboration and formulation 
of external trade policy.  
The new supranational entity was given a legal personality with the 
authority to elaborate, negotiate and enforce all aspects of trade relations 
with the rest of the world. The European Community received thereby an 
exclusive competence to deal with trade matters. It should be noted, 
however, that with the expansion of the trade agenda, some issues of 
shared competence also came to be negotiated in the WTO. The 
Commission is the EU’s main representative in the latter institution, but 
under more controlled procedures imposed by the EU member states.1 
                                                      
1 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, international negotiations on 
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property became an exclusive 
EC competence, in addition to negotiations on trade in goods. In the field of 
services, some important exceptions were included: trade in cultural and audio-
visual services, educational social and human health services, and transport. Also a 
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Situated in the vanguard of EU external relations activity, trade 
policy has frequently been the initial external relations policy instrument 
bringing the EU into contact with a range of countries, including those in 
the developing world. When negotiating with these countries the 
boundaries of what the EU can offer are often very much defined or at least 
influenced by a range of domestic EU policies, including decisions on 
subsidies and standards in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, environment 
and consumer protection (Woolcock, 2005).  
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Once DG Trade has elaborated proposals for trade negotiations, the key 
Council policy discussions take place in a special advisory committee called 
the Article 133 Committee, named after the article in the EC Treaty that 
covers trade policy.  
According to the Treaty, the Committee’s task is “to assist the 
Commission in the negotiation of agreements between the Community and 
one or more states or international organisations”. In practice, the Article 
133 Committee has the main responsibility for ensuring any necessary 
amendments on behalf on the member states to the Commission’s 
proposals in trade negotiations. Like other Council bodies, the Article 133 
Committee has no formal operational guidelines and works mainly by 
consensus, apparently rarely resorting to voting. In 2004, the Committee 
oversaw the work of five expert groups, the so-called sub-committees 
covering textiles, services, steel, motor vehicles and mutual recognition. 
The Article 133 Committee is distinguished from other Council 
preparatory bodies in that it: 
•  is the sole body consulted on proposed EU positions for trade 
agreements,2 
•  debates Commission proposals that are unpublished, 
•  is strongly influenced by high-level Commission experts and 
                                                                                                                                       
blank restriction on the use of QMV (qualified majority voting) with regard to 
issues without a full internal competence (i.e. foreign direct investment) remained 
(Eeckhout, 2004).  
2 With the exception of bilateral trade agreements, such as the EU-Chile trade 
agreement, where the relevant geographical area Advisory Committee is also 
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•  holds substantial decision-making powers, particularly with regard 
to the EU negotiating mandate (as national officials will seldom 
intervene in technicalities). 
Once the 133 Committee has amended a Commission proposal, it is 
transmitted to Coreper I, which then transmits the proposal to the GAERC 
formation of the EU Council of Ministers. 
For bilateral trade negotiations, special committees are established in 
the Council. In addition there are other committees/groups that discuss 
trade issues, such as the WP on the Generalised System of Preferences, 
which agreed the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative and the WP on 
Trade Questions which covers anti-dumping and safeguard measures. In 
comparison to the Article 133 Committee, these groups have a much 
stronger legislative character.  
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
In sessions of the 133 Committee, the Commission’s DG Trade 
representatives present their proposal and assess the requirement for a 
change to their text following a ‘tour de table’ of member state views. Since 
Council decisions on trade policy are made by qualified majority, 
objections at 133 usually need to be supported by a significant number of 
members in order for the Commission to amend its proposal. However, the 
objections of a major member state on a significant issue has been said to be 
sufficient to prompt a change. Moreover, when the Commission refuses to 
amend its proposal, the Council can change the mandate for the 
negotiations only by unanimous agreement.  
All EU member states have to sign and conclude (ratify) international 
trade agreements, which usually implies a vote in the national parliaments. 
This does not tend to cause much problems, but the possibility means that 
the EU member states and their parliaments can exert a de facto veto when 
the outcome of the negotiations is not to their liking. The European 
Parliament is specifically excluded from consultation on international trade 
agreements concluded under Art. 133. This would have changed with the 
Constitutional Treaty, where the assent procedure was foreseen for 
international trade agreements.  
The adoption of negotiating directives for bilateral association 
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agreements, all EU member states have to agree, as well as the European 
Parliament, which must give its assent in a vote in plenary.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: Their 
background and level of seniority 
The European Commission elaborates proposals for the content of 
international trade negotiations, with the initial proposals drawn up by the 
Commission’s Trade Directorate General (DG Trade). DG Trade assists, 
and answers to, the EU Trade Commissioner and also overseas the use of 
trade policy instruments (see organigram at the end of this fiche). Before a 
proposal is presented to the Council, it is adopted by the College of 
Commissioners, acting by simple majority voting.  
The Commission in some respects operates as an ‘agent’ of the 
member states’ bidding and in practice acts on the basis of a subtle mixture 
of exclusive and shared competences, across the following three stages in 
the negotiation of international agreements: 
i)  the design of the negotiation mandate, 
ii)  the representation of the parties during negotiations and 
iii) the ratification of the agreement once negotiated. 
While the Commission is clearly the dominant actor in stages i and ii, 
it is at stage iii that the member states can (only if necessary) reassert 
control with powers of veto.  
The Article 133 Committee has no set number of participants and 
there can be around 50 representatives at its meetings. It operates at two 
main levels: 
•  Deputy level: three to four national trade officials from each member 
state; commerce or trade counsellors from the permanent 
representatives in Brussels, plus two to three trade experts from the 
national capitals, and 
•  Full member level or ‘top configuration’: a monthly meeting of national 
trade officials from member states plus supporting officials. 
As the core trade committee, 133 meets weekly during the ‘term’ at 
deputy level and its chairmanship rotates every six months, to reflect a 
national of the incumbent presidency. While the agenda of the full-member 
133 Committee is set by the Commission, its members include senior civil 
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Director-General of DG Trade. It meets (at least) once a month in Brussels 
or in Geneva when WTO plenary meetings are in session. 
While the Council of Ministers has the power to establish broad 
objectives for trade negotiations – known as the ‘negotiating mandate’ – in 
practice the process works iteratively ,  w i t h  f e e d b a c k  t o  a n d  f r o m  t h e  
relevant ministries, with only sensitive or intractable issues sent to the 
GAERC to resolve.  
This implies that if the 133 Committee and Coreper do their work and 
interact fairly smoothly, these policies can usually be agreed at the level of 
MS trade ministers in the GEARC without further discussion.  
Otherwise, decisions are by unanimous agreement in the Council, but 
only in the most contentious cases where a major country does not vote will 
a ‘silent’ agreement be declared nul and void.  
133 Subcommittees 
Membership of the 133 subcommittees is made up of Commission officials 
and member state civil servants in a similar manner to that of the main 133 
Committee. The Commission’s participation is primarily made up of DG 
Trade personnel, but also augmented with representation from other DGs if 
specific sectoral expertise is required, as in for example the case of 
aluminium production. 
The 133 subcommittees meet twice monthly and channel their 
findings back to the main 133 which generally follows the line taken in the 
subcommittee. 
However, after presenting the proposal to the Council, Coreper will 
discuss any wider financial and political areas, whereas working groups 
will discuss the technical aspects of the policy proposals. The Commission 
is then represented by the responsible Director and Heads of Unit. 
The Commission, present in the Council, regularly amends the 
proposals according to the developing consensus. The Commission is 
generally represented by the Commissioner, the Director-General and 
relevant Director.  
Feedback to member states 
The participation of member state trade officials is the designated route for 
member states to approve trade proposals. In response to concerns that 
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was introduced during the Spanish Presidency to allow 133 members to 
consult relevant experts at national level. Nevertheless, this is still 
considered by many as a very tight schedule.  
In the absence of formal consultation with the EP on EU policy for 
trade agreements, the only parliamentary input comes directly from 
national parliaments. However, given the complex technical nature of 
international trade issues and partly due to varying political priorities 
among member states, there has been little national involvement to date. 
An exception to this is Denmark, where its national trade officials must 
attend hearings at the Folketing, which has consultation rights on all EU 
policies, including international trade issues. 
Other trade bodies 
The GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) Working Party meets 
irregularly. It met once a week when the GSP regulation was discussed in 
2004, but now it meets infrequently. Its participants are mainly national 
trade delegates, either from the permanent representations or from the 
capitals, and for some countries, development specialists (mainly the 
countries with an active development cooperation policy). Implementing 
measures are covered by the GSP Committee, which is a regulatory 
comitology committee that has been established by the GSP regulation to 
monitor implementation. 
The Working Party on Trade Questions is mainly staffed by trade 
specialists and much of its work is done through electronic means as the 
Commission can adopt provisional measures on the issues it covers.  
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
As DG Trade initiates and prepares further the negotiating positions, it also 
consults with other services. In particular, it consults with the services that 
a r e  m o s t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  p o l i c y .  D G  B u d g e t ,  D G  S a n c o ,  D G  A g r i ,  D G  
Environment and DG Ecfin are regular attendees, but depending on the 
nature of the policy, DG Development and other DGs will also be invited to 
attend.  
In practice, a veto can be exercised through voting at the Council and 
via the need for ratification by national legislatures. Powerful member 
states, such as France and Germany, still exercise an informal veto at both 
the mandate and ratification stages, to the extent that the Luxembourg 
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Consultations are carried out at the early stage of drafting 
procedures, and to a lesser extent throughout the preparation process of a 
policy. To that end, DG Trade has a forum where it engages with civil 
society, NGOs, trade and business representatives and needless to say 
representatives from member states.  
Moreover, there also appears to be some difference of emphasis 
among authorities as to whether trade policy is actually decided in the 133 – 
i.e. actually working on behalf of the Council itself – or whether its function 
is technically to assist Coreper. These procedural distinctions are perhaps 
less important in practice, where clearly opportunities exist at the higher 
level to reach decisions on the output from 133.  
Moving on to the higher level, the Council decides trade issues by 
qualified majority voting (QMV). In most cases, however, the Council tries 
to avoid adopting legislation through QMV and attempts rather to 
negotiate a consensus. There is also the practice of reaching agreement 
under the ‘Luxembourg compromise’. As we have seen, the European 
Parliament has no say in trade matters and can only give its opinion, via its 
Trade Committee.  
Almost all countries can veto a decision and this became apparent in 
the recent Doha round of WTO agriculture negotiations, where France 
threatened to veto the Commission’s mandate. The Commission argued 
that it was acting within the limits of an already-approved mandate, which 
it refused to alter, implying that France must seek unanimous support for 
any amendment. The situation was rather exceptional as it is generally 
thought that some countries enjoy de facto veto powers, notably France and 
Germany.  
6.  Development policy input into the procedure  
To provide expertise on issues concerning trade and development, an 
informal group has been established composed of representatives from the 
EU member states and the European Commission. The group reports to 
(and reacts to questions from) both the Art. 133 Committee and CODEV, 
even though the relationship with the Art. 133 Committee is closer. The 
group is organised by DG Trade with input from DG Development and 
sometimes DG Aidco and Relex (External Relations). It is convened on a 
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There is also an informal group that examines the interface between 
trade, agriculture and development. This group meets only once every six 
months, usually on the initiative of the Presidency or individual member 
states and is largely dominated by development specialists concentrating 
on trade and agricultural issues.  
As with most policies, inputs are mostly made at the consultation 
stage. Before proposals are presented to the Council, changes concerning 
development policy can be raised by the Parliament and other 
stakeholders. However, neither body has the right to impose amendments 
to the original trade policy proposal, as the Parliament only gives an 
opinion and hence its approval is not required. There is no co-decision 
procedure in trade policy.  
Therefore, most of the concerns regarding PCD in the area of trade 
policy are addressed by the Commission in the course of preparing the 
proposals. In practice, DG Trade initiates an inter-service consultation with 
other Directorates General. It also carries out an impact assessment, but 
only after the proposal has been tabled.  
The Council itself (at all levels and in all of its bodies) can however 
propose changes to the proposal to include aspects of development. The 
Commission will then decide if and how to amend the proposal in order to 
reach a consensus. However, requests for changes have to be decided 
unanimously by the Council of Ministers if the Commission objects to a 
suggested change. In addition, the Council can also unanimously request 
the Commission to prepare new proposals. 
It is through the generalised system of preferences (GPS) that the EU 
provides access to Community markets and additional trade preferences to 
developing countries that observe basic labour standards. Although the 
GSP Working Party has been mainly staffed by trade specialists, 
development specialists attend its meetings and development concerns are 
repeatedly brought into the discussions. Some countries still mainly defend 
the interests of national industry sectors, but in the end only a few products 
remain protected from the GSP system.  
At a more general level, an increased number of (independent) 
studies has improved the awareness and knowledge of the link between 
development and EU trade policy. With more evidence becoming available 
and cited in newspapers, magazines and other media sources, the issue 
stands at the forefront of the political debate, which has been reinforced by 
developing countries becoming more assertive. As a result, the sensitivities 
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important, the debate in the public domain has triggered a cultural change 
at the working level, where development concerns receive more attention 
by trade specialists, or at least have become more difficult to ignore.  
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
The policy-making process in the area of trade can be strengthened to 
ensure PCD. This action should be accompanied by improvements in the 
way in which national governments coordinate their development 
objectives, in particular with a view to acknowledging the implications 
trade can have on other EU policies. 
Recent WTO negotiations have highlighted the need for the EU to 
coordinate at EU level the position it takes in those negotiations, as it is 
imperative that DG Trade aligns its position with other directorates 
general, such as DG Agriculture and DG Development. One EU policy 
cannot take precedent over another EU policy. The same is true for the new 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which are designed by DG 
Trade but destined for developing countries and hence should include the 
goals of DG Development. Given the importance of taking development 
concerns into account in the early stages of thinking about new proposals, 
one could consider the establishment of project groups composed at a 
minimum of officials from DG Trade and DG Development, to draft 
proposals of a genuine cross-sectoral character. This would require also 
close cooperation at the higher levels, where texts have to be approved. 
In this respect, the informal expert group on trade and development 
also plays an increasingly important role. Although its meetings have 
increased in frequency over time and its involvement takes now place at 
earlier stages of the policy-making process, its status is still somewhat 
unclear (e.g. its position in the hierarchy, etc.), and the topics it can address 
are limited since DG Trade is very much preoccupied with its competences, 
particularly in the areas where an exclusive EC competence exists. 
Therefore, the work of the informal expert group should receive stronger 
backing by the higher political levels.  
The group on trade, agriculture and development should become 
more formalised as well, for instance by making it an official group 
belonging to the presidency or perhaps to DG Agriculture and by 
specifying that it can submit papers to the Article 133 Committee, the SCA 
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focusing on trade and agricultural issues, but it would benefit PCD if trade 
and agricultural specialists would participate more actively and would 
look upon the group as an important source of expertise for their work. 
When the group reports to the relevant committees, as mentioned above, 
this is more likely to happen.  
Another suggestion for strengthening PCD would be to require an 
explicit reference to how Art. 178 of the EC Treaty (on PCD) is taken into 
account in the negotiation mandates for trade negotiations, by including 
this in the explanatory memorandum that accompanies them.  POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 61 
 
8.  Organigram of trade policy-making in the Council of the European 
Union 
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Case Study on EU External Trade Policy: 
Economic Partnership Agreements 
Alan Hudson 
The EU strongly supports a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor 
completion of the Doha Development Round and EU-ACP Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). … In line with development needs, 
the EU supports the objectives of asymmetry and flexibility for the 
implementation of the EPAs.1 
1.  Introduction 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are trade agreements negotiated 
between the EU and six regional groups of ACP (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific) countries. EPAs are intended to promote sustainable development 
and poverty reduction by enabling further economic integration of ACP 
countries, regionally, with the EU and with the world economy. 
Specifically, EPAs are a response to the fact that the EU’s existing trade 
relationship with the ACP countries, which provides the ACP countries 
with preferential access to EU markets on a non-reciprocal basis, does not 
comply with WTO rules. There has been a waiver in place allowing such 
preferential agreements to exist, but this waiver expires at the end of 2007. 
As part of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the EU and ACP countries 
agreed to negotiate new WTO-compatible trade agreements. 
The process of negotiating EPAs began in 2002, with the Council 
providing the Commission with a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the 
EU.2 A first stage of negotiations was between the EU and all the ACP 
countries. A second stage of negotiations has been proceeding between the 
E U  a n d  e a c h  o f  t h e  s i x  r e g i o n s ,  c o n c erning in particular questions of 
regional integration. A third stage, which commenced in late 2005 and early 
2006, is between each of the regions and the EU, and relates to questions of 
                                                      
1 European Consensus on Development, December 2005, para 36 – 14820/05. 
2 Council Conclusions on Economic Partnership Agreements with ACP countries 
and regions, 13 May 2002; see also Commission recommendation for a Council 
Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the ACP countries and regions – SEC (2002) 351 Final. POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 63 
 
market access. No EPAs have been agreed as yet, but they are scheduled to 
be concluded by the end of 2007. 
2.  Implications for development 
Throughout the process of negotiating EPAs, there has been a lively debate 
amongst EU institutions, member states, NGOs and ACP countries about 
whether or not the development dimension has been given sufficient 
prominence. The Commission has consistently insisted that EPAs are first 
and foremost a tool for development. But a range of other stakeholders has 
voiced a number of concerns about the development implications of EPAs. 
These include: concerns that EPAs might hinder rather than encourage 
regional integration of ACP countries; concerns about the loss of tariff 
revenues ACP countries will suffer as a result of trade (tariff) liberalisation; 
and, concerns about the impact on vulnerable ACP economies of entering 
into what amounts to free trade agreements with the EU. 
The developmental implications of EPAs will depend very much on 
how the negotiations proceed and how well they are implemented by both 
the ACP and EU. If the EU takes into account the concerns of the ACP 
countries and others, then EPAs may prove to be a useful tool for 
development. If the concerns of the ACP countries are ignored – for 
instance relating to their ability to decide when to liberalise, based on their 
development needs – then EPAs may not deliver the developmental 
benefits that the Commission argues they hold. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and development inputs 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council provided the 
Commission with a mandate to negotiate EPAs in June 2002. This followed 
a period of intensive negotiations between the Commission’s DGs, and 
some consultation between the Commission and member states. Once 
negotiated, each EPA will have to be ratified by the Council, and signed by 
those ACP states which are party to the agreement. 
Within the Commission, DG Trade is very much in the lead. DG 
Development’s role has been confined largely to dealing with the provision 
of technical and financial assistance to ACP countries. While DG 
Development has become more active and monthly meetings between DG 
Trade and DG Development have been instituted, there is reportedly a big 
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because it has limited its role, and because of the dominance of the former. 
DG TAXUD leads on some of the detail about rules of origin, and DG 
SANCO provides input on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. 
Communication between all the DGs involved is facilitated by an EPA task 
force – the Inter-Service Consultation – which is chaired by DG Trade. 
The ACP countries have found negotiating with the Commission 
rather confusing; they have assumed that their DG Trade counterparts are 
speaking on behalf of the whole Commission (on behalf of the EU), and 
have been puzzled to discover that DG Trade is unable to deal with issues 
such as development assistance. This is particularly problematic because 
the ACP countries’ decisions about whether to enter into EPAs will 
necessarily hinge on whether or not sufficient assistance is provided to 
support their preparations for, and adjustment to trade liberalisation. 
Within the Council of the EU, there is much activity, with the 133 
Committee and the ACP Working Party being the key fora. The 133 
Committee, made up of EU member states’ permanent representatives and 
representatives from DG Trade, monitors the extent to which the 
Commission is sticking to its mandate. The Commission reports regularly 
on progress to the 133 Committee. The ACP Working Party, chaired by the 
presidency and made up of EU member state permanent representatives, 
provides the focus for development inputs into the process. Again, the 
Commission keeps this working party informed. With the ACP Working 
Party dealing with development issues, the Working Party on 
Development Cooperation plays a limited role, although its members were 
– along with those of the ACP Working Party – invited to attend a meeting 
of the 133 Committee in May 2005. 
The EPA Expert Group is an informal group established under the 
UK Presidency. This is chaired by the Commission, and brings together 
representatives from member states (from Brussels and from capitals) and 
officials from DG Trade and DG Development. It has met twice; in late 2005 
and early 2006. It has no mandate to make decisions, but nevertheless plays 
an important role in terms of focusing attention on EPA issues and in terms 
of information exchange. In addition, an informal EPA network of EU 
development officials meets regularly and brings together interested EU 
countries that are keen to ensure that EPAs deliver on the developmental 
promise. So far, it has included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK.  
In March 2005, the UK published a position paper about making 
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Guardian (“EU move to block trade aid for poor”, 19 May 2005), the 
Commission saw this as a “major and unwelcome shift” in the UK’s 
position, believing that it was undermining the mandate that the Council 
had already given to the Commission. That the UK felt it necessary to make 
such an intervention reveals the depth of disquiet amongst some member 
states, many ACP countries and civil society organisations about the 
direction in which EPA negotiations were headed. Poland produced a 
similar position paper on EPAs later in 2005. Some national parliaments 
(including the UK), and the European Parliament have also sought to 
scrutinise the EPA process, and emphasise the need to make EPAs 
‘development-friendly’. In March 2006, the Committee on Development of 
the European Parliament (2006) produced a report along these lines. It is 
too early to say whether this report will have any impact, but it certainly 
adds to the voices calling for the Commission to ensure that EPAs are truly 
supportive of development efforts. The ACP countries themselves are 
clearly in the front-line of attempts t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  E P A s  d e l i v e r  o n  
development. Their involvement comes through the regional negotiating 
process, as well as through a Joint EU-ACP Ministerial Trade Committee. 
Moreover, they will be part of a joint EU-ACP review of the EPA process, 
to be conducted in 2006. 
Over the last year, there has been much debate about whether EPAs 
are on course to deliver their developmental potential. As a result, the 
Commission has worked hard to present EPAs as being primarily about 
development, and it would seem that there has been some progress on this 
front. For instance, the European Commission (2005) produced a staff 
working document on the trade and development aspects of EPAs in 
November 2005, and on 10 April 2006, Council Conclusions were produced 
which gave a little more emphasis to development. Some progress has also 
been made with ensuring that the monitoring mechanism – first proposed 
by Commissioner Mandelson in early 2005 – will be about monitoring 
EPAs and their implementation against development objectives, rather 
than solely about monitoring the provision of development assistance to 
ACP states. 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence for development 
The evolution of EPAs offers a range of lessons in terms of policy coherence 
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•  Development concerns need to be fully integrated into all aspects of a 
policy. In a trade agreement, the development dimensions go well 
beyond the provision of financial assistance. Rather, all aspects of 
EPA policy, including the trade and trade-related provisions and 
regulations, have developmental implications. Treating development 
as a parallel track in trade negotiations is not conducive to the 
production of development-friendly outcomes. Proposals for 
institutional reforms aimed at promoting greater policy coherence for 
development must carefully consider the pros and cons of dealing 
with development in parallel. 
•  Policy coherence requires intra-Commission coherence. If 
development objectives are not to be marginalised, then DG 
Development must be enabled – in terms of resources and mandate – 
to represent development objectives across the board of EPA 
discussions, and must not confine itself to questions of the delivery of 
technical and financial assistance. 
•  Effective negotiations with developing country partners also require 
intra-Commission coherence. It is unacceptable for developing 
countries to find themselves thinking they are dealing with the 
Commission as a whole, only to find that they are dealing with one 
part of the Commission – DG Trade – which is unable to engage on 
questions of development assistance. When one DG is negotiating 
with developing country partners, it must be in a position to 
represent and negotiate on behalf of the whole Commission. 
•  In a complex process, information flows are crucial. Particularly 
when an issue is being dealt with by both development (ACP 
Working Group) and non-development (133 Committee) streams of 
the Council, informal Expert Groups and networks can play a useful 
role in bridging any gaps. By looking ahead at the agenda for 
development and non-development committees, such expert groups 
can identify issues where development inputs would be useful, and 
ensure that they are produced in timely manner. 
Assertions that a policy is first and foremost a tool for development 
will not be taken at face value. Some stakeholders will doubt the sincerity 
of such claims, and others who accept the sincerity of the claim may not 
have the same view of what is best for developing countries. As such, early 
commitments to establishing independent monitoring mechanisms can 
play an important role in encouraging a diverse range of stakeholders, with 
different perspectives on development, to work together. | 67  
2. Fiche on EU Environment Policy 
Louise van Schaik 
1.  Origins 
Environmental problems are often a cross-border concern and it therefore 
seems natural to deal with them at the European level. Initially there was 
no direct EC competence on the environment, but policies were linked to 
the internal market competence. Since 1992 there is a separate environment 
chapter in the treaties and it is estimated that currently 200 to 300 pieces of 
legislation are in place covering environmental issues. Because competence 
is shared, in addition, there are numerous national environmental laws. 
Over time the focus of environmental policies has shifted from direct 
m e a s u r e s  t o  r e d u c e  p o l l u t i o n  t o  e n suring integration of environmental 
concerns into other policies of the EU, often under the heading of 
‘sustainability’. 
The general framework for environmental policy-making until 2012 is 
provided for in the Sixth Environmental Action Programme. It contains the 
development of seven thematic strategies: i) air pollution, ii) prevention & 
recycling of waste, iii) protection & conservation of the marine 
environment, iv) soil, v) sustainable use of pesticides, vi) sustainable use of 
resources and vii) the urban environment. In addition it identifies four 
priority areas: i) climate change, ii) nature & biodiversity, iii) environment 
& health and iv) resources & waste. Proposals for EC environmental 
legislation are drafted by the European Commission. Most of them take the 
form of directives and regulations.  
EU positions for Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) are 
usually drafted by the EU presidency, often with assistance of the Council 
Secretariat. Only for issues where the EC has an exclusive competence 
(mainly trade-related matters) may the Commission draft a negotiations 
mandate that is to be approved by the Council. The EC and the EU member 68 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
states have signed or are Party to 55 international environmental 
agreements, conventions and protocols.1 
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Although the environment formation of the Council of Ministers is usually 
in the lead on environmental policy-making, sometimes other Council 
formations are also involved, for instance with regard to the environmental 
dimension of the Lisbon strategy (e.g. Competitiveness Council) or the 
EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy (e.g. GAERC Council). The 
European Council becomes involved in some horizontal, highly political 
and strategic issues, including competitiveness and environment, 
sustainable development and climate change.  
Environmental legislation for the internal market 
Proposals for legislation are discussed in the Working Party on the 
Environment (WP ENV), which meets often (2-3 times a week), but with 
different issues on its agenda. Its participants are usually environment 
attachés of the permanent representations, sometimes seconded by officials 
from national ministries (mainly environment). Coreper I functions as the 
clearinghouse between the WP and the Council.  
International environmental issues 
The international side is covered by the Working Party on International 
Environment Issues (IEI). It is actually divided into several different 
formations, each focusing on different international environmental issues:  
•  Global, to prepare for UNEP (United Nations Environment 
Programme) and CSD (Commission on Sustainable Development) 
meetings and otherwise to discuss horizontal international 
environmental matters. Meets about once a month.  
•  Climate Change, to prepare for international climate negotiations (see 
fiche on climate change). Meets once or twice a month. 
•  Biodiversity. Meets about once a month. 
                                                      
1 For an overview, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ 
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•  Biosafety. Meets about once every two months (sometimes combined 
with biodiversity). 
•  Chemicals. Meets about once a month. 
•  Aarhus, on the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. Meets irregularly.  
Also for the Working Party IEI (International Environmental Issues), 
Coreper I is the official interlocutor with the Environment Council of 
Ministers. However, since IEI meetings are usually not attended by 
attaches from the permanent representations, who brief the deputy 
permanent representatives participating in Coreper I, work is usually 
forwarded from IEI WP to the Environment WP and presented there by the 
presidency.  
During international environmental negotiations, the EU delegates 
gather in daily EU coordination meetings. In these ‘Council meetings at 
location’, representatives of the member states and the European 
Commission at senior official or ministerial level decide how to adjust the 
EU position to reach agreement with negotiating opponents. 
Friends of the Presidency group for Sustainable Development 
A novelty, in terms of organising tasks inside the Council, were the 
preparations for the June 2006 European Council discussions on the EU’s 
renewed Sustainable Development strategy. These are being prepared by a 
specifically-established ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group in which all 
sectoral interests are represented (see point 6 as well). The EU presidency 
has also asked all Council formations to answer questions regarding the 
Sustainable Development Strategy and some Council formations to answer 
specific questions. In the past, preparations on sustainable development 
discussions in the European Council were mainly prepared through the 
Environment Council and its subordinate bodies with some limited input 
by other Council formations (e.g. Competitiveness or GAERC), which had 
taken up the issue on their initiative.  
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
Environmental legislation is subject to the co-decision procedure with 
QMV used as the voting rule in the Council. There are exceptions, however, 
for which consultation with unanimity applies (mentioned in Art. 175):  70 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
•  Provisions primarily of a fiscal nature; 
•  Measures affecting: i) town and country planning, ii) quantitative 
management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the 
availability of those resources, and iii) land use, with the exception of 
waste management; and 
•  Measures significantly affecting a member state’s choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. 
The EU positions used for the negotiations in Multilateral 
Environment Agreements (MEAs) are adopted by consensus reflecting the 
member states’ individual competence to negotiate in international bodies 
and to conclude international agreements.2 However, in the exceptional 
cases where there is an exclusive EC competence the Commission is given 
the right to propose a negotiations’ mandate, which can be decided upon 
by QMV.  
MEAs have to be ratified by both the EC and the EU member states. 
On behalf of the EC, the Commission drafts a proposal for conclusion of the 
agreement, which is subsequently subject to approval by the EU Council of 
Ministers by QMV and to a vote of the European Parliament. Given that the 
EP vote falls under the consultation procedure, the resulting ‘opinion’ can 
be put aside by a unanimous decision of the EU Council.3 The member 
states have their own ratification procedure, sometimes with and 
sometimes without a vote in the parliament.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
Several parties monitor the development of EU environmental policies 
closely. In the Commission, proposals for environmental legislation are 
                                                      
2 The legal basis is Art. 174 §4 of the environment chapter of the EC Treaty. It refers 
to Art. 300 (TEC), which states that with regard to Community policies it is the 
Commission that will be authorised by the Council to negotiate international 
agreements with third countries. The last sentence of Art. 174 §4 stipulates, 
however, that “the previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to member 
states’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements”.  
3 This would change if the Constitutional Treaty would enter into force (see Van 
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drafted by DG Environment. Other services follow environmental dossiers 
closely, such as DGs TREN, ENTREPRISE, DEVELOPMENT and RELEX, 
with many intense battles being fought during the inter-service 
consultation (e.g. on REACH). Moreover, the Commission chairs several 
comitology committees, which have been delegated authority from the 
Council to oversee and decide upon specific issues of environmental 
directives and regulations. Given that these committees are usually the first 
political arena where problems over current legislation are being discussed, 
they often play an important informal role in catalysing legislative change. 
Examples of important committees in environmental policy-making are the 
Art. 19 committee on the pollutants (registration of emissions, waste), the 
NOx committee, the chemicals committee and the waste committee.  
The Environment WP is usually staffed by attachés from the 
Permanent Representations seconded by national officials with expertise on 
the issue being discussed. The IEI WP is staffed primarily by national 
officials. Input is usually coordinated with and monitored by various 
national interests (energy, agriculture, development, etc.) at the national 
level. Diplomats from permanent representations usually do not attend 
international environmental negotiations.  
The participants of the Friends of the Presidency group that has been 
established to prepare the discussions in the June 2006 European Council 
are cross-sectoral delegations from the EU member states, often seconded 
by staff from the permanent representations.  
In the European Parliament, the Environment Committee is in the 
lead position. Its activities on climate change are usually closely monitored 
by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and to a lesser extent 
by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and other committees. The EP’s 
influence is clearly felt when legislation under the co-decision procedure is 
concerned. Usually environmental policy is subject to intense lobbying, 
with the MEPs being the main target. In this respect, it can be a real 
challenge for a rapporteur to bring a file to a successful ending.  
The EP’s role is less significant with regard to the EU position for the 
MEAs, where the consultation procedure applies. MEPs are not allowed to 
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A key actor is the EU presidency, especially in these international 
negotiations, where it is the EU’s main representative usually in the context 
of the ‘troika’ (presidency, incoming presidency, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat).4 In fact, in most environmental negotiations, the EU 
presidency is in the lead with the exception of the ones that are clearly 
trade-related and bilateral agreements. In these, the Commission is in the 
lead since there is a clear EC competence. The presidency also usually 
prepares the first draft of the EU position either specified in the Council 
conclusions or in undisclosed documents. In the negotiations the lead 
representative of the EU usually speaks on behalf of the EU member states 
and the EC on the basis of what has been agreed upon in the mandate from 
Council meetings or the EU coordination at the international negotiations 
(see above).  
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
DG Environment appears to be the champion of stakeholder consultation 
meetings in Brussels. It is very keen on creating legitimacy and broad 
support (by environmental NGOs, industry, academic experts and other 
stakeholders) for its policy proposals. There are also regular meetings with 
these groups, the most important of which are from the environment side: 
the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), WWF, Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth, and from the industry side: UNICE, International Chamber of 
Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce, as well as many sector-
specific associations and individual companies. 
Environmental legislation – apart from the exceptions that do not go 
through co-decision – depends upon the support for proposals of a simple 
majority in the College of Commissioners, a simple majority in the EP and a 
qualified majority in the Council. On the international side, it takes an 
active presidency and support by all EU member states.  
The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and the Committee 
of the Regions (COR) are consulted on all environmental policies and laws 
(according to Art. 175 of the EC Treaty).  
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6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Development inputs into EU decision-making on environmental issues are 
made mainly at the national level when development and environment 
ministries coordinate the national position for Council meetings. Also 
(development and environment) NGOs and researchers emphasise the 
importance of sustainable development. The European Commission has 
been particularly active with regard to the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development that was organised in Johannesburg in 2002. It published a 
Communication on the external dimension of Sustainable Development 
(2002/82). The development component also received considerable 
attention in a Communication in the aftermath of the Johannesburg 
Summit, which covered the EU’s implementation strategy with regard to 
the commitments made (2003/829).  
To ensure the integration of environmental concerns into 
international development cooperation,5 a manual was developed in the 
context of a Communication on integrating sustainable development into 
Community cooperation policy. The focus is on integrating environmental 
concerns in development policy-making and not the other way around. In 
developing countries, however, there is often a suspicion that the EU’s 
environmental policies are used as a trade barrier, particularly since 
environmental standards set in MEAs are accepted within the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedures. Indeed, for a small company in Africa, it 
might be challenging to comply with for instance the EU’s packaging 
obligations. Another example is the EU’s stance on GMOs, which have led 
African states to refuse food aid from the US since it could not or did not 
want to guarantee the aid to be GMO-free and accepting it into the country 
would jeopardise its export position vis-à-vis the EU (Ochs & Schaper, 
2004).  
As mentioned earlier, at the time of writing, the EU’s sustainability 
development strategy is subject to a review culminating at the European 
Council in June 2006. This is an issue clearly of both environmental and 
development concern. In the friends of the presidency group that has been 
established, both interests are represented together with other interests. In 
addition, the UK Presidency has asked all Council formations to provide 
                                                      
5 See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l28114.htm. 74 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
input. In our view, this is a good example of how policy coherence could be 
enhanced by an institutional solution at the Council level. It would not 
seem feasible, however, to install such groups for many other 
environmental issues that are less horizontal of character.  
Finally it deserves mentioning that the agenda-setting in MEAs is 
often highly influenced by the EU, as well as the launch of new 
international negotiations on environmental subjects. Although the 
commitments made usually incur an extra administrative burden for 
developing country governments, they quite often as well have positive 
effects for the health and living conditions of inhabitants of developing 
countries. In that respect they can be considered a positive contribution to 
development cooperation activities. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
In general, the experience is that development aspects are sufficiently taken 
into account in environmental policy-making of the EU. This 
‘mainstreaming’ has been spurred by the extensive consultation of DG 
Environment on new proposals and is likely to be strengthened inter alia 
by the recent installation of the Friend of the Presidency group to prepare 
the issue of sustainable development. 
Development experts have focused foremost on capacity-building as 
well as budgetary aspects of EU environmental legislation and 
commitments in MEAs. The requirements as such and their 
implementation have received somewhat less attention, especially as these 
issues are considered to belong to the domain of the environment officials. 
For products mainly imported from developing countries, however, it 
would seem justifiable to involve development experts. With their 
knowledge of administrative capacities of the producer countries, they 
could assist with designing and monitoring the standards in such a way 
that it would be possible for developing countries to comply with them.  
For the internal market, such standards are quite often set in 
comitology committees. EU member states and the Commission could 
consider improving their monitoring of which standards are decided upon 
in which committees, what potential effects these have on developing 
countries and, where relevant, could take a more active stance in ensuring 
that the development aspect is taken account of in the decisions taken.  
For the MEAs, it would seem important that both development and 
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could also consider sending an (informal) representative to the meetings of 
the Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WP IEI) to 
monitor how development aspects are taken into account in the mandates 
for international negotiations (both those taking place in Brussels as those 
taking place alongside the international negotiations).  
8.  Organigram – Environmental Policy-Making in the European 
Union with a focus on the Council 
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3. Fiche on EU Climate Change Policy 
Louise van Schaik 
1.  Origins 
EU policies. As climate change is an area of shared competence, there are 
both climate change policies at the EU level and at the member state level. 
At the EU level, climate change is one of the four priority areas under the 
Sixth Environmental Action Programme that was decided upon in 2001 and 
which provides a general framework for environmental policy-making 
until 2012. Proposals for EU climate change policies, the so-called ‘common 
and co-ordinated policies and measures’, are drafted by the European 
Commission. Most of them originate from the European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP) and take the form of directives and regulations. The 
ECCP is composed of several groups, one of which focuses on adaptation 
to climate change, an issue with high relevance for developing countries. 
Sometimes problems encountered with the implementation of a directive 
are also dealt with in the climate change committee that has been delegated 
authority to decide upon technical details of legislative acts (‘comitology 
system’).  
International pressure. Since the mid-1980s when scientific findings 
clearly indicated the likelihood of emerging and negative impacts on the 
climate due to human behaviour, the issue of climate change has been an 
important political topic.1 Its ‘public good’ character – i.e. it does not matter 
where on earth greenhouse gas emissions are emitted – led to discussions 
at the UN level which culminated in the signing of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In both agreements, the EU takes an active part and 
the greenhouse gas reduction targets set in the Kyoto Protocol provide an 
important guidance for internal policy-making. The position for the 
international climate change negotiations, as stipulated in the EU Council 
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Conclusions, as well as in EU submissions and statements, is usually 
drafted by the EU presidency.  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EC (EU-15)2 is committed collectively 
to a greenhouse gas reduction of 8% by 2008-12 as compared to 1990 levels, 
whereas each of the individual member states also has its own target under 
the so-called ‘Burden-Sharing Agreement’, which, with the entry into force 
of the Kyoto Protocol, became international law. The EC and the EU 
member states can fulfil their respective commitments by implementing 
policies and measures and by buying emissions credits from projects 
implemented abroad or from others countries that are signatories to the 
Kyoto Protocol and in possession of surplus emissions.3 
With the Kyoto Protocol due to expire in 2012, the EU’s current focus 
is on negotiating a new agreement for the period post-2012.4 Preparations 
for these negotiations are currently taking place within the UNFCCC 
context and discussions have already started informally in the numerous 
international fora that have addressed the issue of climate change, namely 
the G-8, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the 
International Energy Agency/Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (IEA/OECD) and the World Bank.  
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Proposals for legislation are first discussed in the Working Party on the 
Environment, which meets often (two to three times a week), but with 
                                                      
2 Because the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 – before the latest enlargement of 
the EU in May 2004 – only the EU-15 have a combined target. Each of the new 
member states has an individual target, which is on average similar to the EU-15 
target. Malta and Cyprus do not have a target.  
3 Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries with a greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
target (the so-called ‘Annex I' countries’), can fulfil this commitment by domestic 
policies and measures, certain types of projects in developing countries (through 
the Clean Development Mechanism), in countries with economies in transition 
(Joint Implementation) and by buying emissions from a country with a target and 
in possession of surplus emissions.  
4 The EU has discussed its medium- to long-term strategy in various meetings of 
the Council of Ministers (Environment formation) and in the Spring European 
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different issues on the agenda. Coreper I functions as the clearinghouse 
between the WP and the Council.  
The international side is covered by another Working Party, the 
Climate Change formation of the Working Party on International 
Environment Issues (IEI), which meets once or twice a month. It prepares 
the EU position for the negotiations in the UNFCCC – in which the Kyoto 
Protocol is the main agreement signed so far. Most of the issues addressed 
by the Working Party are in turn prepared by specific expert groups and 
issue groups that are formed within these expert groups. One expert group 
focuses on the relationship between climate change and development (the 
developing countries expert group). Also, for the Working Party IEI, 
Coreper I is the official interlocutor with the Council of Ministers.  
During the international climate change negotiations, there are 
Council meetings on location, the so-called ‘EU coordination’ meetings. In 
these meetings, which take place on a daily basis, the climate delegations of 
the member states and the European Commission at senior official or 
ministerial level decide how to adjust the EU position to reach agreement 
with negotiating partners. Usually national development experts present at 
the negotiations attend the EU coordination meetings.  
At the ministerial level, climate change is the prerogative of the 
Environment Council. The GAERC and the European Council become 
involved in some highly political and strategic issues. At the 2005 Spring 
European Council, decisions were made on a medium- to long-term 
strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  Its decisions were 
preceded by various inputs, including a Communication by the European 
Commission, Council Conclusions by the Environment Council and a 
contribution by the Competitiveness Council.5 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
Decision-making on climate change i n  t h e  E U  i s  c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  
Environment chapter of the EC Treaty (Arts 174-176). Accordingly, 
legislation is decided upon through the co-decision procedure. The voting 
rule used for the adoption of environmental policy in the Council is QMV, 
but there are exceptions when a vote by unanimity is required (Art. 175). 
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One exception concerns provisions that are primarily of a fiscal nature, 
which prevented a proposal on an EU-wide carbon tax from being adopted 
in the mid-1990s. Another exception concerns proposals affecting land use 
and town and country planning. Perhaps the most important one is 
“measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”. Given that 
climate change policies are often related to energy-related greenhouse gas 
emissions, EU member states at times have argued that unanimity should 
apply for these pieces of legislation. To date, however, most climate change 
policies and measures have been adopted by QMV.  
The EU positions used for the negotiations in the UNFCCC are 
adopted by consensus reflecting the member states’ individual competence 
to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international 
agreements.6  
International climate change agreements have to be ratified by both 
the European Commission and the EU member states. With the Kyoto 
Protocol, on behalf of the EC, the Commission drafted a proposal for 
conclusion of the agreement, which was subject to approval by the EU 
Council of Ministers by QMV and to a vote of the European Parliament. 
Given that this vote was based on the consultation procedure, the resulting 
‘opinion’ could have been put aside by a unanimous decision of the EU 
Council.7 The member states have their own ratification procedures, 
sometimes with and sometimes without a vote in the parliament.  
 
 
                                                      
6 The legal basis is Art. 174 §4 of the Environment chapter of the EC Treaty. It refers 
to Art. 300 (TEC), which states that with regard to Community policies it is the 
Commission that will be authorised by the Council to negotiate international 
agreements with third countries. The last sentence of Art. 174 §4 stipulates 
however that “the previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to member 
states’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements”.  
7 Should the Constitutional Treaty ever enter into force, this would change (see 
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4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
Proposals for EU climate change legislation are drafted by the European 
Commission, where DG Environment and in particular its Climate, Ozone 
and Energy Unit has the lead. Other services also follow climate change 
closely, such as DGs TREN, ENTREPRISE, DEVELOPMENT and RELEX, a 
fact that becomes most apparent during the inter-service consultation. On 
technical implementation issues, decision-making powers are delegated to 
the climate change committee, which is chaired by the Commission and 
further composed of representatives of the EU member states. It is a so-
called ‘regulatory comitology committee’, where QMV can be used to reach 
decisions.8 The committee and its three subordinate working groups are 
often the first to signal shortcomings with existing legislation, sometimes 
leading to revisions and new agenda items for legislation. There have even 
been joint meetings with the expert groups that are subordinate to the IEI 
WP, for instance with regard to the directive that links the EU emissions 
trading scheme to the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM and 
JI, see also above).  
T h e  E n v i r o n m e n t  W P  i s  u s u a l l y  c o m p o s e d  o f  a t t a c h é s  f r o m  t h e  
permanent representations, sometimes seconded by experts from national 
ministries (mainly environment).  
The IEI WP is composed of representatives from environment 
ministries at a rather senior level. Sometimes, officials focusing on specific 
sectors second their environment counterparts or act as the main 
representative in the expert group meetings.  
In the European Parliament, the Environment Committee is in the 
lead position. Its activities on climate change are usually closely monitored 
by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and to a lesser extent 
by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and other committees. The EP’s 
                                                      
8 See point 20 and Art. 9 of “Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 February 2004 concerning a mechanism for monitoring 
Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol”, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L49/1. These 
refer to Arts 5 and 7 of the ‘Comitology’ Decision 1999/468/EC, having regard to 
Art. 8 of the same decision, as published in the Official Journal L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 
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influence is clearly felt when legislation under the co-decision procedure is 
concerned, but less so with regard to the resolutions issued for the 
international climate negotiations, where the consultation procedure 
applies. MEPs are not allowed to attend the EU coordination meetings at 
the international negotiations.  
A key actor is the EU presidency, especially with regard to the 
international climate negotiations where it is the EU’s main representative 
and usually drafts the EU position. In the UNFCCC negotiations, it speaks 
on behalf of the EU member states and the European Commission. 
Together with the next (incoming) presidency and the European 
Commission, it forms the so-called ‘troika’,9 which conducts the most 
important (informal) negotiations for the EU. The presidency and the troika 
usually operate with a relatively restrictive mandate from the EU 
coordination meetings (see above). On specific topics in the negotiations, 
the EU uses a system of lead negotiators and issue leaders, a representative 
of one EU member state that is responsible together with the EU presidency 
for maintaining relationship with the international negotiating partners on 
specific topics (Van Schaik & Egenhofer, 2005). With regard to the 
negotiation of bilateral agreements in which climate change is the key or a 
related topic, the EU is usually represented by the European Commission. 
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
Consultation on new legislation on climate change is done mainly at the 
European Climate Change Programme working groups and through many 
informal meetings. Adoption depends upon the support for proposals of a 
simple majority in the College of Commissioners, a simple majority in the 
EP and a qualified majority in the Council. On environmental policies also 
the COR and ECOSOC are consulted with some issues being more relevant 
to them than others.  
To arrive at the EU position in the international negotiations, there 
are debates in the EU member states (to determine their position) as well as 
in Brussels. For instance, in 2004 the Commission organised a stakeholder 
consultation on action on climate change post-2012 alongside the 
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preparation of its Communication for the European Council.10 Decisions 
concerning the EU’s negotiation position are made by consensus. In 
practical terms, an active stance by the presidency is key in steering things 
forward.  
Input by national representatives from the environment ministries in 
the Council bodies is usually coordinated with and monitored by various 
national ministries (energy, development, etc.). Since this coordination 
takes place at home, there are differences between the member states, some 
of which have strong oversight by foreign ministries or some receiving 
little coordination at all (Beyers & Trondall, 2004). To illustrate the 
sensitivities surrounding national coordination, with regard to the 
participation in the IEI Working Party, it has occurred that officials from 
related ministries decided to attend a meeting without informing their 
colleagues from the environment ministries beforehand. 
All climate change policies are subject to intense lobbying by 
environment NGOs, mainly CAN Europe, WWF, Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth, and industry groups (UNICE, ICC and WBCSD), as well as 
many sector-specific associations and individual companies. 
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
From a development perspective, the international climate change policy of 
the EU is the most important, but there are also some linkages with internal 
policies, for instance the amount of credits allocated in the EU emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) influences the demand for credits from CDM 
projects.  
The EU seems to realise that climate change is an issue impacting 
severely on developing countries. There is moreover a relatively high 
awareness that (economic) development is the priority for developing 
countries and that industrial countries should take the lead in reducing 
emissions. However, the EU also sees an increasing need for addressing the 
rapidly growing greenhouse gas emissions in the economically stronger 
developing countries, e.g. China, India, Brazil and South Africa. In 
addition, it is important to them to maintain support by the G-77/China in 
the international negotiations. Nevertheless, when it comes to actual 
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financial commitments, they are utterly reliant on their financial 
counterparts and hesitant to come forward.  
Bilaterally there are agreements with China and India, which mainly 
focus on fostering the development of clean energy technologies.11 At the 
operational level, there is some funding for mitigation and adaptation 
provided for by the Global Environment Facility, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund. Most resources however are 
provided by national development agencies that have decided to take 
sustainability into account and from the international finance institutions. 
There are also some EU government tenders and capacity-building projects 
aimed at the least developed countries and undertaken in the context of the 
Clean Development Mechanism.  
In 2004, Council Conclusions and an action plan on climate change in 
the context of development cooperation were adopted by the Council as a 
follow-up to a 2003 Commission Communication on the same topic. These 
have served as perhaps the most evident point at which development 
inputs were made, as is illustrated in the case study that follows this fiche. 
In general, development inputs are contributed mainly at the national level 
when national development specialists are involved in the coordination of 
the national position for the WP IEI, as well as through the input of 
developing country expert groups into the Working Party.  
Pressure to take development input into account is strengthened by 
(development and environment) NGOs and researchers, who emphasise 
the risks posed by climate change to the sustainable development of poor 
countries.  
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input  
As already indicated in the preceding discussion, the EU’s primary focus is 
to integrate climate change into development cooperation and not the other 
way around. Indeed, many synergies and co-benefits may exist at the 
operational level. For instance, the establishment of a local energy system 
based on renewable energy reduces the need for energy imports and the 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions being emitted. But there are also 
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many cases where climate change and development objectives conflict, e.g. 
when large-scale investments in the energy sector are more expensive 
when climate change objectives are taken into account. Whereas climate 
change specialists tend to focus on ‘greening’ such investments, 
development specialists argue that developing countries should be free in 
their choice of energy sources. The EU, when aiming to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, could subsequently decide to provide the additional 
resources needed to ‘green’ investments in the energy sector.  
National development experts are involved in EU policy-making on 
CDM and adaptation activities in developing countries, although they are 
sometimes constrained by a lack of time and must often rely on their 
environment counterparts to keep informed of what has been agreed in the 
high-level negotiations between developing and industrialised countries. In 
this respect it is essential for participants of the developing countries expert 
group to the WP IEI to attend the international climate negotiations, 
participate in the EU coordination meetings, and where possible, be present 
at the most important formal and informal negotiating sessions with 
developing country representatives. 
An area where more mainstreaming could take place is the EU input 
in international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank, an 
issue that has been at the heart of the G-8 process on climate change and 
energy. As the EU coordinates its position in the IFIs, it would seem 
coherent to take climate change, energy and development objectives into 
account along with the insights of energy specialists (see energy fiche). This 
would require an active stance by development experts focusing on climate 
change and energy. 
Besides international finance, other policy areas of the EU also 
influence whether developing countries and in particular their citizens will 
be able to cope with the increased variability of the climate. For instance, 
the ability to diversify one’s livelihood is key, but the poor in LDCs are 
constrained by the EU’s common agricultural policy and trade agreements 
as they influence to a large extent the choice of agricultural products in 
LDCs. This complex, but important situation implies that intensified 
cooperation between development, climate change, agriculture and trade 
specialists might be needed in order to ensure coherent policies towards 
the LDCs. This might be an areas for new initiatives, for instance in the 
form of a Commission Communication, a presidency-sponsored conference 
or at a later stage a combined WP meeting or even a Friends of the 
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A much larger systemic change would be to perceive climate change 
less as an environmental issue and more as an economic development and 
foreign affairs topic. Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures 
are undertaken mostly in non-environmental sectors, notably energy, 
spatial planning, infrastructure and agriculture, or are strongly influenced 
by decisions taken outside the environmental remit, e.g. international 
finance, ODA and research cooperation. It could benefit policy coherence 
for development if climate change policy were to be approached from a 
more holistic viewpoint, for instance to be dealt with by the GAERC, with 
energy, environment and other interests closely involved during the 
preparatory stages. Acknowledgment of the wisdom of this holistic 
approach has already been indicated by the decision of the European 
Council to continue its discussions of the issue of climate change 
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8.  Organigram – Climate Change Policy-Making in the EU with a 
focus on the Council of the European Union 
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Case Study on Climate Change in the Context of 
Development Cooperation 
Alan Hudson 
1.  Introduction 
In November 2004, the Council – in its General Affairs and External 
Relations configuration – adopted conclusions on climate change in the 
context of development cooperation, along with an Action Plan. The initial 
proposal had been made by the European Commission in March 2003, in 
the format of a Communication. The purpose of the strategy and Action 
Plan is to mainstream climate change into the EU’s programme of 
development cooperation, and to enable developing countries to integrate 
strategies to deal with climate change into their development plans, in 
particular by supporting them in the implementation of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol (see climate change 
fiche for details of the history of the EU’s engagement with climate change 
issues). 
2.  Implications for development 
Climate change has tended to be seen as an environmental issue, but it is of 
great significance for development and developing countries. Climate 
change puts at risk efforts to reduce poverty and make progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals. This is because the negative impacts 
of climate change are felt more severely by poor people and countries, 
which are more dependent on natural resources and often lack the capacity 
to cope with climatic variability and extremes. For donors of development 
assistance such as the EU and its member states, it is essential that climate 
change is mainstreamed into their development cooperation activities 
because otherwise their efforts to promote poverty reduction in developing 
countries may be rendered ineffective. In short, incoherence between 
approaches to development and to climate change will lead to inefficient 
use of resources. 
The Action Plan provides a menu of options available for selection by 
the member states and organised into four key themes. The first is about 88 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
raising the profile of climate change with policy-makers in both developing 
countries and EU member states. The second is about supporting 
adaptation to climate change and mainstreaming such efforts into national 
strategies for poverty reduction. The third concerns supporting the 
mitigation of the causes of climate change, for instance as regards energy 
supply, energy use and transport infrastructure. And the fourth is about 
supporting capacity development; working with the public sector, the 
private sector and civil society in developing countries, to enhance their 
capacity to deal effectively with climate change issues. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and development inputs 
DG Development, on behalf of the Commission, produced its 
Communication on climate change in the context of development 
cooperation, in March 2003.1 Throughout the process of policy evolution, 
DG Development was in the lead for the Commission, although there was 
close cooperation with DG Environment, in particular through the inter-
service consultation. There was also relatively good cooperation between 
development ministries and environment ministries in member states, 
which was very important for an initiative aimed at mainstreaming climate 
change (an ‘environmental’ issue) in development cooperation. 
In December 2003, the Council – in its General Affairs and External 
Relations configuration – agreed Council Conclusions, welcoming the 
Communication but asking that further work be done by the relevant 
Council Expert Group to elaborate the Action Plan.2 In November 2004, 
once further work had been done on the Action Plan, the Council agreed to 
adopt the strategy and Action Plan.3 Climate change tends to be dealt with 
by the Environment configuration of the Council, but as the strategy is 
about the EU’s relations with developing country partners, GAERC was the 
relevant Council configuration. 
                                                      
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on climate change in the context of development cooperation, 11 March 
2003, COM (2003) 85-final. 
2 Council conclusions on climate change in the context of development policy, 5 
December 2003. See also “NGO comments on the draft text of the revised Action 
Plan”, EU Consultation Workshop, 14 June 2004. 
3 Council conclusions on climate change in the context of development 
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Below the level of Council, the Working Parties on Development 
Cooperation and on International Environmental Issues (the climate change 
configuration of this Working Party) were very active. The Working Party 
on Development Cooperation was in the lead, as it was the expert group 
the GAERC had in mind when taking its decision in December 2003. 
However, the International Environmental Issues Working Party was 
regularly consulted and in fact its subordinate Developing Countries 
Expert Group was asked by CODEV to take care of most of the preparatory 
discussions on the action plan, given its expertise on the issue. This feature 
of the process – involving Working Parties from development and non-
development streams – is particularly noteworthy and provides a 
significant contrast to, for instance, the experience recounted in the case 
study on fisheries. 
In terms of expert groups, the Developing Countries Expert Group 
was particularly active, informing the work of the Working Party on 
International Environmental Issues. Its members included strong 
representation from member states’ development agencies, including those 
of the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and France. 
Relationships between the more development- and climate change-focused 
Working Parties and Expert Groups seem to have worked well. Indeed, 
there was much overlap between memberships, with most of the people on 
the Developing Countries Expert Group also involved in the International 
Environmental Issues and Development Cooperation Working Parties. 
The presidency too played an important and constructive role, with 
the Irish Presidency pushing the issue forward in the first half of 2004, and 
the Netherlands Presidency bringing the initiative to conclusion. Under the 
Irish Presidency the Action Plan was revised through a process involving 
consultation with developing countries and civil society organisations 
(CSOs); it should be noted that CSOs had criticised the initial Action Plan 
for lacking detail on responsible actors, time-frames, target groups, funding 
and monitoring. The Irish Presidency also worked to ensure that 
developing countries – the ministries of finance and planning in particular 
– were part of the process, which will be essential when it comes to 
implementation. And, the Irish Presidency also introduced some useful 
innovations in the ways in which the EU deals with climate change issues, 
making it more outward-looking and more inclined to engage with 
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officials to push on particular issues, and improving relationships between 
working groups. 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence for development 
The evolution of the EU’s strategy and Action Plan on climate change in the 
context of development cooperation holds a number of lessons in terms of 
policy coherence for development: 
•  The Action Plan framed climate change in terms of development 
cooperation. This ensured that development concerns were central. It 
would appear that this developmental-framing came about because of 
the drive given to the initiative by the Dutch and Irish Presidencies, and 
the leadership provided by the development community. 
•  Coherence at EU level was only possible because of close formal and 
informal cooperation between environment/climate change and 
development ministries in member states’ capitals. No country objected 
strongly to climate change being dealt with, for the purpose of the 
Action Plan, as a development issue. 
•  Even if coherence is achieved on paper by the EU, attaining coherence 
in practice depends on implementation, within the EU and in partner 
countries. Involving developing countries – and particularly the 
decision-makers in their governments – is essential if the strategy 
produced is to be implemented effectively.  
•  Effective relationships, and even overlapping memberships between 
Working Parties and Expert Groups approaching the issue from 
‘development’ and ‘non-development’ angles can be very helpful for 
delivering coherence. But, rather than leaving this to chance, when non-
development issues are likely to have significant developmental 
impacts there should be some formalisation of relationships between 
‘development’ and ‘non-development’ work-streams. 
•  Presidencies can play an important role in pushing issues forward, and 
ensuring that development dimensions are to the fore. They can also 
play an important role in re-shaping institutional procedures, e.g. 
deciding which Council formation and WP deals with the issue, and 
allowing non-presidency lead negotiators to be involved in external 
representation, etc. In order for efforts to attain policy coherence for 
development to be effective, there needs to be good coordination 
between presidencies to ensure that issues are taken forward. 
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4. Fiche on EU Security Policy 
Marius Vahl 
1.  Origins 
Security policy is one of the most recent additions to the competences of the 
EU. Discussions on international security issues began in the 1970s in the 
framework of the European Political Cooperation. Yet it was not until 1992 
that these talks were given a treaty basis, through the establishment of the 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) at Maastricht. EU security policy was further developed with 
the Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) Treaties, particularly in the latter 
through the creation of the European security and defence policy (ESDP).  
Security policy is a primary example of the intergovernmental 
approach towards policy-making in the EU. The Council of Ministers plays 
the dominant role in all stages of the policy-making process, supported by 
an increasingly influential Council Secretariat. 
The  European  Commission, however, is ‘fully associated’ with the 
policy and may for instance submit proposals on the CFSP to the Council – 
as may any member state – and assist the presidency in the negotiation of 
international agreements on CFSP. It also manages the parts of the CFSP 
budget that do not have military or defence implications. The Commission 
and the Council are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU 
external activities. The European Parliament plays a marginal role in the 
CFSP, and shall according to the Treaty merely be regularly informed by 
the presidency and consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the 
CFSP.  
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
While the Council makes decisions for defining and implementing the 
CFSP, the European Council sets out its principles and general guidelines. 
The  presidency  represents the Union and is responsible for the 
implementation of Council decisions on CFSP, including the negotiations of 
agreements with non-EU countries on matters covered by the CFSP.  92 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) is the main 
decision-making arm on EU security policy. The GAERC consists of EU 
foreign ministers and the high representative for the CFSP (HR). Ministers 
responsible for European affairs, defence, development and trade also 
participate, depending on the items on the agenda. The meetings of the 
GAERC are prepared by Coreper II, the more senior of the two 
configurations of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
Special institutions were established to manage the CFSP and the 
ESDP by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The Amsterdam Treaty created 
the post of HR, held by the Secretary-General (SG) of the Council. 
According to the TEU (Art. 18, para. 3 and Art. 26), the HR/SG assists the 
presidency. The HR/SG assists the Council on CFSP matters through 
contributions to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy 
decisions. S/he can also conduct political dialogue with third parties on 
behalf of the Council at the request of the presidency. The HR/SG is 
assisted by a Policy Unit, which operates separately from the ‘old’ External 
Relations Directorate-General of the Council Secretariat. A gradual de facto 
merger has been occurring between these two policy-making bodies 
through the establishment of joint task forces led by ‘double-hatted’ senior 
officials and including personnel from both the Policy Unit and the DG for 
Politico–Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat. The Council may also 
appoint EU special representatives (Art. 18, para. 5 of the TEU) for 
geographical regions (the Great Lakes region, Middle East and South 
Caucasus) or the HR/SG may appoint personal representatives on thematic 
issues (e.g. non-proliferation and human rights, and others having no basis 
in the TEU). 
A  Political and Security Committee (PSC) of specially appointed 
ambassadors of the member states was established by the Treaty of Nice to 
monitor the international situation and the implementation of agreed 
policies, and to contribute to the def i n i t i o n  o f  p o l i c i e s  b y  d e l i v e r i n g  
opinions to the Council, either on its own initiative or following a request 
from the Council. The PSC further exercises “political control and strategic 
direction of crisis management operations”, albeit “under the responsibility 
of the Council”, which may authorise the PSC to take decisions concerning 
control and direction.1 
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The PSC is the main preparatory body on security for the Council, as 
well as being the main body to discuss broader security issues. 
Furthermore, ESDP operations are managed by the PSC. Formally, the PSC 
reports to Coreper II. In practice, Coreper II has left responsibility for 
security issues in the Council to be handled by the PSC. Coreper II is 
normally drawn in only on considerations of financial issues or where there 
is a strong Commission involvement. 
The Military Committee of the EU (EUMC) is the highest military body 
of the EU and consists of national chiefs of defence and their military 
representatives. The EUMC gives military advice and recommendations to 
the PSC, and provides military direction to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). 
The EUMS is a Council Secretariat department attached directly to the 
HR/SG and consists of military staff seconded from member states. The 
EUMS provides military expertise (early warning, situation assessment and 
strategic planning for ESDP operations) and implements decisions made by 
the EUMC. 
The PSC is assisted by two further working groups: the Political 
Military Group (PMG), which prepares the meetings of the PSC and consists 
of the deputy PSC ambassadors, and the Civilian Crisis Management 
Committee (CIVCOM). Security issues are handled in a number of other 
working groups and committees, including the working groups on the 
European Defence Agency, those on consular services (CONON), on rescue 
operations (PROCIV), terrorism (COTER), the UN (CONUN), proliferation 
and others. Furthermore, geographical working groups are also involved. 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
CFSP decisions are made in the Council by unanimity. In the case of a 
member state’s veto, the matter is returned to the European Council, which 
has to take a decision by unanimity. There are provisions for abstention in 
the treaties, but these are rarely invoked, as they do not prevent the 
adoption of a decision. Qualified majority voting has been introduced on 
decisions related to common strategies, the implementation of joint actions, 
common positions or the appointment of CFSP special representatives. In 
practice, however, the Council takes decisions by consensus.  
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4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
The policy-making process revolves around the monthly meetings of the 
GAERC, with the other institutions being involved in the preparation of 
these meetings and the follow-up of its decisions. 
The process is typically initiated by a member state or the 
Commission, or a situation or development emanating outside the Union 
that is considered to warrant a response or a policy from the EU. The 
Council or the PSC often request joint papers from the Policy Unit/Council 
Secretariat on the matter at hand, which is then discussed in the PSC. The 
PSC then requests a more detailed paper with recommendations from the 
relevant working group or committee, most often the PMG. Following an 
initial discussion in the PSC, other committees such as CIVCOM are 
consulted before the PSC takes a decision.  
The matter is then referred to the Council. The presidency draws up 
the agenda for the GAERC and prepares its conclusions. The support 
provided to the presidency by the Council Secretariat in preparing the 
Council agenda varies between presidencies: while some actively seek such 
suggestions from the HR/SG, other presidencies prefer to manage the 
agenda with less assistance from the Council Secretariat.  
The role of the Secretariat and the HR/SG is nevertheless becoming 
increasingly prominent in both the formulation and the execution of EU 
security policy. The Secretariat’s support functions are gradually becoming 
more focused on the HR/SG, rather than on the presidency or the Council 
as such. Although the presidency draws up the agenda, the HR/SG is 
virtually always asked to brief the foreign ministers on specific security 
issues, including the various options for a Council decision. 
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
There are multiple vetoes at multiple levels on EU security policy. To a far 
greater extent than in other policy areas, security policy is dominated by 
the three large member states: Germany, France and the UK. When the ‘big 
3’ agree on a security issue, it is highly unlikely that any of the other 
member states will oppose their proposed action. A strongly held position 
by a big member state on a specific issue is more likely to sway smaller 
member states and affect the eventual decision than a strongly held 
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Despite the fact that decisions are formally made by the GAERC, in 
practice most security issues are agreed upon in the PSC. Sometimes issues 
are already settled in the working groups, typically in the PMG, but more 
often agreement among the member states is reached in the PSC. There 
have been a few cases where member state vetoes have emerged in the 
working groups assisting the PSC, preventing the issue from being brought 
to the Council proper, and by extension any EU action on the matter at 
hand. Although the PSC most often pushes issues of disagreement back to 
the working groups, it does happen that open issues are discussed and 
even conclusions drafted by the Council itself. This mainly occurs on 
urgent issues and does not necessarily depend on the political importance 
of the issue at hand.  
The daily engagement of the Secretariat on each security issue 
provides a continuous push behind EU security policy. Although major 
policy initiatives from the Secretariat often backfire, the Secretariat has 
become increasingly influential through strings of smaller more modest 
initiatives. This situation is reflected in the fact that the number of 
proposals submitted by the member states have declined considerably, as 
they prefer to influence the eventual decision through informal contacts 
with the Council Secretariat.  
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Discussions on policy coherence and a ‘comprehensive approach’ take 
place at the highest political levels – in the European Council and the 
GAERC.  
Links with development issues arise frequently in connection with 
discussions on countries or regions with which the EU has extensive 
development cooperation (i.e. Africa). There is a certain hesitation on the 
part of participants in the PSC to obtain information on relevant EU 
development policies. It is often left to committees to inform them about 
information provided previously to other – more development-related – 
groups. Coordination at the level of member states also needs 
improvement.  
The member states increasingly ask the Council Secretariat to 
cooperate with the Commission and DG Development in the preparation of 
papers and there has been a considerable amount of joint 96 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
Council/Commission work on security issues with development aspects, 
for instance on security sector reform in Africa.  
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
The principal obstacle to policy coherence on the security-development 
nexus in EU foreign policy is the pillar structure of the Union, which 
requires considerable cooperation and coordination between the Council 
and its structures and the Commission.  
Through the establishment of a legal personality for the EU, the 
Constitution would harmonise legislative procedures across different legal 
bases in the Treaty and the procedure for negotiating and concluding 
international agreements. Yet the distinction between exclusive and shared 
competences would remain (and thus the continuation of mixed 
agreements), and there would still be two decision-making procedures – 
the intergovernmental and community methods – for the CFSP and 
development policy, respectively. 
As long as the Constitution is on hold, procedural improvements are 
difficult at lower levels for legal reasons. Enhanced policy coherence must 
therefore take place at the higher political level, either through the 
European Council or (perhaps more plausibly) in the Council. One 
possibility would be to increase the frequency and regularise the 
participation of development ministers in the GAERC.  
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8.  Organigram – Process and structures for the EU’s security 
policy 
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Case Study on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
Alan Hudson 
The EU, within the respective competences of the Community 
and the Member States, will strengthen the control of its arms 
exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU manufactured weaponry 
be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions 
or conflicts in developing countries.1 
1.  Introduction 
The EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was introduced in 1998. 
Member states retain the power to grant or deny applications for licences to 
export arms, but the Code lays down criteria and aims at harmonising 
practices across the EU. The Code of Conduct has two parts. The first is a 
series of eight criteria, which constitute grounds for refusing an application 
to export arms, including the potential impact on human rights, internal 
and regional stability and sustainable development. The second is a set of 
operative provisions for implementing the Code. 
Between the end of 2003 and early 2005, the EU was engaged in a 
process of reviewing and revising the Code. The process of revising the 
Code of Conduct is all but complete. Technical discussions have been 
concluded, but one country has political objections that are linked to the 
debate about lifting the EU’s embargo on arms sales to China. The revision 
of the Code has been about updating it, expanding its scope and tidying it 
up. Perhaps the most significant change is that the Code will now likely 
have the status of an adopted Common Position, and member states will 
have an obligation, although not a legal requirement, to ensure that national 
laws are in compliance. 
In addition, in November 2003 the Working Party on Conventional 
Arms Exports (COARM) issued the first edition of the User’s Guide, 
intended to set out certain agreed practices and clarify member states’ 
responsibilities. This first User’s Guide was intended to unify member 
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states’ practices in respect to Operative Provision 3 of the Code and thus 
lead to an enhanced exchange of information. Subsequently, the User’s 
Guide has been expanded to include chapters on issues such as 
transparency and criteria guidance. Criterion 8 – the sustainable 
development criterion – was the first to be elaborated, with new guidance 
appearing in the 2005 edition of the User’s Guide. Elaboration of criterion 2 
(human rights), a criterion that is crucial to development issues, and 
criterion 7 (end-use controls) is expected to follow. 
2.  Implications for development 
The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and its review, as well as the 
User’s Guide, are of great importance for development because of the close 
links between security and development, and because of the role of EU 
member states in exporting arms to developing countries. In 2004, the four 
major arms-exporting countries in the EU had a 22% share – $4.8 billion – in 
arms exports to developing countries.2 Although it is acknowledged that 
countries have the right to self-defence and may have legitimate interests in 
acquiring military equipment, there is no doubt that the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons fuels conflicts in and between developing 
countries. Additionally, funds spent by developing country governments 
on arms exports are not available for investment in development. In terms 
of policy coherence for development, it would seem inconsistent for the EU 
to spend resources on development cooperation, while at the same time 
risking that its arms exports might undermine sustainable development. 
The revision of the Code of Conduct and the User’s Guide are 
important from a developmental perspective; the Code lays down criteria 
and the User’s Guide provides member states with guidance on the issues 
to consider when determining whether to grant export licences. A Code of 
Conduct with tighter or clearer guidelines about not granting licences that 
might hamper sustainable development or be used for internal repression 
in countries where human rights abuses have taken place, may stem the 
flow of arms to developing countries, reduce the risk of conflict and further 
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human rights violations, and prevent developing countries from spending 
excessively on arms. Achieving policy coherence for development in this 
area is about ensuring that the developmental effects of arms exports are 
taken sufficiently into account in both member states’ decisions about 
granting export licences and the EU’s Code of Conduct. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and inputs to development 
policy 
Member states retain the competence to decide on applications for arms 
export licences. As such, the Commission does not play a role in relation to 
the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Rather, it is the member states – 
in capitals and through their representatives on Council committees – who 
are the key actors, in terms of both determining and implementing policy 
through their decisions about whether or not to grant particular licence 
applications. With regard to the Council, the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council is at the apex of decision-making, but COARM is the 
body where the Code of Conduct, its implementation and evolution are 
discussed in detail. 
COARM is chaired by the presidency, and its membership comprises 
member states’ representatives from capitals, a representative from the 
Commission, along with administrative support from the Council 
Secretariat. Member state representatives tend to be from foreign 
ministries; some larger countries may also send a representative from the 
organisation that processes export licence applications. COARM meets 
approximately every two months. The presidency meets with the European 
Parliament once every six months, and, acting in their national capacity 
rather than as members of COARM, national experts attend twice-yearly 
meetings organised by NGOs concerning arms export control. 
The review of the Code of Conduct, and the drafting and issue of the 
User’s Guide (containing best practice guidelines for the interpretation of 
the criteria of the Code) take and have taken place through two parallel 
processes. In terms of development, the action takes place in the 
elaboration of the criteria. Both tasks were managed by COARM. The 
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in early 2005.3 Agreement on the elaboration of criterion 8 passed 
unopposed in COARM on 26 September 2005 and was included in the 
User’s Guide published in October 2005 as “best practices for interpretation 
of criterion 8”.4 The process of elaborating criterion 2 – the human rights 
criterion – is well underway. Germany has led on this process, with a draft 
now having been circulated by COARM. Subject to the responses from 
other member states, the process may be concluded during the Austrian 
Presidency (January-June 2006). 
There are no expert groups feeding into the work of COARM; the 
Working Party itself is where the expertise is to be found. It is very rare for 
officials from development agencies or from the development side of 
foreign ministries to attend meetings of COARM, and the Code of Conduct 
has reportedly not been discussed at the Working Party on Development 
Cooperation. Yet when the Code of Conduct was being developed in the 
late 1990s, the Department for International Development chaired COARM 
and was able to promote criterion 8. As such, under certain circumstances 
COARM can take account of development issues. 
Above the level of COARM is the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), made up of representatives from member states’ permanent 
representations in Brussels. The Council or the PSC may issue instructions 
to COARM. Similarly, COARM’s output may pass through the PSC to the 
Council. For politically contentious issues, there may be substantive 
discussion in the PSC. Above the level of the PSC is the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper). This committee endorsed the new 
Code on 30 June 2005; the Council’s approval has not yet been given. 
With arms export controls, an area of member state competence, the 
European Parliament has no formal role. Nevertheless, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs has produced regular reports on the EU’s Code of Conduct, 
with the Committee on Development providing its opinion too. The 
European Parliament’s report of October 2005 encouraged COARM to 
further strengthen the Code of Conduct, in particular to ensure that EU 
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arms exports do not undermine sustainable development.5 This report was 
forwarded to both COARM and member states by the Rapporteur, in an 
effort to increase the level of engagement between the Parliament and 
COARM. National parliaments have also applied some pressure to push 
the review of the Code in certain directions. 
NGOs such as Saferworld, Oxfam, the International Action Network 
on Small Arms and Amnesty International have sought to influence the 
review of the Code of Conduct, with some success. In particular, the 
elaboration of criterion 8 owes much to the analysis provided by the report 
on  Guns or growth? Assessing the impact of arms sales on sustainable 
development, although from an NGO perspective the key features of their 
proposals – thresholds to enable clear decisions about whether arms 
exports are likely to hamper sustainable development – were not included.6 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence on development objectives 
The review of the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports holds a number 
of lessons in terms of policy coherence for development: 
•  Perhaps especially on a subject area in which the Commission has a 
limited role, it is member states that have the responsibility for 
achieving policy coherence, individually in terms of licensing decisions 
and collectively in terms of reviewing the Code of Conduct. 
•  COARM is the key Council committee. COARM has been seen as a 
technical committee, which is ill-suited for taking account of 
development objectives. But, with COARM firmly established as the 
main committee, it is imperative that it becomes a forum where 
development objectives are discussed. 
•  Efforts to attain policy coherence on development objectives can be 
very much influenced by political issues that might seem distant from 
                                                      
5 See European Parliament, Report on the Council’s Sixth Annual Report according to 
Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 
Rapporteur: Raül Romeva i Rueda, A6-0292/2005 final, 12.10.2005. 
6 See Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA) and Oxfam, Guns or growth? Assessing the impact of arms sales on sustainable 
development, Amnesty International, New York, IANSA, London and Oxfam, 
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the issue at hand (e.g. the EU’s embargo on arms exports to China). This 
can stimulate progress towards policy coherence for development, but 
also hinder progress. 
•  Arms exports are a pillar 2 inter-governmental issue, while 
development is, in part, a pillar 1 area of Community competence. This 
distinction can be a source of friction, for instance in terms of efforts to 
prevent the spread of small arms in developing countries. The division 
of responsibilities between the Commission and the Council needs to be 
clear and well-understood. 
•  The use of criteria to guide decision-making about whether or not to 
grant arms export licences has played a useful role in ensuring that 
development objectives are not forgotten. Nevertheless, the existence of 
clear criteria does not ensure that they are interpreted and applied in 
the same ways by different countries; political considerations can 
override the application of the criteria. Elaboration of the criteria is very 
important. In addition, there is a danger that once a ‘development 
criterion’ has been established, stakeholders will take the view that the 
development issues are covered entirely by that criterion. To prevent 
this, efforts must be made to clarify the relationship between different 
criteria and to ensure that criteria – which aim at preventing 
development from being forgotten – do not lead to development being 
marginalised. 
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5. Fiche on EU Agricultural Policy  
Jorge Núñez Ferrer 
1.  Origins 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union is a common 
European sectoral policy, where the EU has exclusive competence. The 
European Commission and the Agricultural and Fisheries Council of the 
EU are the central policy decision-makers, with the European Parliament 
only playing a consultative role for the core areas of support. The European 
Commission has the right of initiative for the policy, monitors its 
implementation and is generally seen as playing a large role in the policy-
making process; its implementation however is in the hands of national 
ministries of agriculture.  
From its inception until the late 1980s, the Directorate General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission and the 
Council of the EU for Agriculture ran the policy with little regard to 
economic distortions, effects on the environment or impacts on developing 
countries. It was largely considered that the policy was internal in nature 
and international implications were ignored or misunderstood. A 
combination of budgetary pressures, rise of social and environmental 
concerns, as well as trade conflicts caused by market distortions led to 
radical changes in the policy. Since the early 1990s, impacts on developing 
countries have increasingly informed policy formulation and decision-
making. This is due to an increased awareness that market support 
interventions and other subsidies can have implications on other countries 
and due to enhanced attention in the Commission to ‘better policy-making’. 
The EU’s CAP has exerted an important influence on trade flows of 
agricultural goods, thus affecting agricultural production patterns in 
developing countries. Production-enhancing support for producers and 
export subsidies have undermined local production. In some cases, 
however, the policy has benefited certain developing countries, either 
through cheaper import prices of certain food commodities or by 
preferential access of certain products such as sugar to the EU market. 
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benefits, while unintended indirect development support through distorted 
world markets is not an efficient policy approach to development.  
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
For agricultural policy, once the Commission has tabled a proposal, the 
Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), composed of the agricultural 
attaches of the permanent representation of the member states, meet to 
discuss it. The SCA is one of the strongest committees in the Council and is 
the equivalent to Coreper for most of the files it discusses. It reports 
directly to the Council of the EU. The SCA often delegates to specialist 
working groups the analysis of technical aspects of the proposals. There are 
22 working groups and 45 associated groups in charge of the specific areas 
under the SCA, a few of which are related to fisheries. There are specific 
working groups on each commodity market (beef, sugar, wheat, wine, etc.) 
and technical groups on issues such as phytosanitary or veterinary rules. 
Coreper II, however, is also involved in the overall financial and political 
aspects. Thus Coreper can be found working on the same proposal as SCA, 
but concentrating on different aspects, e.g. its budgetary implications. 
Given the nature of the CAP, with specific directives concerning all 
aspects of the sector down to very technical areas, the SCA has been less 
successful historically in reaching agreement before formal discussions by 
Ministers in the Council than is the case in other policy areas. The decision-
making procedure is highly politicised, with lobbies placing pressure on 
the Commission during the development of the proposals and on the 
governments of the member states throughout the preparation and 
negotiation of the policies. Politicians in the Council are also affected by 
their constituencies, which in some countries include strong agricultural 
interests. There is thus stronger pressure to maintain the support to the 
agricultural sector than to support developing countries.  
The Commission, however, retains a central role throughout even 
after submitting the proposal, as it is the guarantor of all agreements 
undertaken by the EU and is responsible for ensuring coherence between 
decisions across policy areas also during Council deliberations. Attaining 
coherence with the separate national policies of member states (rare with 
the CAP, as it is a fully common policy) will depend on the internal 
coordination within the member states. 
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3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
As a common policy with precise standards and rules for the different 
agricultural subsidies and as the standard-setter for the whole food chain in 
the EU, the CAP is governed legally through regulations. For the 
regulations relating to the Common Market Organisation (mainly 
intervention prices, direct payments or export subsidies), the decision-
making procedure in place is the ‘consultation procedure’. However, for 
matters relating to rural development, phytosanitary rules, animal welfare 
or consumer protection, the ‘co-decision procedure’ is in place. The 
difference is that with the consultation procedure, the European Parliament 
only has to be consulted and that with the co-decision procedure, as the 
name indicates, it has powers to co-legislate in conjunction with the 
Council. 
In the Council the voting rule for agriculture and rural development 
is Qualified Majority Voting, although the Council tends to not vote 
formally and to reach agreements based on consensus. Some countries have 
also historically managed to possess implicit veto power (see point 5). 
Formal voting occurs in the Council, and the SCA (or Coreper I) performs 
all preliminary negotiations and briefs the respective ministries. If the SCA 
(or Coreper I) reaches an unequivocal agreement (usually on non-
controversial technical issues), the point will be presented as an ‘A point’ in 
the Council, which is usually approved without discussion. In case there 
remain disagreements, the point will be presented as a ‘B point’, indicating 
that the Council has to negotiate. B points, which are generally 
fundamental policy changes, are negotiated directly by the Ministers in the 
Council of the EU. The Agricultural Council is known for having the 
longest negotiation sessions and the largest number of B points.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
The Commission has the power of initiative and develops the proposals. 
Many consultations with specialists, officials of member states and civil 
society are carried out during the preparation of the proposals and during 
the extended impact assessment, when there is one. The Directorate 
General of Agriculture and Rural Development also consults other services 
of the Commission which are affected by the policy. DGs BUDGET, REGIO, 
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nature of the policy DGs DEV, TRADE and others will be invited to attend. 
A problem often encountered for agriculture is the lack of specialists in 
agricultural policy in other DGs, including at times DG Development, 
reducing their ability to provide input in the policy development during 
consultations.  
Once the proposals have been presented to the Council, the SCA and 
its delegated working groups will discuss the technical aspects of the policy 
proposals, and Coreper II will discuss any wider financial and political 
dimensions. The SCA is usually composed of agricultural attachés or 
specialist envoys of the ministries of agriculture; the working groups are 
technical specialists (veterinary, phytosanitary, soils). The Commission is 
represented in the SCA and working groups by the relevant Director and 
Heads of Unit. It regularly amends the proposals according to the 
developing consensus 
The Commission’s central role is particularly visible at international 
trade negotiations. Before commitments can be made by the EU in these 
settings, they have to be compatible with existing EU legislation or if not, 
they need the support of the member states to adapt EU legislation to the 
new trade rules. It is not uncommon for the Agriculture Commissioner to 
attend WTO negotiations and to be accompanied by agricultural ministers 
from the EU member states who are there to ensure that their position is 
reflected in the Commission’s stance at all times. Top officials from DG 
Agriculture and agricultural ministries are also closely involved in the 
preparations.  
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
The main bulk of the consultation is done by the Commission during the 
course of drafting the proposals. The Commission engages in external 
consultations on the proposals, with member state representatives, 
representatives of the sector, NGOs and other civil society organisations, 
such as the agricultural lobbies, the most powerful and influential of all at 
EU level being COPA/COGEGA (which integrates many lobbies), or 
representatives of input suppliers, such as EFMA (European Fertilizer 
Manufacturing Association). On development-related issues, NGOs such as 
OXFAM and WWF are very active. 
The Council voting rule is QMV, but some member states have 
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under the implicit rule of the Luxembourg compromise. France and 
Germany are considered in the literature to possess an implicit veto power 
due to their population weight and importance as founding members and 
as gross contributors to the budget (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997; 
Nugent, 1999). In any case, the Council tends to avoid agreeing on changes 
that do not reach consensus, even if it is formally possible to adopt with 
QMV (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006). 
The European Parliament is not very powerful on CAP matters due 
to its sole role as consulted body, while for veterinary, consumer protection 
or animal welfare, its influence has been much more marked as it has a co-
decision power on these issues. The Parliament has an Agricultural 
Committee composed mainly of MEPs with agricultural interests and who 
in general tend to defend the interests of the farming sector. Contacts 
between this group and Committees dealing with trade, development or 
environment have not always been very strong and their interests diverge. 
However, a group of MEPs have created LUFPIG (Land Use and Food 
Policy Intergroup) as a kind of policy debate group on the role of 
agriculture in the economy, trade and development areas. This group tends 
t o  f a v o u r  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  a n d  some members of the Agricultural 
Committee are members of LUFPIG. 
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Most of the concerns on development impacts are addressed by the 
Commission during the preparation of legislative proposals. DG 
Agriculture is required to consult other Directorates General within the 
Commission as well as officials of member states and trade associations. 
During this inter-service consultation, the lead DG has a strong influence, 
as it decides which DGs to consult and the timing of the process. However, 
neglecting a relevant DG can cause the procedure to encounter major 
problems, effectively blocking the proposal preparation. Thus the lead DG 
has an interest to consult early and widely any proposal in preparation. DG 
Development is often invited, but it does not always attend or affect the 
policy development, as either the DG does not have appropriate 
agricultural experts to follow the dossier, or the officials of DG AGRI and 
other associated DGs are unable to understand the development 
implications. It is important in interdepartmental meetings to be highly 
specialised in the subject and to win other DGs approval for amendments. 
It is rare for agricultural specialists of other DGs present at meetings to POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU COUNCIL| 109 
 
argue convincingly for incorporating development aspects in policy 
proposals.  
The same holds true for the impact assessments, where DG 
Development tends to be even less involved and less able to provide input 
in a meaningful and successful way.  
For external consultation, the main avenue is a public consultation, in 
which all stakeholders can contribute. The Commission launches the 
consultation online with an explanatory document on the reform options 
and ideas, such as the recent launch of a consultation for a reform of the 
fruit and vegetable CMO (common market organisation). For sugar reform, 
a more restricted consultation process was followed, involving only the 
major organisations, some of which are also represented in the Advisory 
Committee on sugar. It is the lead DG that determines the scope of the 
consultation. 
Before proposals are presented to the Council, amendments 
addressing development aspects can proposed by the Parliament, 
Committee of the Regions or the Economic and Social Committee after 
consultation. The level of interest these bodies have in development 
questions has been rather low, due to the composition of the main 
committees responsible for preparing their opinions. However, neither 
body has the capacity to impose amendments for the CAP in the 
consultation procedure, and the Commission is only obliged to incorporate 
the Parliament’s amendments in the co-decision procedure, where the 
approval of the Parliament in necessary.  
The Council bodies at all levels can propose the integration of 
development aspects. The Commission will decide if and how to amend 
proposals in order to reach a consensus. The Commission is only ‘obliged’ 
to integrate changes into the proposal if at the Council of Ministers a 
unanimous decision is taken to integrate a specific change. It is clear, 
however, that sectoral working groups and ministers of agriculture will 
have a limited interest in ensuring policy coherence for development. 
The Council of Ministers or the Council of the European Union 
(Heads of State) can always request the Commission (unanimous request of 
all member states) to prepare new proposals for reforming or creating new 
policies, or to prepare reviews of policies and their impacts, including 
impacts on developing countries. Although development concerns have 
not often been the central concern of these requests in the area of 
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1990s, due to pressures exerted by developing countries through the WTO, 
even if often motivated by the need to find convincing arguments to defend 
certain measures of the Common Agricultural Policy against rising 
criticism.  
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
There are several areas in EU agricultural policy where procedures for 
ensuring PCD can be strengthened. First, it is important that national 
governments have their development objectives carefully coordinated with 
their ministries of agriculture, given the important implications that EU 
agricultural policies can have for trade. 
At EU level, there have been instances where the positions of the 
Trade Commissioner have apparently not been well coordinated with the 
Commissioner for Agriculture or with other Commissioners, including 
development. In general, it is important that the Commission President not 
only is aware of the needs to integrate development concerns into the areas 
of action, but also ensures that all services and the Commissioners integrate 
development considerations in their decision-making process.  
The EU has embarked in the right direction eliminating trade 
distortions created by the policy in the different CAP reforms since 1992. 
The EU has to continue this path, but has to be careful that the overall 
policy structure for agriculture is in line with the needs to assist developing 
countries to participate and take advantage of the world market. Policy 
changes, such as increasingly stringent phytosanitary rules which create 
non-trade barriers have to be avoided. Studies by the World Bank have 
shown that several of these controls are unjustifiable. Political or 
protectionist interests of the developed countries, which introduce 
prohibitive phytosanitary costs under the pretext of protecting human 
health from highly improbable diseases, should be avoided. An example of 
the disproportionate relationship of risk versus the costs was the attempt 
by the EU to impose a standard on Aflatoxins1 superior to the one required 
by the Codex Alimentarius. The World Bank estimated that the number of 
deaths avoided by the new rule was of 1.4 for every billion people as 
compared to the Codex standards, but would eliminate 64% or $670 million 
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worth of African imports, with clearly more devastating effects on the 
livelihood of the African populations.  
To guarantee that development concerns are incorporated in EU 
decision-making, it is important to start by ensuring that these aspects are 
taken into account at the drafting stage. It is difficult to incorporate these 
once a policy proposal reaches the Council. The Commission must ensure 
that impact assessments incorporate development concerns, that DG DEV 
is involved and that relevant experts are consulted. The Commission can 
strengthen its capacity to incorporate these concerns through training and 
by having officials in the DGs dedicated to this issue. 
At the Council, it is more difficult to ensure that the working groups 
all follow the development concerns. Officials from member states cannot 
be requested to follow training on this, nor can the different working 
groups easily incorporate members of CODEV. There are various 
horizontal issues – gender mainstreaming, environment, Lisbon strategy, 
etc. – that would need to be taken into account in all Council working 
groups. This is the reason why it is much easier to have the Commission 
integrate the development policy concerns. 
In the Council, however, there is at present no system in place for a 
working group e.g. on environment to give advice on a proposal in the area 
of agriculture or financial affairs. It would be possible to add one additional 
step at Council level where working groups on horizontal issues do a 
preliminary reading to comment on the issue before the sectoral working 
group convenes. This would require that (specialised expert groups led by) 
CODEV would screen proposals for any development issues before it 
reaches the SCA or other Coreper I group.  
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8.  Organigram – Agricultural Policy-Making in the EU Council  
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Case Study on the Reform of the EU’s Sugar Regime 
Alan Hudson 
Within the framework of the reformed Common Agricultural Policy, 
the EU will substantially reduce the level of trade distortion related 
to its support measures to the agricultural sector, and facilitate 
developing countries’ agricultural development.1 
1.  Introduction 
The EU’s sugar regime has been characterised by high guaranteed internal 
prices, quotas, tariffs, export subsidies and preferential access to EU 
markets for ACP sugar producers in Sugar Protocol Countries. At great 
cost, it has led to the over-production of sugar in the EU, distorted world 
markets, and led some ACP countries to be reliant on the preferential 
market access which they have enjoyed since the entry into force of the 
Sugar Protocol in 1975. 
The EU has grappled with the issue of sugar regime reform for many 
years, and recently has made determined progress. The pace of change has 
increased because: firstly, there has been a realisation that the sugar regime 
is inefficient, expensive and unsustainable, and will become more 
unsustainable as the Everything But Arms (EBA) Agreement provides 
enhanced access to LDC producers; and secondly, because the WTO ruled 
that the EU must drastically reduce its use of export subsidies, a move that 
strengthened the need to stop over-production. 
On 20 February 2006, the EU Council formally adopted a regulation 
that will lead to the reorganisation of the EU sugar regime.2 The key feature 
of the reform is a reduction of 36% in the price of sugar over four years. 
This will lead to a substantial reduction in EU sugar production. However, 
producers will benefit from a voluntary restructuring aid scheme, and 
growers from direct income payments amounting to 64% of their losses. As 
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production decreases, so will the need for trade-distorting export subsidies. 
Concluding a parallel process of policy-making, on 15th February 2006, the 
Council and the European Parliament both adopted a regulation 
establishing accompanying measures for ACP countries likely to be 
affected by the reform of the EU’s sugar regime.3 For the period from July-
December 2006, this package of support for modernisation, adjustment or 
diversification amounts to Euro 40 million, a sum of money which will 
come out of the EU’s development budget. However, none of this will be 
paid until the end of the year as applications for funds must first be 
evaluated. Support will continue during the period 2007-13 although the 
level is still under negotiation. These funds will again be provided from the 
development budget. 
2.  Implications for development 
The reform of the EU’s sugar regime has complex development 
implications. First, those ACP countries that have enjoyed preferential 
access to the high and guaranteed prices of the EU market will lose 
revenues of around €250 million per year, even if they do not reduce 
production in response to the price cut. However, the likely result of the 
price cut will be a decline of production in many of the Sugar Protocol 
countries, so actual losses of income could amount to €500 million per year. 
Second, the fully liberalised access to the EU market which least-developed 
countries will enjoy from 2009 under the EBA Agreement, will be access to 
a market characterised by lower prices than currently pertain. And, if their 
exports to the EU increase too rapidly, then LDCs may be subject to import 
restrictions. And third, reduced dumping of EU sugar will enable efficient 
sugar producers such as Brazil and South Africa to capture a larger share of 
the world market. The world market price is expected to increase as a result 
of reduced EU production, although there is considerable uncertainty over 
the outcome. 
The impact on countries in sub-Saharan Africa will depend on what 
access they have had to EU markets (whether they are Sugar Protocol 
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countries), what access they will have to EU markets (whether they are 
EBA, and to what extent future Economic Partnership Agreements improve 
access), and how efficient their sugar producers are. In general, Sugar 
Protocol countries will lose out, and EBA countries will gain, but not by as 
much as they would have done had EU prices remained inflated. Efficient 
producers will prosper, inefficient producers may be forced out of business. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and development inputs 
In September 2003 the Commission published a Communication and 
Impact Assessment setting out options for reform of the EU sugar regime. 
This was followed in July 2004 by a Commission Communication outlining 
its proposals for the future of the sugar regime.4 The Commission’s revised 
proposal – taking account of the views of a wide range of interests – was 
presented in June 2005, with DG Agriculture and Rural Development 
taking the lead.5 At the same time, the Commission – with DG 
Development in the lead – presented a proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council to establish accompanying measures 
for those ACP countries affected by reform of the EU sugar regime.6 
As regards the reform of the EU sugar regime, the Council 
institutions involved have been the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, the 
Special Committee on Agriculture, and the Working Party on Sugar and 
Iso-glucose. These fora were the venues for discussion of the internal 
implications and technicalities of the EU sugar reform, discussions to 
which, it has been suggested, development experts could contribute little. 
Certain member states – including the UK – ensured that development 
issues and the interests of ACP states were raised, for instance at meetings 
of the Special Committee on Agriculture. 
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As regards the accompanying measures for ACP countries, the key 
Council institutions have been the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC), Coreper and the Working Party on Development 
Cooperation (CODEV). The ACP Working Party also debated the 
accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries. These fora were the 
venues for discussions on the accompanying measures, not least because 
the payment for such measures would come out of the development 
budget. Very few member states – the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden 
– seem to have been willing to discuss the possibility of funding 
accompanying measures from the agriculture budget, a so-called 
‘agricultural dividend’. And, with financing to be discussed at ECOFIN, 
and at the Agrifin Working Party it was difficult for those member states 
keen to push for an ‘agricultural dividend’ to make their case at the ACP or 
Development Cooperation Working Party. There is little evidence of 
contact between the Working Party on Development Cooperation and the 
Working Party on sugar and iso-glucose; it would seem that the former 
focused on the accompanying measures, and the latter on the nature of the 
EU’s internal reform. 
The European Parliament was active both in terms of the 
accompanying measures, which were dealt with under the co-decision 
procedure, and in terms of the reform of the EU’s sugar regime itself, which 
was dealt with under the consultation procedure. On the former, the 
Development Committee led, taking the view that the accompanying 
measures to support Sugar Protocol producers in 2006 – €40 million – are 
quite inadequate, particularly in comparison with the generous 
compensation offered to EU sugar producers.7 Criticisms of the reforms 
and the support package were also strongly voiced by NGOs including 
Oxfam who had lobbied hard throughout the process on behalf of what 
they took to be the interests of the Sugar Protocol countries. The Sugar 
Protocol countries themselves, along with the LDCs, argued strongly for 
more gradual reform. The Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development led on the EU’s reforms themselves, and proposed many 
amendments to dilute the reform package, including that of restricting 
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imports from LDCs.8 However its report, published in December 2005, 
came after the Council had largely agreed on the package of reforms. 
By the time the proposals were adopted in February 2006, the price 
cut had fallen to 36% from 39%, the amount of income that would be 
provided to farmers via the Single Payment System was unchanged, and 
the time taken to complete the reform had increased from 2 years to 4 
years. 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence for development 
The reform of the EU’s sugar regime holds a range of lessons in terms of 
policy coherence for development: 
•  Dealing with development on a parallel track, separate from the main 
policy proposal, may be effective in terms of reaching some sort of 
agreement. But when discussions take place primarily in non-
development fora, and communications between development and 
non-development fora are poor, there is a risk that development 
concerns may not be taken account of sufficiently. 
•  Coherence at the level of the EU will only come about if there is 
coherence at the level of individual member states. 
•  Decisions on policy reform are taken by those from whose budget line 
the reforms will be paid. For development interests to be taken account 
of, they must be voiced at fora where those who will pay for reform 
come together. If financing decisions are taken at fora where 
development interests are poorly represented, then financing decisions 
will take little account of development. 
•  The impacts of proposed reforms can be uncertain, and – certainly in 
the sugar case – are likely to vary across developing countries. 
Therefore, it is difficult to say what a development-friendly outcome – 
an outcome in which policy coherence for development has been 
attained – is. In a related vein, considerations of impact must be 
disaggregated by country-type, and all players must be clear what they 
mean when they say that development is being taken account of; 
otherwise such claims will become meaningless. 
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6. Fiche on EU Fisheries Policy 
Jorge Núñez Ferrer 
1.  Origins 
EU has exclusive competence in fisheries, as is the case for agriculture. The 
effect of exclusive competence means that member states no longer have 
the power to introduce their own legislation in this area.  
The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union has recently 
been reformed first and foremost due to the unsustainable exploitation of 
Community waters. However, it also addresses the need to improve 
fisheries agreements with third countries and in particular developing 
nations. The Community has one of the largest fishing fleets in the world. 
Most of it operates within Community waters, but an important part of the 
EU fishing sector depends on access to external resources shared with third 
countries. These are in waters under the jurisdiction of non-EU coastal 
states or in international waters. The conditions of access have to be agreed 
between the EU and coastal or flag states. 
The EU adheres today to a Code of Conduct in its international 
agreements, which includes not only the need to ensure that fishing 
resources are used in a sustainable way, but also includes a specific 
assistance package for the developing country partners to modernise their 
fleet. This is achieved through Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPA). 
Also at international level, specialised multinational bodies and 
Regional Fisheries Organisations (RFOs) have been established to 
coordinate fisheries activities. The EU has thus an active international role 
in fishery resource use and in developing countries fishing fleet 
development and use. Nevertheless, the actual benefits of the EU approach 
are undermined by weak statistical data on stocks and the unrestricted 
bilateral agreements of those developing countries with other nations. 
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
For the Fisheries Policy decision-making cycle, once the Commission has 
tabled a proposal, Coreper I, composed of the deputy permanent 
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working groups look after the common fisheries policy; four are exclusively 
dedicated to fisheries. For development issues and the FPA, the working 
group on External Fisheries Policy is the most important.  
The Commission, however, retains a central role throughout and 
even after submitting proposals, as it is the guarantor of all agreements 
undertaken by the EU and responsible to ensure coherence between 
decisions across policy areas also in the Council.  
For fishing agreements, FPAs, the Commission has the mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of the member states. The member states with 
international fleets have representatives present at the negotiations, and 
sometimes also representatives of other member states interested in the 
quality of the EU’s agreements with third countries. 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
For general policy changes, the decision making procedure in place is the 
‘consultation procedure’, for FPAs the member states have to ratify 
agreements in the GAERC Council.  
The voting rule for fisheries in the Agriculture and Fisheries Council 
is Qualified Majority Voting, although the Council tends to not vote 
formally and reach agreements based on consensus. Some countries have 
also historically managed to possess implicit veto power, because they have 
major fishing fleets. Countries without a large fishing fleet or access to the 
sea often do not actively participate in policy decisions, allowing the large 
fishing nations to have a strong influence on the policy.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
The Commission has the power of initiative and develops the proposals. 
Many consultations with specialists, officials of member states and civil 
society are carried out during the preparation of the proposals. For the 2002 
fisheries reform, the Commission embarked on a wide consultation process 
with the publication of the Green Paper on the Future of the Fisheries 
Policy. The Directorate General of Fisheries also consults other services of 
the Commission which are affected by the policy. DGs AGRI, BUDG, 
REGIO, SANCO, ENV and ECFIN are regular attendees, but depending on 
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to attend the interservice meetings at the level of officials and sometimes 
Heads of Unit. See section 5 for more details. 
Once a proposal has been presented to the Council, Coreper I 
discusses it. Working groups will address specific areas of the policy. The 
three main working groups are:  Working Party on External Fisheries 
Policy, Working Party on Internal Fisheries Policy and the Working Party 
of Directors-General of Fisheries Departments. The first two are attended 
mainly by the fishery attachés of the permanent representations. Other 
working parties are involved in fisheries as well, such as the working party 
of veterinary experts for fisheries, or working parties on labelling or Codex 
Alimentarius. The Commission is represented in Coreper and working 
groups by the responsible Director and Heads of Unit. 
Non-controversial items may be agreed at Coreper level and will be 
presented in the Council as A points, usually technical issues agreed 
without discussion by the ministers. ‘B’ points, generally fundamental 
policy changes, are negotiated directly by the Ministers in the Council of 
the EU. The Commission, present in the Council, regularly amends the 
proposals according to the developing consensus. The Commission is 
generally represented by the Commissioner, the Director General and the 
relevant Director.  
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
The bulk of the consultation is done by the Commission during the drafting 
time of the proposals. The Commission engages in external consultations 
on the proposals, with member state representatives, representatives of the 
sector, NGOs and other civil society organisations.  
As for agriculture, the decision-making procedure is highly 
politicised, with lobbies placing much pressure on the Commission during 
the development of the proposals and on the governments of the member 
states throughout the preparation and negotiation of the policies. Given the 
rather specific nature of the policy, interests are concentrated on specific 
countries and interest groups, which has historically affected the 
discussions on wider policy external policy implications. Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s commitment to incorporate a serious development 
dimension and the serious interest by some member states to do so, have 
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The Council voting rule is QMV, but some member states have 
enjoyed  de facto veto powers. Generally, the fisheries policy is of major 
importance only for the countries with large fishing fleets. Thus countries 
with a keen interest, such as Spain, France or the UK, have a very large say 
in the policy. Countries with small fleets or no access to the sea are less 
involved.  
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Most of the concerns on development impacts are addressed by the 
Commission during the preparation of the proposals. DG Fisheries consults 
internally other Directorates General and externally officials of member 
states and lobbyists. Impacts on third countries and the developing 
countries in particular are becoming an integral part of the extended impact 
assessment now required before any proposal is presented. The Green 
Paper in 2001 (COM(2001) 135 final) started the consultation process on the 
future of the policy and dedicated an important part of the document to 
development concerns. Extended impact assessments were prepared, as 
required. Development impacts were included in these assessments, 
although only to a limited extent. 
DG Fisheries is required to consult internally other Directorates 
General and externally officials of member states and lobbyists. As the 
knowledge in other DGs and DG Development on the fisheries policy is 
weak, only marginal inputs were made. As a consequence, the wider 
implications of the fisheries policy are often weakly addressed in 
Commission proposals. 
Amendments addressing development aspects can be proposed by 
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee or the 
Committee of the Regions after their consultation, but these bodies do not 
have the capacity to impose amendments. In any case, for fisheries, due to 
the very specific characteristics of the sector, participation in these bodies is 
limited. 
The Council bodies at all levels can propose to integrate development 
aspects. The Commission will decide if and how to amend proposals in 
order to reach a consensus. The Commission is only ‘obliged’ to integrate 
changes into the proposal if, at the Council of Ministers, a unanimous 
decision is taken to integrate a specific change. The Council of Ministers or 
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(unanimous request of all member states) to prepare new proposals for 
reforming or creating new policies, or to prepare reviews of policies and 
their impacts, including impacts on developing countries. How far these 
development concerns are actually taken into account will depend on the 
quality of the proposals and the interest of member states in development 
issues. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
For the fisheries sector there are several areas where procedures can be 
strengthened. First, it is important that national governments have their 
development objectives properly coordinated with their ministry 
responsible for fisheries, given the important effect the EU can have on 
international fishing waters. This would notably apply both for member 
states with a keen interest in fisheries policies, but as well for member 
states with strong development cooperation links to countries where the 
fisheries sector is or could be an important contributor to economic 
development.  
It is the Commission that ensures that across all Council meetings, no 
EU policies and international commitments are in conflict with each other. 
Coherence at EU level should be guaranteed by the Commission. 
Coherence with national policies has to be guaranteed by the national 
representatives at the working group and Council level.  
This indicates already that the key point to ensure coherence is to 
have a strong initial input by the Commission. As an initiator of policy, its 
capacity to integrate development concerns is critical. The Commission has 
formal systems in place to incorporate development concerns. Reinforcing 
these can take the form of specialist training for relevant Commission 
officials, the existence of a specialist official in the DGs overseeing the work 
of the DG, or further improving the method of consultation of the 
Commission, internally and externally. The EU is a very open institution 
for consultation; thus most changes could concentrate on reinforcing the 
capacity and improving existing mechanisms. 
At Council level this is more difficult. Ensuring that member state 
officials are aware of development concerns cannot be imposed as in an 
organisation like the Commission. However, proposals could be screened 
first by specialised horizontal working groups, such as CODEV, before the 
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participates more fully in the policy coherence process but without 
burdening the specialised groups with additional horizontal-issue officials, 
making the Council meetings unworkable. Additionally, since the 
Common Fisheries Policy is still under the consultation procedure, 
introducing co-decision could increase the interest of the European 
Parliament’s Development Committee to propose policy amendments. 
8.  Organigram of Fisheries Policy-Making in the Council of the EU 
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Case Study of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements 
Alan Hudson 
The EU will continue to pay particular attention to the 
development objectives of the countries with which the 
Community has or will agree fisheries agreements.1 
1.  Introduction 
The EU has, for more than 20 years, entered into agreements with 
developing countries to gain access to their coastal fishing waters in return 
for financial compensation. In principle, the EU will fish only where there 
is a surplus stock which the local fleet does not have the capacity to catch. 
In practice – because of the difficulties of accurately estimating stock levels, 
and because short-term economic interests have taken priority over 
sustainable development – it seems likely that the EU fleet has fished 
beyond sustainable levels. Some 80% of the economic benefits of the EU’s 
external fishing agreements go to the Spanish fleet, with Portugal, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland and Lithuania also benefiting. By 
paying financial compensation to third countries, the EU in effect 
subsidises its member states’ fleets. 
In July 2004, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council agreed to the 
Commission’s proposal for an integrated framework for Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements (FPAs) with third countries.2 Such agreements are 
an external dimension of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy. The integrated 
framework is intended to provide the basis for FPAs which, by prioritising 
sustainable development, will meet the needs of the EU fishing fleet, and 
the needs of fisheries sectors in developing countries. In contrast to earlier 
agreements, a portion – between 20 and 40% – of the financial transfer 
should be for targeted measures to help develop the local fisheries sector. 
Thus far, no FPAs have been ratified; Morocco’s is closest to ratification. All 
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third country agreements which include financial compensation are due to 
be replaced by FPAs by 2008. 
2.  Implications for development 
The EU’s fisheries policy has major implications for developing countries. 
Of the EU’s 20 fisheries agreements with third countries, 18 are with ACP 
states. For many of these states, the financial rewards they receive from 
granting access to the EU fleet are substantial; in total, annual payments 
have amounted to €150 million. For some developing countries, such 
payments can be a significant source of revenue. But the importance of 
fisheries extends beyond the payments received for access; in terms of 
people’s livelihoods and their diets, and in terms of government revenues. 
For instance, in Senegal, around 15% of the economically active population 
derived their livelihoods from fisheries ,  w i t h  f i s h  p r o v i d i n g  7 5 %  o f  t h e  
animal protein in the population’s diet, and up to 50% of export earnings 
come from fish products.3 
If the sustainability of fisheries in developing countries is 
undermined, there will be high developmental costs and eventually a loss 
of the revenue from fisheries agreements. Therefore, if the EU is serious 
about promoting development in its partner countries, then it must ensure 
coherence between the two objectives of its external fisheries agreements: 
promoting the interests of its distant-water fishing fleet, and ensuring the 
sustainable development of third country fisheries. The concept of Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements goes some way in recognising that sustainable 
development is crucial, but it remains to be seen how they will work out in 
practice. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and development inputs 
In 2000, the Commission submitted a Communication to the Council and 
the European Parliament on fisheries and poverty reduction, emphasising 
the need for coherence between the EU’s policies on development and on 
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fisheries.4 This was followed by a Council Resolution on fisheries and 
poverty reduction in 2001, and then – after the revision of the Common 
Fisheries Policy – a Communication from the Commission on an Integrated 
Framework for Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Third Countries, in 
December 2002.5 The Council conclusions on fisheries partnership 
agreements were produced in July 2004, after 18 months of negotiations, a 
period of time which illustrates the complexity of the issues and the 
diversity of EU member states’ views. By July 2004, near-consensus had 
been reached, but Coreper was invited to consider proposed amendments 
from Sweden and Germany, relating in particular to making the results of 
impact assessments available to member states in good time. 
The Council Conclusions of 2004 provide the Commission with the 
framework to negotiate specific FPAs with third countries. A mandate is 
also required from the Council for each specific agreement. With fisheries 
being an area of Community competence, the Commission is very much in 
the lead. It is the hub of negotiations, with other institutions – including 
Council Working Groups – reportedly reduced to the role of pleading with 
the Commission to take certain issues forward. Within the Commission, 
DG Fisheries is very much in the lead, with DG Development consulted as 
regards implementation and monitoring, but somewhat marginalised and 
lacking the resources to be a champion for development issue as regards 
fisheries policy. Development, it would seem, is not the motivation for 
FPAs; their purpose is to promote the interests of EU fishing fleets. 
The Working Party on External Fisheries Policy is the key Council 
Working Party on FPAs. It meets twice a month, and is made up of staff 
from member states’ permanent representations and experts from capitals. 
Discussions on fisheries at the Working Party on Development Cooperation 
are reported to be extremely rare, a situation that is explained by a clear – 
perhaps too clear – division of labour between the fisheries and 
development working parties. And, there have been very few development 
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inputs into the Working Party on External Fisheries Policy. Indeed, there 
seems to be little opportunity for development interests to feed into 
Council discussions of FPAs. 
In September 2003, the Committee on Fisheries of the European 
Parliament produced, on its own initiative, a report on the FPAs’ proposal, 
with the Committee on Development Cooperation also offering its 
opinion.6 The former gave more emphasis to the interests of the EU fishing 
fleet, the latter more emphasis to sustainable development issues. The net 
effect of these opinions on the approach to FPAs taken by the Commission 
appears to have been negligible. 
During negotiations with third countries, the Commission and 
member states hold official Council Working Group meetings in the 
margins, in which the Commission informs member states of progress. 
Member states with strong interests in promoting the interests of their 
fishing fleets send their representatives to promote their national interests. 
In recent years, other countries including Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK have also sent representatives to promote 
development interests.  
Once negotiations are concluded, the Commission will initial the 
agreement which then has to be ratified by the third country and by the 
European Community under Art. 37 and hence by qualified majority 
voting. Parliament can give its opinion under the consultation procedure. 
The Council has not blocked a fisheries agreement; this reflects both the fact 
that the Commission works closely to the Council’s mandate, and the fact 
that no member state has felt it appropriate to block – on the grounds of 
development concerns – the progress of an agreement in the Agriculture 
and Fisheries Council. 
The ACP states are of course part of the FPA negotiations, but there 
are serious question marks about the capacity of many individual ACP 
states to defend their interests in negotiations with the European Union. 
The FPAs may be a step towards a partnership, but – with DG 
Development marginalised, and impact assessments not widely available – 
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the process is currently much more of a commercial negotiation than a 
dialogue on sustainable development. Indeed, some developing countries 
remain to be convinced of the value of the new FPA approach, and would 
prefer to retain control over what is done with the financial compensation 
received rather than have to spend it on issues indicated by the EU. There 
is some discussion of fisheries issues at EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly, but little leverage over policy or particular negotiations. 
An important innovation of the FPAs is the importance they place on 
scientific evidence of fisheries stocks, and of ex ante and ex post impact 
assessments. Impact assessments in this area do not have a good 
reputation, but if they are taken seriously and made available to all parties 
in a timely manner, they may provide a better basis for concluding 
sustainable fisheries agreements. 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence for development 
The evolution of the integrated framework for FPAs with third countries 
and the negotiation of specific FPAs holds a number of lessons in terms of 
policy coherence for development: 
•  In an area of Commission competence, where DG Fisheries is in the 
lead, and where Council considerations are focused on fish rather than 
development, there is little formal opportunity for development inputs 
to be made in the Council’s institutions. There may be value in 
institutional arrangements which require consultation with CODEV on 
an issue such as third-party fisheries agreements, which has important 
development implications. 
•  In the absence of effective entry points for development inputs within 
Council processes, coherence at member state level is especially 
important. Within member states, while policy coherence for 
development will only be attained once non-development ministries 
take account of development issues, development ministries will have 
to take the lead in making the case that fisheries policies have important 
development implications. 
•  Coherence at Commission level is equally crucial. DG Development 
ought to be involved in the design of any proposal, and the negotiation 
of any partnership, which has development implications. And the 
Development Cooperation Working Party should be kept informed by 
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•  Reliable scientific data and timely, widely available impact assessments 
are essential to the formulation of policies which are coherent and 
supportive of development objectives. For policy proposals with 
development dimensions, independent assessments of the likely 
development impacts should be required. 
•  Delivering and implementing real policy coherence for development 
requires that developing countries are on board and that policies of 
partnership with the EU are an integral part of developing countries’ 
strategies and plans. Attaining policy coherence for development in 
terms of EU policies is necessary but not sufficient. 
•  Policy coherence for development in bilateral relationships depends too 
on the activities of other countries. For instance, a fisheries agreement 
which appears sustainable would be rendered ineffective were the 
developing country to have entered into agreements with other fishing 
countries and failed to take this into account in its assessment of 
biological stocks. 
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7. Fiche on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, 
Employment and Decent Work 
Michael Kaeding 
1.  Origins 
According to the Treaty of Rome (1957), social policy competences were to 
remain largely a national affair. Yet in 1987, the Single European Act made 
one important exception: Art. 118a on minimum harmonisation concerning 
the health and safety of workers provided an escape route out of the 
unanimity requirement. For the first time in EU social policy, it allowed 
directives to be agreed on the basis of a qualified majority of the Council 
members. With the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992) signed in 
Maastricht, the Protocol on Social Policy (an additional, explicit social 
policy competence) was annexed to the EEC Treaty. This provision 
authorises member states to use the institutions, procedures (more majority 
voting) and mechanisms of the Treaty for the purpose of implementing the 
Social Chapter. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) then transferred the 
innovations of the agreement on social policy to the main Treaty, making 
them binding for all. In addition, it introduced a new employment policy 
chapter providing for the coordination of national employment policies on 
the basis of annual guidelines and national follow-up reports. 
Consequently, employment and social policy in the EU are subsumed 
under hard and soft law (the latter without binding legal constraints). The 
Commission has the right of initiative in the hard core legislative procedure 
covering the free movement of workers, labour, health and safety at work, 
gender equality and anti-discrimination. Whereas the important areas of 
employment and social protection have remained the exclusive 
responsibility of the member states, since the Amsterdam Treaty they have 
been coordinated through soft law, as it was acknowledged by the 
European Council that employment is a “matter of common concern” for 
the member states and one of the Community’s goals (Falkner, 2003).  
The Lisbon European Council of March 2000 asked member states 
and the European Commission to take steps to make a decisive impact on 
the eradication of poverty in the EU by 2010. More specifically, the 
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policy) or strategies (employment), analysing measures taken at the 
national level, monitoring progress towards the objectives and adopting 
recommendations to the member states (for employment). Here the EU 
strives to ensure that economic development is accompanied by social 
progress, not only within its own territory, but also internationally. It has 
therefore made social issues a subject of its external relations. 
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
The Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council 
(EPSCO) is the most important Council of Ministers formation for decision-
making on the social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent 
work. It meets about three times a year. The Economic and Finance Council 
(ECOFIN) and formations on competitiveness are sometimes involved or 
take decisions influencing the EU’s policies in the field of employment and 
social affairs, mainly because of the Lisbon strategy.  
At the level of working parties and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper), the matter is more complicated, mainly as a 
result of the division of competences between the Community and the EU 
member states. In the fields where the Commission has the right of 
initiative, there is the Working Party on Social Questions, which meets four 
times a month, depending on what is on the table in the form of 
Commission proposals. Coreper I usually deals with employment and 
social issues in the run up to each of the three annual Council meetings 
(March, June and December). It is very rare to submit files to Coreper for 
guidance outside of the context of preparation for a Council meeting, but it 
could be done and indeed does occur in other sectors (concerning the 
internal market, for example). 
To coordinate the member states’ policies there is the Employment 
Committee (EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC), which are 
independent advisory committees meeting outside the Council building. 
They monitor the development of national employment and labour market 
policies as well as social issues, and formulate opinions at the request of 
either the Council or Commission or on their own initiative. The SPC has 
established an Indicators Sub-Group to work on the development of 
indicators and statistics in support of its tasks. In any event, the EMCO and 
SPC conduct most of their work in the framework of the annual Lisbon 
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3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
There are a great variety of decision-making procedures – varying from co-
decision to consultation with the Council acting by qualified majority or 
unanimity and the open method of coordination (OMC). It is the issue at 
stake that determines which policy-making procedure is applied (Hervey, 
1998).  
The Council acts by qualified majority on matters such as determining 
the guidelines for member states to take into account in their employment 
policies (Art. 128(2)) and when it delivers recommendations to member 
states concerning employment policy (Art. 128(4)).  
The Council acts by unanimity in areas defined by the Social Policy 
Protocol – social security and the social protection of workers, employment 
conditions for third-country nationals legally resident in Community 
territory and so forth. It also takes such action on measures necessary to 
combat all forms of discrimination based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Art. 13).  
Co-decision  is used for the adoption of measures such as those on 
ensuring the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
(Art. 141(3)).  
Finally yet importantly, the member states coordinate the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) and their policies for combating poverty and 
social exclusion and for reforming social protection systems on the basis of 
the  open method of coordination. This method consists of the setting of 
common objectives, indicators and benchmarking, the exchange of best 
practices and monitoring at the EU level for social protection issues. This 
approach also involves setting up strategies for integrated guidelines on 
employment. The idea is that member states learn from each other’s 
policies and are subject to peer review. Subsequently, they are free to 
choose how they want to achieve the common objectives/strategies and 
how they want to use the open method of coordination. Common strategies 
are adopted by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission.  
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4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
In the hard core legislative procedure, the working party on employment 
and social questions receives the Commission’s proposal. The working 
group normally consists of Brussels-based representatives of EU member 
states. Effectively, it is one working group with ‘two teams’. National 
permanent representations to the EU send either their employment or 
social attachés to the meetings, which in fact makes it binary by nature. 
Then, the redrafted version of the proposal is sent directly to Coreper I and 
from there it is forwarded to the EPSCO. 
In the soft law procedure, the EMCO and the SPC are responsible for 
preparing several issues dealt with by the Council, including the EES and 
its related instruments of employment guidelines, the joint employment 
report and the recommendations on the implementation of national 
employment policies and the social indicators in the context of the 
guidelines for social protection. Both the EMCO and the SPC consist of two 
representatives of each member state and the Commission. Normally, they 
represent higher levels of seniority compared with the working group, but 
the level of seniority has declined in recent years.  
In the hard core legislative procedure as well as in the soft law sphere 
of social and employment policy, expert groups and comitology 
committees follow the policy-making cycle. There are 68 expert groups set 
up by the Commission to assist it in proposing EU legislation or exercising 
tasks of monitoring and coordination, consisting not only of national 
experts but also those representing stakeholders from business, NGOs, 
trade unions, academia, etc. In particular, there are 4 consultative and 
scientific groups, 25 permanent expert groups and 39 temporary groups. 
Examples here are the EQUAL Initiative and European Employment 
Services groups. Moreover, there are eight comitology committees on social 
and employment policy to assist the Commission in the implementation of 
EU legislation in the field, consisting of government representatives of the 
member states.1 
                                                      
1 The comitology committees are: 1) the Committee on Employment Incentive 
Measures; 2) the Committee of the Community Action Programme to Encourage 
Cooperation between the Member States to Combat Social Exclusion; 3) the 
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5.  Consultation and approval processes 
Both the EMCO and the SPC work closely with other committees charged 
w i t h  w o r k i n g  o n  E U  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y ,  m o s t  n o t a b l y  t h e  
Economic Policy Committee.  
In terms of the social dialogue, the Commission has to consult 
European employer and labour groups (social partners) before submitting 
proposals on a matter in order to reach a collective agreement. In terms of 
civil dialogue, the Commission consults with a network of NGOs and other 
bodies active in the social field. This network brings together around 1,000 
representatives of NGOs and other bodies in a Forum on Social Policy.  
In addition, expert groups provide independent advice to the 
Commission. Aside from offering a forum to exchange views, an expert 
group can advise the Commission throughout the policy process, from the 
policy development stage, through to decision-making and up to the 
implementation and evaluation phases. Comitology committees deliver 
opinions on draft implementing measures submitted to them by the 
Commission pursuant to the basic legislative instruments and intervene 
under the advisory, management or regulatory procedures provided for 
that purpose. 
In the field of employment and social policy the European Parliament 
shares only limited legislative power with the Council. In some areas it is 
involved under consultation, whereas under the open method of 
coordination, Parliament plays no role at all. Other consultative bodies, 
such as the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) are mainly 
concerned with labour policy, which gives it a particular perspective on 
more general social affairs. The Committee of Regions, established by the 
                                                                                                                                       
Committee of the Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination; 4) the 
Committee for the Technical Adaptation of Legislation on the Introduction of 
Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health of Workers at 
Work; 5) the Committee for the Technical Adaptation of Legislation on the 
Minimum Safety and Health Requirements for Improved Medical Treatment on 
Board Vessels; 6) the Restricted Committee for Safety and Health in the Mining 
and other Extractive Industries; 7) the Disability Advisory Committee; and 8) the 
Committee for the Implementation of the Programme relating to the Community 
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TEU, plays a role in the implementation of the EU’s structural funds, 
especially the European Regional Development Fund. 
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
The EU has officially made social issues a subject of its external relations. It 
advocates compliance with core labour standards and promotes equal 
opportunities and non-discrimination beyond the borders of its member 
states, which it considers an integral part of human rights.  
There are four core labour standards, identified at the Copenhagen 
World Summit for Social Development: freedom of association and real 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms 
of forced or compulsory labour; the real abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. The 1998 
declaration by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on fundamental 
principles and rights at work affirmed the universality of these core labour 
standards. Since 2002, the EU has agreed to monitor the work of the ILO’s 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation. On 19 July 
2004 the Commission and the ILO even signed up to a strategic partnership 
to facilitate their operational cooperation in the developing countries. In 
fact, it is through the generalised system of preferences, for example, that 
the EU offers access to Community markets and additional trade 
preferences to those developing countries applying the core labour 
standards.  
The EU also pursues its activities in equal opportunities and non-
discrimination beyond the borders of its member states. For instance, the 
EU takes part in summits and conferences organised at the UN’s initiative, 
for example on gender equality, the ageing of the world’s population and 
social development. It contributes to the activities of the Economic and 
Social Council, the Commission for Social Development and the 
Commission on the Status of Women. Furthermore, the EU is in constant 
communication with the WTO and the OECD on employment and social 
policy issues. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
Since the EMCO and the SPC (the senior Council preparatory committees) 
conduct most of their work in the framework of the annual Lisbon cycle, 
development input could be provided at the expert-group level, the 136 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
 
working-group level and/or Coreper. The history of the EMCO’s role 
(Larsson, 2003) in EU employment policy illustrates the potential for 
strengthened coherence on development objectives. It has evolved from a 
small advisory committee to the Commission to a fully institutionalised, 
senior working committee within the Council framework. It is a good 
example of how an expert group can be used to influence the rest of the 
policy-making process by linking it to other institutions and arenas. 
8.  Organigram – Process and structures for the EU’s social and 
employment policy in the EU Council  
EPSCO Council  GAERC; Ecofin; 
Competitiveness  Council 
Coreper II  Coreper I 
EMCO  SPC 
Employment and social 
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European Council 
Indicators' 
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and Social Affairs) 
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(DG Employment, social affairs and equal 
opportunities) 
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(3 management, 2 advisory, and 3 
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8. Fiche on EU Migration Policy 
Sergio Carrera and Meng-Hsuan Chou 
1.  Origins 
Immigration policies became a Community competence after the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997).1 The meeting of the European 
Council at Tampere in October 1999 represented a turning point in 
migration development: it was the first time a multi-annual programme 
was officially established. What came to be known as the Tampere 
Programme stressed that “the European Union needs a comprehensive 
approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development 
issues in countries and regions of origin and transit” (European Council, 
1999). The European Commission then presented a Communication on a 
Community Immigration Policy (European Commission, 2000), which 
suggested closer cooperation with countries of origin to mitigate the effects 
of a brain drain and maximise the benefits of remittances. 
The Commission Communication on a Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration (European Commission, 2005a) stressed “the need to enhance 
collaboration with third countries on economic migration and to develop 
initiatives offering ‘win-win’ opportunities to countries of origin and 
destination and to labour immigrants”. The Commission envisages 
submitting a proposal by 2007 for a directive aimed at establishing a 
                                                      
1 The Amsterdam Treaty transferred the Title IV provisions, which included “visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons”, 
from the third pillar to the first. Yet it should be noted that in practice the 
parameters of these competences are still in the process of being defined. For 
example, although the Amsterdam Treaty has asked the Commission to propose 
legislation that would eventually lead to a common immigration policy, attempts 
by the Commission have been met with resistance by the member states, which has 
led to the withdrawal of several Commission proposals in this area. See, for 
example, European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid 
employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final, Brussels, 
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common framework of rights for all immigrants who are in legal 
employment and who have already been admitted to the EU territory. It 
will also elaborate four specific directives dealing with, respectively, highly 
skilled workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and 
remunerated trainees.2 
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Two councils are involved in the making of migration policies, namely that 
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and on General Affairs and External 
Relations (GAERC). The JHA Council, consisting of interior and justice 
representatives, has the primary responsibility of overseeing the policy-
making process in relation to immigration. The GAERC only intervenes on 
issues that have an impact on external relations or contain an ‘external 
dimension’. Immediately underneath the JHA Council is the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper II), which as its name indicates 
consists of the permanent representatives of the EU member states, i.e. the 
top diplomats presiding over the permanent representations of their 
country to the EU. This juxtaposition of interior/justice and foreign 
representatives within a single, internal policy-making process of the 
Council is unique to migration matters. These permanent representatives 
meet weekly and prepare works for the interior/justice ministers.  
Three committees falling immediately under Coreper II prepare JHA 
files, of which only the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum (SCIFA) is specifically relevant to migration policies. SCIFA, also 
known as the ‘Art. 66 Committee’ of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC), consists of one interior ministry representative from 
each of the member states and one representative from the European 
Commission. It considers matters mainly relating to immigration, frontiers 
and asylum. Underpinning the SCIFA is a conglomerate of working parties. 
Issues concerning migration are mainly taken up by the Working Party on 
Migration and Expulsion, which covers topics related to both admission 
and expulsion of third-country nationals, and to a lesser extent the Visas 
Working Party and the Centre for Immigration, Discussion and Exchange 
                                                      
2 The first two directives are expected to be presented between 2007 and 2008, and 
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on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI).3 When EU 
migration policies contain an external dimension, the High-Level Working 
Group (HLWG) on Immigration and Asylum is called upon to draft the 
Council conclusions on the particular proposal. In policy development 
terms, the work of the HLWG is surely the most relevant. 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
The decision-making procedure for legal migration has remained the 
consultation process as outlined in Art. 67 of the TEC.4 Under the terms of 
this process, the Council votes on a unanimity basis after consulting the 
opinion of the European Parliament. In practice, votes are never taken in 
the Council. Efforts are always made to garner consensus from all EU 
member states. Since May 2004, the Commission has had the exclusive 
right to initiate proposals.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
Once the Commission submits a proposal for a Council directive or 
regulation, it is considered by the competent working party. Members of 
working parties are technical experts seconded by EU member states. They 
are based at the member states’ permanent representations. The agenda of 
the Council working party is mainly to discuss technical aspects of the 
                                                      
3 The CIREFI is not a legislative working party; its role is purely that of information 
exchange. See European Council, List of Council Preparatory Bodies, 15180/05, 
Brussels, 5.12.2005(c). 
4 The use of the decision-making process outlined in Art. 67 TEC has been subject 
to criticism because of its perceived democratic deficit (see Balzacq, T. and S. 
Carrera,  Migration, Borders and Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2005). Since January 2005, the remaining areas of Title IV TEC have 
been transferred to the co-decision procedure, as stipulated in Art. 251 TEC. See 
European Council, Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions 
of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil 
exchanges, unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ L 375, 23.12.2004(b). 140 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
 
legislative proposals.5 Political and strategic discussions generally do not 
take place at working party levels as these are done by the SCIFA. SCIFA 
members are senior officials, such as the heads of units, from the interior 
ministries.6 If the SCIFA cannot find a consensus, these matters are passed 
on to Coreper II. When agreements are reached in either body, they become 
so-called ‘A items’. Matters on which they have not managed to reach a 
consensus become ‘B items’, on which further discussion can take place in 
the JHA Council.  
As previously mentioned, however, the HLWG deals with all 
migration issues containing an ‘external dimension’. The HLWG mainly 
consists of representatives from the interior and justice ministries; they take 
political decisions and do not legislate.7 Working parties that are 
traditionally within the JHA Council, such as the Working Party on Visas 
and Migration and Expulsion, can also be called upon to carry out 
preparatory work for the HLWG. Yet, as not all migration policies have an 
external dimension, these groups can be quite ad hoc. It is important to 
stress that the HLWG has and will continue to have a leading role on issues 
relating to migration that contain an external dimension such as migration 
policies dealing with development issues. Therefore, what we can observe 
in this cross-Council division in terms of competences on migration policies 
is the availability of venues allowing member states make their 
contributions on migration–development policies. The HLWG is not to be 
confused with the Committee on Immigration and Asylum (CIA), which is 
an expert group headed by the European Commission. CIA members are 
technical experts from and nominated by member states. Depending on the 
issue, usually one or two of these experts will be present during informal 
consultations in the proposal phase (comitology).8 
                                                      
5 The working parties’ agenda and minutes are immediately accessible on the 
Council’s Register; however, this is not the case for LIMITE documents.  
6 For the Netherlands it is the Justice Ministry that deals with migration issues and 
in Spain it is the Social Affairs Ministry. 
7 For further discussion on the HLWG, see European Council, Modification of the 
terms of reference of the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration 
(HLWG), 9433/02, Brussels, 30.5.2002(a). 
8 The CIA is an important component of the comitology process, as these experts 
are the liaisons between the Commission and the member states. For example, in 
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5.  Consultation and approval processes 
Formal and informal consultations occur throughout all stages of migration 
policy-making. Following this, it is also indicative that veto players 
abound. During the proposal phase, the Commission, relevant 
stakeholders, member states and national technical experts can all act as 
veto players on what subsequently reaches the EU immigration policy 
agenda. Moreover, it is perhaps during the adoption phase that one sees 
the most ‘visible’ veto actors, as there are strict procedural guidelines 
steering this process. Yet the ‘invisible’ veto factors include public opinion 
about migrants, public perceptions about the EU and national electoral 
pressures that might prevent member states from endorsing certain 
migration measures, even though some governments can see the potential 
benefits of a Community-wide migration policy.9 
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Two approaches have emerged in EU member states on how to handle the 
nexus of migration and development, namely to: 1) use development tools 
to reach migration goals such as tackling illegal immigration; and 2) utilise 
migration tools such as legal immigration to achieve development 
objectives. The former represents a more ‘coercive approach’ in the form of 
restricting or conditioning development aid if certain non-EU countries do 
not comply with member states’ requests on migration management and 
the readmission of illegal immigrants. The latter can be characterised as a 
more ‘open approach’, which seeks to foster the potential of ‘brain 
circulation’, circular migration and the positive effects of remittances. 
                                                                                                                                       
the legislative process for deriving a common visa list, the Commission used the 
CIA extensively to sound out member states’ positions with regard to the 
formulation of the questionnaire that was subsequently sent out to the member 
states.  
9 For an elaboration on the need to reconcile public concerns about immigration 
and Europe’s demand for migrant labour, see Boswell, C., M.-H. Chou and J. 
Smith,  Reconciling Demand for Labour Migration with Public Concerns about 
Immigration: The cases of Germany and the UK, Anglo-German Foundation, London 
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The coercive approach was very much championed by Spain and the 
UK during the Spanish presidency in 2002,10 but was ultimately 
abandoned at the EU level. Sweden and France, with the endorsement of 
Germany, pushed for migration diplomacy through co-development. 
Although efforts were made to resurrect the coercive approach in 2003, it 
was soundly rejected by the Greek presidency at the Council meeting in 
Thessaloniki.11  
The Thessaloniki meeting was a watershed. Since then, although the 
establishment of an effective policy on illegal immigration remains a top 
priority for the EU, there seems to be a gradual move towards addressing 
development goals through legal migration instruments. This is 
particularly evident if we look at the 2005 Commission Communication on 
Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations (European 
Commission, 2005b).12 In this Communication, the Commission explored 
the possibility, among other things, of having fast, secure and cheap ways 
of sending remittances, and the transfer of technology and skills through 
circular migration and brain circulation.13 
                                                      
10 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council 
of 21-22 June, SN 13463/02, Brussels, 24.10.2002(b). In the same vein, see for 
example European Commission, Communication on Integrating Migration Issues 
in the European Union's Relations with Third Countries, COM(2002) 703 final, 
Brussels, 3.12.2002.  
11 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European 
Council of 19-20 June 2003, SN11638/03, Brussels, 1.10.2003(a). It is important to 
note that the Greek presidency expressly addressed the nexus between migration 
and development within the HLWG, which then led to the adoption of the Council 
Conclusions on this issue on 19 May 2003 (see European Council, Draft Council 
Conclusions on Migration and Development, 8927/03, Brussels (2003b). 
12 This Communication is part of The Hague Programme (see European Council, 
The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 2005/C53/01, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005(a)), which is the successor to 
Tampere.  
13 The most explicit proposal concerning development goals and migration is 
outlined in the European Commission’s Communication on an EU Strategy for 
Action on the Crisis in Human Resources for Health in Developing Countries, 
COM(2005) 642 final, Brussels, 12.12.2005(f). But it should be noted that this 
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The 2005 British presidency welcomed the Commission’s input on 
migration and development and asked the HLWG to draft a set of 
conclusions regarding migration and external relations ( Council, 2005). 
These conclusions were adopted by the GAERC on 21 November 2005 
(Council, 2005) with an eye towards the Commission Communication on a 
Policy Plan on Legal Migration (European Commission, 2005a). Here, the 
focus seems to have switched to a ‘global approach’ to migration, linking 
policy areas to the mobility of people – with priority actions focusing on the 
African and the Mediterranean regions, much of which follows a JHA 
agenda. In the GAERC conclusions, the Council also invited the 
Commission to analyse the recommendations made by the Global 
Commission on International Migration and to prepare EU’s contribution 
to the UN’s High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 
September 2006.  
Furthermore, the Council conclusions and programmes, as well as 
acts by the European Commission illustrate that inputs on development-
related issues are introduced at every stage of the policy-making process. In 
this regard the contribution of the HLWG is more relevant than the input 
provided by the SCIFA. In the latter, political and strategic discussions 
concerning the external dimensions of migration policy take place. As 
noted earlier, the HLWG representatives are mainly interior and justice 
officials, but officials from the foreign ministries can also be present. For 
example, in the case of the UK, the delegations are comprised of 
representatives of the Foreign Office, Home Office and the Department for 
International Development; but it is the Home Office official who 
represents the UK in the HLWG.  
Yet in spite of these external inputs, only the JHA Council can decide 
whether or not to translate them into EU legislation. It is clear that the 
Commission, given a mandate by the European Council, is adopting a 
‘lobbying’ tactic, in which ideas are re-introduced in different guises 
throughout the evolution of cooperation on EU migration policy. The 
Commission believes that this strategy will permit non-JHA Council 
contributions to be incorporated into the law-making process. Thus far, 
only two pieces of legislation have addressed development issues through 
                                                                                                                                       
Communication is an example of how development issues have taken migration 
matters into consideration, and not vice versa. 144 | SECTORAL FICHES & CASE STUDIES 
 
migration policies. These are: 1) the Council Directive (2004/114/EC) on 
the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
studies, pupil exchanges, unremunerated training or voluntary services 
(Council, 2004); and 2) the Council Recommendation (2005/762/EC) on a 
specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of 
scientific research (Council, 2005). The Commission Communication on 
Migration and Development (European Commission, 2005) has expressly 
referred to these two instruments as playing a fundamental role in the 
development of skills, technology and capital within the framework of 
migration and development. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
Given the presence of the two dominant and diametrically-opposed 
strategies on addressing the nexus between migration and development, it 
is perhaps most important that the EU should resist using development 
tools to achieve migration goals. A continuing emphasis on reaching 
development objectives through legal migration tools will ensure that 
inputs to strengthen the process can continually be incorporated as the 
process evolves. Closely following this, if the EU is serious about reaching 
development objectives through migration tools, then EU legal instruments 
concerning circular migration, the protection of residence rights of migrant 
workers, and the facilitation of transfer of technology and skills to 
developing countries should also be adopted. As mentioned in the 
previous section, two legal instruments are already in place that utilise 
migration tools to achieve development objectives, and their exploitation 
and possible expansion within the development field should be 
encouraged. Along this vein, however, serious consideration should also be 
given to the financial and administrative burdens linked to the mobility of 
students and researchers, such as the issuing of visas and admissions fees 
for overseas students. 
In policy development terms, the membership of the Council 
working groups can be supplemented if there was greater attendance by 
development Ministry representatives (if applicable) in the relevant 
working groups.  
Furthermore, a simplification of the Council structure such as the 
elimination of the SCIFA, with regard to the existing venues in which 
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issues, would also ensure that better development-related inputs will come 
to fruition. In the light of this, the structure could be simplified to the extent 
that inter-ministerial rivalries are not magnified at the EU level, which can 
often lead to policy stalemates on migration-related issues. If this can be 
achieved, one could more easily delineate where the responsibility lies 
and/or has been taken.  
Although it might be true that transparency in the Council’s activities 
has significantly improved since the Amsterdam Treaty, more progress is 
still needed – for example, in “the openness of the Council meetings when 
acting in its legislative capacity” (European Parliament, 2006). This would 
mean, in practice, that the entirety of the minutes should be made publicly 
accessible immediately.  
Inclusiveness, simplification and transparency are in any case 
conditions for securing better contributions on the nexus between 
development and migration. 
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8.  Organigram – Process and structures for the EU’s migration 
policy in the EU Council  
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Case Study on EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in 
Human Resources for Health in Developing Countries 
Alan Hudson 
The EU will strive to make migration a positive factor for 
development, through the promotion of concrete 
measures aimed at reinforcing the contribution to 
poverty reduction, including facilitating remittances 
and limiting the ‘brain drain’ of qualified people.1 
1.  Introduction 
Identifying human resource constraints as a key barrier to the effective 
provision of health services in developing countries, in 2004 the 57th World 
Health Assembly – the governing body of the World Health Organisation – 
designated 2006-15 as a decade of action on human resources. The EU 
strategy for action on the crisis in human resources for health in developing 
countries outlines the response of the EU and the European Commission in 
particular to the WHO’s decade of action. 
The EU’s strategy builds on the Commission’s May 2005 
Communication on A European Programme for Action to Confront 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis through External Action.2 In that 
Communication, the lack of health workers was identified as a major 
obstacle to effective action. The EU’s strategy also builds on that it outlined 
for Africa.3 The strategy for action was adopted by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) on 10 April 2006. 
 
                                                      
1 See para. 38 of the European Consensus on Development, OJ C 46/01, 24.02.2006. 
2 See European Commission, Communication on a European Programme for 
Action to Confront HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis through External Action, 
COM(2005) 179 final, Brussels, 27.4.2005(c).  
3 See European Commission, Communication on an EU Strategy for Africa: 
Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development, COM(2005) 489 
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2.  Implications for development 
The crisis in human resources for health in developing countries is of great 
importance to these countries and regions across the world. Africa, for 
instance, has the highest disease burden of any continent, but the lowest 
number of health workers. Africa has 0.8 health workers per 1,000 
population, compared with 10.3 per 1,000 in Europe. There are many 
reasons why developing countries lack the human resources (health 
workers) they need to provide effective and adequate health services. These 
include poor working conditions as a result of years of under-investment, a 
lack of training, demoralisation, low salaries and other inadequate 
incentives. 
One fundamental reason for the lack of human resources is that many 
health workers in developing countries, and particularly in rural areas of 
developing countries, opt to migrate to either urban areas, neighbouring 
countries, or internationally to Europe or North America. As such, the crisis 
in human resources for health in developing countries has a critical 
migration dimension. For the crisis to be addressed instrumentally, greater 
coherence is needed between the migration and development policies of 
the EU and other developed countries. 
The EU’s strategy for action includes a range of measures to support 
developing countries to address the crisis in human resources for health. 
These include the provision of support at a country level, at a regional level 
(through the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development in the case of Africa) and at the global level. At the global 
level, the strategy commits the EU to exploring the value and feasibility of a 
code of conduct for ethical recruitment. This is the element of the strategy 
for action that raises policy coherence challenges. Put differently, there is 
little point in the EU spending development funds in building the capacity 
of developing countries’ health systems, if the health workers needed to 
deliver services then migrate to the EU and beyond. A code of conduct for 
ethical recruitment would seek to ensure greater policy coherence for 
development. 
3.  EU (Council) players, processes and development inputs 
The European Commission was responsible for initiating the strategy for 
action. The Directorate General (DG) for Development took the lead and 
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(AIDCO), the DG for External Relations (RELEX), and the DG for Health 
and Consumer Protection (SANCO) on an early draft of the 
Communication, as part of the process of preparing the Communication on 
Action to Confront HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (European 
Commission, 2005c). Beyond the Commission, the DG for Development 
consulted extensively with member states prior to launching the 
Communication for formal inter-service dialogue. At that stage, a number 
of DGs provided formal feedback, including AIDCO, DG RELEX, the DG 
for Employment, the DG for Information Society and Media, the DG for 
Justice, Freedom and Security, the DG for Research, and DG SANCO, who 
were concerned to ensure cross-reference to DG SANCO’s work on internal 
EU health policies. 
As regards coherence with the EU’s approach to migration, it is 
important to note that the planned Communication was in line with the 
Commission’s Communication on Migration and Development, published 
in September 2005.4 That Communication, the production of which had 
been led by DG Justice, Freedom and Security, included sections on 
mitigating the adverse effect of brain drain, mentioning the possibility of an 
EU code of conduct to discipline recruitment. Yet in preparing the 
Communication on the human resources crisis in health, the Commission 
was keen to emphasise that the migration and brain drain of health 
workers, while an important cause of the human resource crisis, is not the 
only cause. 
Beyond the Commission, there was much consultation with member 
states’ technical experts on health issues. An important focus for these 
consultations was the member states’ health expert forum. This informal 
group is attended by a representative from each member state, and can 
play an important role in providing guidance to the Commission. After 
these discussions, which served to clarify several issues and to put the 
matter on member states’ agendas, member states/the Council invited the 
Commission to prepare a communication on the crisis in human resources 
for health in developing countries. The UK – holding the presidency in late 
2005 – was particularly active in pushing for a code of recruitment for 
health service personnel, having established its own guidelines some years 
                                                      
4 See European Commission, Communication on Migration and Development: 
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earlier. Consultations also took place with developing countries, including 
through the Secretariat for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
The Commission produced its Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament in December 2005.5 
The Council’s Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) 
was the key player in examining the Commission’s proposal. After several 
meetings and much informal dialogue between the Commission and the 
CODEV, the latter agreed to a set of draft conclusions that it had invited 
Coreper to submit to the GAERC for adoption. GAERC adopted the 
conclusions on 10 April 2006, only four months after the initial Commission 
Communication.6 Despite the fact that the EU action plan puts progress on 
disciplining ethical recruitment – an issue that is at the interface of 
migration and development – at the top of its list of priority actions, there is 
no evidence of CODEV consultation with the High-Level Working Group 
on Asylum and Immigration, the key Council institution for migration 
issues. 
4.  Lessons for policy coherence for development 
Although this case study is about efforts to achieve coherence between 
development and other policies in a development context, it nevertheless 
holds some useful lessons for policy coherence for development in general: 
•  Efforts to attain policy coherence for development involve not only 
pushing development objectives in non-development arenas, but also 
ensuring that objectives for development and other issues are dealt 
with coherently in fora on development. CODEV and the 
development community should seek to include other interests in 
their discussions, at the same time as seeking to inject development 
concerns into non-development arenas. 
                                                      
5 See European Commission, Communication on an EU Strategy for Action on the 
Crisis in Human Resources for Health in Developing Countries, COM(2005) 642 
final, Brussels, 12.12.2005(f). 
6 See European Council, Conclusions from the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council meeting on an EU strategy for action on the crisis in human 
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•  Consultation between the Commission and member states prior to 
the formal Commission inter-service consultation seems to have been 
very useful in helping to ensure that the various DGs understood the 
member states’ wishes. This dialogue between the member states and 
the Commission smoothed the process of inter-service consultation. 
•  While there seems to have been excellent communication between the 
Commission and member states, and among the various DGs, there 
seems to have been little communication between the migration and 
development streams of Council, either at the level of working parties 
or the Council itself. Consultation among the different Council 
streams should be required when issues that spill over institutional 
boundaries are being discussed. 
•  External champions – in this case the ACP countries – can play an 
important role in stimulating and supporting EU policy initiatives. 
Indeed, on issues where there are major development implications, 
the input of developing countries should be actively sought. 
Finally, member states with prior experience of implementing 
initiatives intended to achieve greater policy coherence for development 
can play an important role in encouraging the EU as a whole to adopt 
similar measures. 
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9. Fiche on EU Research Policy 
Louise van Schaik 
1.  Origins 
European research policy originated in the Coal and Steel Community 
(1950) and later in the context of the EURATOM Treaty (1957), which 
includes a multi-annual EURATOM research Framework Programme (Art. 
7) and the Joint Research Centre, whose mandate has since been enlarged 
to include a large non-nuclear work programme as well. Within the scope 
of the EC Treaty, research policy was gradually developed through sectoral 
initiatives such as ESPRIT (on information technologies) or BRITE/EURAM 
(on industrial and materials technologies), under the strategic supervision 
of the high-level advisory committee CREST (Comité de recherche scientifique 
et technique).  
Since 1986, European Community research policy has been managed 
through the multi-annual Framework Programmes (FPs) for Research and 
Development. While earlier FPs had a duration period of five years, the 
proposed FP7 will extend to seven years, in parallel with the Financial 
Perspectives (2007-13). Currently FP6 is in place, which runs for the period 
2002-06 with a budget of €17.5 billion. Under this programme, research is 
undertaken in seven thematic priority areas. 
At the time of writing, negotiations on FP7 are in full swing after the 
Commission adopted the FP7 proposal on 6 April 2005.1 The proposal 
contains four specific programmes: cooperation (which includes several 
thematic priorities), ideas, people and capacities, each of which contains 
resources for international activities. The programme is to run from 2007 to 
2013. The Commission has proposed a budget of €64.5 billion, which has 
been reduced to €50.2 billion in the context of the agreement set on the EU’s 
overall budgetary framework. This figure will amount to a 60% increase in 
                                                      
1 The European Commission’s key documents and proposals for the programmes 
of FP7, as well as the rules for participation and so forth can be downloaded from 
the Commission’s Research website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/ 
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resources in comparison with FP6, reflecting the EU’s increased attention 
on research as a strategic aspect of stimulating economic growth. An added 
novelty is the proposed European Research Council, a body that is to 
allocate a considerable portion of the resources of FP7 to investigator-
driven ‘frontier’ research on the basis of academic excellence through an 
open competition. 
Research already comes third in terms of EU spending, just after 
agriculture and regional development. One of the goals of EU research 
policy is better policy coordination, as research policy is still an area in 
which the Community only has a complementary competence.2 Indeed, 
most of the spending for research is still allocated at the national level3 and 
a recurring argument is not only that research spending is generally lower 
in the EU than in the US and Japan, but more dispersed and fragmented as 
well, leading to lesser output per euro spent. This situation can be 
particularly problematic given the strategic importance of R&D for 
maintaining a competitive position vis-à-vis the rest of the world, as is the 
key objective of the Lisbon strategy. The budget is a sensitive issue for the 
EU member states, although they generally tend to be protective when it 
comes to sharing authority over resources for spending on public research. 
Further, they carefully check the distributive effects of the FPs and 
particularly look after their own shares (Banchoff, 2002). 
To redirect the focus from the concrete projects in the FPs to research 
policy for the EU overall, the concept of a European Research Area (ERA) 
has been launched in conjunction with FP6. Its aim is the creation of a 
genuine ‘internal market’ in research to increase pan-European cooperation 
and coordination of national research activities by 2010. Currently, the 
triangular relationship between education, research and innovation is 
becoming a dominant theme for thinking about EU research policy.  
 
 
                                                      
2 Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would see research become a shared 
competence. 
3 A c c o r d i n g  t o  B a n c h o f f  ( 2 0 0 2 ) ,  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  s t i l l  a c c o u n t  f o r  a r o u n d  9 5 %  o f  
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2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Legislative proposals on research policy are negotiated in the Working 
Party on Research, which normally meets about once or twice a week, but 
with different topics on the agenda. Now, with decision-making on FP7 
moving towards its final stages, the group meets more often. When needed, 
further discussions and negotiations take place in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper I), and subsequently in the 
competitiveness formation of the Council of Ministers. 
Member states’ policies are coordinated by CREST, the EU’s scientific 
and technical research advisory body, which is composed of member 
states’ representatives. Its function is to assist the Council and the 
Commission in performing the tasks incumbent on them in the sphere of 
research and technology development (RTD). CREST meets about four to 
six times a year and supervises five expert groups along with a steering 
group on human resources and mobility. The focus of the latter group is 
probably the most important from a development perspective as it covers 
the position of researchers from non-EU countries (including developing 
countries). The expert groups gather about once a month and monitor 
aspects of the research policies of the EU member states through comparing 
statistics, benchmarking policies, peer review, identifying best practices, 
etc. On the basis of this analysis CREST formulates opinions at the request 
of either the Council or Commission or on its own initiative. CREST 
conducts its work in the context of the Lisbon process and is one of the 
bodies applying the open method of coordination (OMC) (see below).  
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
The final decision on FP7 will be taken through the co-decision procedure 
on the basis of Art. 166. The rules of participation in undertakings, research 
centres and universities along with the rules governing the dissemination 
of research results are also decided upon by co-decision (Art. 167). 
Although the European Parliament is involved as co-legislator on FP7, this 
is only with regard to the overall framework and principles governing the 
programme. The specific programmes, in line with Arts. 166§3 and 166§4 
are decided upon by the Council through the consultation procedure. In 
practice, however, the European Parliament can threaten to withhold its 
approval on the FP unless more information on the specific programmes is 
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The open method of coordination, which is used to coordinate the 
national research policies of the EU member states, is a soft law approach 
not enshrined in the EC Treaty. It consists of the setting of common 
objectives, indicators and benchmarking, the exchange of best practices and 
monitoring at the EU level. The idea is that member states learn from each 
other’s policies and are subject to peer review. Subsequently, they are free 
to choose how they want to achieve the common objectives/strategies and 
how they want to use the OMC. Strategies are adopted by the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
Within the European Commission, the Directorate General (DG) for 
Research is in the lead when it comes to legislative proposals on research. 
Yet on some topics (e.g. energy, transport and information society) other 
DGs such as those on Energy and Transport, Information Society and 
Media, Enterprise, Fisheries, Health and Consumer Protection (SANCO), 
Agriculture and Environment have a keen interest in following and 
influencing EU priorities for research.  
Moreover, the Commission has a strong role in the implementation of 
the FPs: it drafts and publishes the calls for research, moderates committees 
of scientific experts that evaluate the proposals, conducts the contract 
negotiations and finally transfers the funds that pay for the research 
project. The final approval on calls for research, the work programmes 
accompanying them, the evaluation criteria and ultimately the decision on 
the selection of research projects is the task of so-called ‘programme 
committees’ established by the specific programmes of the FP. These are 
chaired by the Commission and composed of member states’ 
representatives. They follow the general rules of the Council’s comitology 
Decision (Council Decision 468/1999/EC of 28 June 1999). For the selection 
of projects they draw heavily on the ranking made by the evaluation 
committees of scientific experts.  
In FP7 the Commission proposes to have all logistical and 
administrative tasks – i.e. those not related to policy – undertaken outside 
its services by executive agencies, in order to be able to manage the sharply 
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be less concerned with the implementation of the FP and more with the 
development of research policies for the ERA.  
As previously noted, a new body is envisaged to take over tasks from 
the European Commission on an increasing basis, the European Research 
Council, which would be charged with directing some of the research 
budget towards projects they consider to be of academic excellence. Under 
FP7 larger portions of the budget will be allocated through the European 
Research Council – around one-sixth of the total budget for FP7, if the 
Commission’s proposal is followed. 
In the European Parliament, research is the prerogative of the 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee, with other committees 
closely following the file and sometimes indirectly influencing it, notably 
the Budget Committee when looking at the EU’s financing. 
The participants of the Council Working Party on Research are 
attachés from the permanent representations, sometimes seconded by 
national experts from the capitals. CREST and its expert groups are staffed 
by policy-makers from the national ministries, with CREST being staffed by 
very senior officials and the expert groups by somewhat less senior 
representatives. The programme committees are staffed mainly by national 
officials, who normally supervise and carry out the implementation of 
national research programmes. 
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
Coordination of national research policies is a sensitive issue as it involves 
relatively large budgets and is sometimes closely related to the strategic 
choices of states (e.g. to invest more in renewable energy research versus 
nuclear options or in the health sector). When it comes to research 
coordination, for a long time member states have seemed to favour 
intergovernmental solutions over delegating activities to the Commission. 
For instance, in the mid-1990s the member states strengthened CREST and 
the individual programme committees looking after FP formulation and 
implementation. They also established EUREKA, an intergovernmental 
technology project on defence matters (Banchoff, 2002). 
Yet the framing of research policy in the context of the Lisbon process 
has changed the focus of the member states to a certain extent. This change 
is most evident in the creation of the European Research Council, where the 
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research questions (e.g. stem cell research).4 I t  i s  a l s o  o b v i o u s  i n  t h e  
decision of member states to make research an area of shared competence 
under the Constitutional Treaty, the ratification of which, however, is 
currently blocked by the negative outcome of the French and Dutch 
referenda. 
Concerning the priorities set in the FPs, the Commission consults 
widely on its proposals with relevant stakeholders in the research 
community.  
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
In 1994 the Commission first proposed to include strategic programmes for 
international cooperation in the EU’s research policy. Attention to broader 
policy questions was given in the Communication on the International 
Dimension of the European Research Area (European Commission, 2001b). 
For the life of FP6, a budget of €658 million has been available for 
international scientific cooperation (INCO) activities involving non-EU 
countries or regions. The aim is to support projects that bolster the EU’s 
external relations and development aid policies – particularly as they relate 
to the fight against poverty, the Community’s water initiatives and its 
commitment to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. There are also 
some sums available for international research mobility. The Commission is 
currently drafting a new communication on INCO activities that is due to 
be published in summer 2006. 
In addition, under FP6 there is one specific project, the European and 
Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP),5 in which the 
Community participates in a research project involving developing 
countries along with several member states plus Norway. The EU finances 
€200 million, about one-third of the total budget. The objective is to 
translate medical research results on certain diseases that particularly afflict 
the developing world – including HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis – 
                                                      
4 Although this aspect of FP7 is still subject to ongoing negotiations, it is likely that 
the European Research Council only has to refer to the programme committee 
when ethical questions arise in the call for research. 
5 For further information on the project, see the European Commission’s Research 
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into clinical applications tailored to the developing countries. The clinical 
trials are conducted in sub-Saharan African countries that participate in the 
project. The project is the first in which Art. 169 (TEC) is used, allowing the 
participation of the Community in member states’ joint national research 
and development programmes. The EDCTP owes its creation very much to 
a determined effort by the Commission, rather than being a bottom-up 
initiative from the member states. Community participation was decided 
upon by the Competitiveness Council by co-decision with strong backing 
by the European Parliament. 
In terms of policy, further interest in the relationship between 
research and development was sparked in 2004 by an EU presidency 
conference on brain drain – the loss of the skills and knowledge of well-
trained people who migrate to the Western world6 (see also the migration 
case study in this report). The conference concluded that sub-Saharan 
Africa would be particularly vulnerable to brain drain to the Western 
world and argued for a targeted cooperation programme. A preparatory 
expert meeting7 emphasised that Europe is quite often used by researchers 
as a transit location to gain knowledge and experience needed in order to 
move on to more attractive regions, meaning the US and Canada. In that 
respect the EU should focus on either keeping the researchers in which it 
has invested, or – and perhaps more importantly – on creating favourable 
conditions for undertaking research efforts in the home country.  
Under FP7 the Commission has proposed that international 
cooperation in FP7 will no longer be a separate part of the programme, but 
will be integrated in all four programmes, allowing projects to be carried 
out with international partners. There is a fear that the negotiations on the 
budget and the strong focus on the EU’s competitive position vis-à-vis the 
                                                      
6 The conclusions and recommendations of the EU conference “Brain Gain – The 
Instruments” held in The Hague on 29-30 September 2004 are available on the 
website for the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher 
Education (Nuffic) (http://www.nuffic.net/common.asp?id=1013). 
7 See the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher 
Education (Nuffic), Report of the expert meeting on migration, brain drain and 
development, from the meeting held on 11 December 2003 in Scheveningen, Nuffic, 
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rest of the world will detract attention from the problematic issues of brain 
drain and research capacity-building, particularly in Africa. 
Apart from the FPs, some of the budget of the European 
Development Fund is allocated to R&D activities in developing countries 
and there are some bilateral agreements with developing countries that 
have an R&D component (e.g. the partnerships on clean energy and climate 
with India and China). In 2001 the total expenditure allocated by the 18 EU 
and European Economic Area countries to bilateral RTD cooperation with 
all non-EU countries was estimated at around €750 million annually. Some 
20% of this would be allocated to international cooperation programmes 
with developing countries. Another 25% would be sent to Africa to develop 
RTD activities and improve research capability (European Commission, 
2001b). 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input  
As with all Commission proposals, FP7 and its specific programmes have 
gone through inter-service consultation within the Commission before 
being adopted by the College of Commissioners. But the proposal gives 
little attention to specific activities to stimulate research in developing 
countries, making it more difficult for the Council to reinforce this aspect. 
Moreover, to date it lacks any concrete suggestion for further projects 
under Art. 169 (like the EDCTP, but in other fields such as agriculture, 
energy and biodiversity).  
A way of focusing attention on the issue of research in relation to the 
economic development of the least-developed countries would be for the 
Commission to issue a specific communication on research policy in the 
context of development cooperation, something that development experts 
in EU member states and the participants of Council’s Working Party on 
Development Cooperation (CODEV) could argue for on the basis of the 
inclusion of research in the Council conclusions on policy development.  
Another option to strengthen the development input in research 
policy-making could be to ask CREST to take up the issue of policy 
coherence for development in their benchmark activities for spending on 
national research programmes, either directly or through their expert 
groups. 
Finally, the issue of brain drain is very much one for the domain of 
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later in this report. Development experts could give a stronger emphasis to 
the particular importance of brain drain in sub-Saharan Africa and see how 
this issue could garner more attention in policy-making on migration (e.g. 
the ethical guidelines used for health workers could also be applied to 
academic researchers).  
In general, it seems to be the case that the research–development 
interface is greatly influenced by the Councils on Justice and Home Affairs 
and Competitiveness. With their main focus respectively on limiting 
migration to the EU and the economic position of the EU vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world, it may not be realistic to expect that they would automatically 
see the link with development goals or fully understand it. In that respect, 
awareness-raising, for instance through the drafting of a communication on 
the topic or through a follow-up conference organised by the presidency, 
could be an effort worth pursuing.  
Finally, the CODEV and the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council could argue that, when making their decisions about FP7, more 
explicit mention should be made of those parts of the budget that will be 
allocated to non-EU countries, and in particular what share will go to 
increasing the research capacities of the least-developed countries. 
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8.  Organigram – Process and structures for the EU’s research 
policy with a focus on the EU Council  
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10. Fiche on EU Information Society Policy 
Lorna Schrefler 
1.  Origins 
Information society is a relatively new arrival in European policy-making. 
Since the beginning, the policy has been based on two main pillars, R&D in 
information and communications technologies (ICT) and 
telecommunications policy, whose foundations can be traced back 
respectively to the mid-1980s with the ESPRIT Programme on R&D 
activities in ICT  and the 1987 Green Paper on telecommunications 
liberalisation.1 The 1994 Commission’s Communication on the information 
society2 constitutes a further step in devising the EU’s approach and 
strategy in this policy area. 
Policy on the information society is encompassing in nature and thus 
affects many areas of Community intervention, including the 
competitiveness of the internal market, competition, enterprise, education, 
content and media, and development policies. Moreover, technological 
convergence and the increasing importance of information as an economic 
resource make it a pivotal tool to promote growth and competitiveness in 
the so-called ‘knowledge-based economy’ described by the Lisbon strategy. 
For these reasons, EU institutions have adopted a proactive approach, 
urged on by the fact that other countries are investing in the information 
society and Europe cannot afford to lag behind.3  
                                                      
1 See European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on 
the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, 
COM(87) 290, Brussels, June 1987. 
2 See the European Commission’s Communication on Europe’s Way to the 
Information Society – An Action Plan, COM(94) 347 final, Brussels, 10.7.1994. 
3 For further details, see European Council, Recommendations to the European Council 
– Europe and the Global Information Society, Report prepared by the High-Level 
Group on the Information Society (‘Bangemann Report’), 26 May 1994; see also 
European Commission, Communication on Challenges for the European 
Information Society beyond 2005, COM(2004) 757 final, Brussels, 19.11.2004 and 
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2.  Main Council bodies involved 
Despite its pervasive nature, information society policy is dealt with mainly 
through a traditional three-level approach: working parties, the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (Coreper I) and the Council of Ministers. 
There are two Council configurations responsible for the dossier, 
depending on the policy aspect at stake. The Council for Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy, meeting under the Council of 
Telecommunications Ministers, deals with matters related to electronic 
communications. The Competitiveness Council is in charge of other areas 
of information society policy such as research, e-commerce and internal 
market issues.  
Preparations are generally conducted by the Working Party on 
Telecommunications and Information Society (H.5), whose experts meet 
around 24 times a year. Other working parties can potentially influence the 
decision-making process, namely on issues related to internal market 
harmonisation or to crucial areas for the Lisbon strategy, which fall into the 
domain of the Competitiveness Council. In particular, the Working Parties 
on Competitiveness and Growth (G.1), Technical Harmonisation (G.7), 
Competition (G.13) and Research (G.14) provide relevant input and 
direction to form the policy early on in its technical aspects. Joint meetings 
between these working parties and the Telecommunications and 
Information Society Working Party happen very rarely, thus their 
respective dossiers tend to remain separate. 
Subsequently, work continues in Coreper I and finally at the 
ministerial level. The Council of Telecommunications Ministers meets 
approximately three times per year, while Competitiveness Council 
meetings are normally held every two or three months. 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
Even if not specifically outlined by the EC Treaty, information society 
policy influences many areas of Community intervention and is thus 
grounded in various provisions regarding competition (Arts. 81 to 89), 
                                                                                                                                       
European Commission, Communication on i2010 – A European Information 
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internal market harmonisation (Art. 95), and to a lesser extent the right of 
establishment and services (Arts. 47 and 55). Moreover, the legal basis for 
the support of research and development in ICT technology lies in Arts. 
163-173, while the impact on the competitiveness of Community industry is 
governed by Art. 157. Finally, Arts. 154-156 TEC establish the promotion of 
trans-European networks (TENs) for transport, energy and 
telecommunications. 
The broad scope of the policy is reflected in the distribution of 
Community competences for policy-making, which can be exclusive or 
mixed, depending on the characteristics of the particular case at hand. For 
instance, with regard to external policy, when Community intervention is 
linked to the common commercial policy, the EU has exclusive competence 
on the basis of Art. 133 TEC. This is also the case for all bilateral agreements 
between the EU and non-EU countries, governing the commercial aspects 
of the information society policy.4 For all other areas of external policy, for 
example the cooperation in international programmes coordinated by inter-
governmental agencies, the EU has mixed competence together with the 
member states.  
Legislative acts are generally adopted following the co-decision 
procedure (Art. 251). The right of initiative belongs to the Commission. In 
many cases, the Economic and Social Committee has to be consulted. The 
Council usually votes by qualified majority. Unanimity-based voting can be 
necessary when the Council’s position differs from that of the Commission 
or the European Parliament. Political files are adopted by consensus as 
conclusions or resolutions, which have no legally binding power.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
The contributions to policy development at the EU level come from the 
European Commission, through the DG Information Society and Media. 
Some of the initial ingredients of the policy proposal can also be based on 
                                                      
4 See, for example European Council, Decision 2003/840/EC of 17 November 2003 
relating to the conclusion on behalf of the European Community of Council of 
Europe Convention No. 180 on information and legal cooperation on information 
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input by the member states (i.e. on the initiative of a certain number of 
member states within the Council itself, on the experience or the 
suggestions of national regulatory authorities) or can stem from the 
advisory role of the European Regulators Group (ERG), the Independent 
Regulators Group (IRG) and ad hoc committees.5 These bodies are 
composed of representatives of the member states, members of the 
Commission and, when relevant, the heads of the competent national 
authorities and play an important role throughout the whole policy 
process. For example, some of them are involved in comitology when 
specific requirements, such as prices or market conditions, are imposed by 
a directive/legislative act and need to be modified for the information 
society policy to work.  
Other inputs for policy development can originate from broader 
consultations with relevant trade associations such as ETNO, ECTA, ECCA, 
INTUG and the GSM Association.6  
In a secondary stage, the Commission’s proposal is submitted to the 
appropriate working party in the Council for technical and policy aspects 
to be tackled by national experts, normally Brussels-based diplomats, 
before being passed to Coreper I. Finally, the dossier moves on to the 
Telecommunications or Competitiveness Council. The majority of issues 
(around 90%) are solved at the working party level. When the subject at 
stake is among of the priorities of the presidency, the latter plays a relevant 
role in accelerating the policy-making procedure, through agenda-setting 
mechanisms and by reconciling positions in the drafts that are usually 
supplied before the Council itself meets.  
 
                                                      
5 For instance, on the basis of the new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, several committees have been created to assist the European 
Commission in its work on the e-communications aspects of information society 
policy, namely the Communications Committee, the Radio Spectrum Committee, 
the Radio Spectrum Policy Group and the Working Party on the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, known as the ‘Art. 29 
Working Party’. 
6 For the full names of these associations, see the Glossary of Abbreviations and 
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5.  Consultation and approval processes 
As the co-decision procedure is generally applied for information society 
policy, the role of the European Parliament is gaining ground. Moreover, 
owing to the multifaceted aspect of the policy itself, there are various levels 
of intervention. Three parliamentary committees with different portfolios 
have competence on the information society dossier. The Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy deals with the industrial policy implications 
of the information society agenda and more specifically with information 
society and information technology aspects affecting the development of 
TENs in the telecommunications infrastructure. The Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs addresses all possible effects of 
information technologies on citizen’s rights, such as the protection of 
privacy, the processing of personal data and so on. Finally, the Committee 
on Culture and Education acts on information and media policy and on the 
international aspects of cooperation in education and culture. For every 
legislative act, the rapporteur is a key player in the interaction between the 
European Parliament and the Council and has considerable influence on 
the final outcome of the co-decision procedure.  
Advisory bodies such as the ERG, the high-level groups7 and other 
specific fora set up by the European Commission provide it with political 
guidance and advice on drafting the legislative proposal. As previously 
mentioned, the latter are also involved in further stages of the process, to 
facilitate a correct and harmonised implementation of the policy. The 
consultative role of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), 
embedded in the co-decision procedure itself, also shapes the consultation 
processes of policy-making. 
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
Development goals are only indirectly linked to information society agenda 
and are not a core priority in the dossiers. Nevertheless, the EU is well 
aware of the international dimension of its policy and of its potential for the 
achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals. This was clearly 
                                                      
7 Among these are the High-Level Expert Group on the i2010 Strategy and the 
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stated during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 
Tunis in November 2005. More generally, ICTs are considered an 
appropriate tool to promote and facilitate education and good governance. 
As with other aspects of the policy, inputs come from the Commission, but 
owing to the political dimension, mixed competences and the international 
visibility of development objectives, the roles of the Council and the 
member states in these international fora are key. For example, in the case 
of the WSIS, the EU position was drafted by the European Commission 
together with the presidency. During the summit, the presidency spoke on 
behalf on the EU in order to have a single and thus more powerful voice in 
the context of a UN event, where EU member states were also individually 
represented. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
It is important to note that the amount of funding allocated for information 
society issues within development policy is generally not clearly 
identifiable, as it is incorporated in the total financial aid directed to a 
specific country. It is normally the government of the targeted country that 
chooses the amount of resources to apply to information society initiatives, 
thus rendering sectoral policy orientations more difficult to influence. Only 
in some cases is targeted funding easily recognisable, as interventions are 
linked to specific programmes such as @LIS or EUMEDIS. The distance 
between the different areas of policy intervention is increased by the fact 
that decisions on development aspects, including those concerning 
information society issues, are taken in the framework of the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council, without direct input from the 
specialised working parties normally dealing with the technical and 
internal aspects of the policy. This might lead to a dispersion of precious 
contributions and thus to less coherent policy-making.  
Given the greater political context associated with development 
issues when compared with the rather technical character of information 
society matters, the policy process could be strengthened by increasing 
internal coordination and cooperation within the Council. As previously 
stated, the majority of issues are discussed and solved at the working party 
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parties could secure a coherent inclusion of development inputs in the 
various aspects of the information-society policy process.8 To maximise the 
impact of increased internal coordination, the structure of the General 
Secretariat could be rearranged to ensure that all actors dealing with such a 
broad policy are informed of activities on different fronts of Community 
intervention and can provide a valuable contribution. This step would 
stimulate a change in the administrative culture and develop an internal 
awareness of development problems in a field that is partly isolated from 
the topic.  
Such an approach could be fostered now by including development 
inputs in the ex-ante impact assessments carried out by the Commission, 
where relevant. In that respect, lessons learned at the institutional level in 
sectors that have a greater track record of dealing with development 
aspects of Community policies could be translated to the information 
society field. This move would create a sort of ‘institutional convergence’ 
that strongly mirrors one of the intrinsic and most challenging technical 
characteristics of the information society policy itself. 
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8.  Organigram – Process and structures for the EU’s information 
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11. Fiche on EU Transport Policy 
Michael Kaeding 
1.  Origins 
In the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community, the creation of a single market for intra-Community transport 
was judged as one of the necessary conditions for achieving the ‘four 
freedoms’ (Erdmenger, 1981). The missio n  i s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  
policies are designed for the benefit of all sectors of society, businesses, 
cities and rural areas. Arts 74-84 of the Treaty of Rome form the legal basis 
of the common transport policy, which has been subsequently amended 
and shifted towards more regulatory measures, the most significant being 
the Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty of the European Union in 
1992. The Treaty of Amsterdam, in 1999, led to a further reinforcement of 
environment provisions in the transport sector and further strengthened 
the European Parliament’s role in the co-decision process.  
In terms of the external dimension of transport policy, the judgement 
by the European Court of Justice on AETR (European Agreement 
concerning the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road 
transport) is important. It reads that the member states are no longer free to 
negotiate with others on an equal basis as autonomous sovereign states, but 
have to agree a common position within the Community and reach an 
understanding within the Council as to how much a position is to be 
pursued within a given negotiating forum, and by whom. Furthermore, the 
AETR judgement says that the Commission is in some cases entitled to 
make proposals and negotiate, while it is for the Council to conclude the 
agreement, which implies a measure of cooperation between the two 
institutions (shared competence). Nowadays these methods of cooperation 
are laid down in negotiating mandates agreed within the Council on a case-
by-case basis. 
On 12 September 2001, the Commission presented its White Paper on 
the future common transport policy. The 130-page document proposes 60 
measures to overhaul the current transport policy in order to make it more 
sustainable and avoid huge economic losses due to congestion, pollution 
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and its proposals constitute the first practical contribution to the 
sustainable development strategy adopted by the Gothenburg European 
Council in June 2001.  
Generally speaking, transport is a response to a crisis-driven policy 
area. In terms of air transport, for example, the heavy losses suffered by 
Europe’s leading airlines between 1990 and 1993 were not only because of 
the Gulf wars. In a climate of increasingly fierce international competition, 
airlines continued their restructuring in order to improve their 
productivity. In maritime policy, a number of stricter EC measures were 
deemed necessary in the aftermath of major shipping accidents such as 
those involving the Amoco Cadiz, the Exxon Valdez and the Herald of Free 
Enterprise. In particular member states such as the United Kingdom, 
France, Spain, Sweden and Germany, which were directly concerned, 
subsequently pushed for stricter regulations. The grounding of the tankers 
Braer, Aegean Sea and Estonia led to a common policy on safe sea – a 
package of some eight separate directives – not to mention the well-known 
Erika packages I, II and III pushed for by the Council and Spain and France 
in particular. 
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
For the transport area a typical three-level approach holds true: Working 
groups, Coreper I and the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
Council, which meets with transport ministers when this issue is on the 
agenda. There are four working parties on transport questions: Working 
Party on Land Transport (H.1), Working Party on Shipping (H.2), Working 
Party on Aviation (H.3) and Working Party on Transport – Intermodal 
Questions and Networks (H.4) which meet about once every two weeks. 
The Council of transport ministers meets four times a year. In exceptional 
cases, the working group system is substituted by exploratory discussions 
among the presidency, the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 
and the individual member state. As for the procedure on the Financial 
Perspectives in the European Council, the presidency might decide to opt 
for one-to-one exploratory discussions with the national delegations when 
the issue at stake is very ideologically driven as, for example, in the case of 
the Eurovignette Directive.  
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3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
Co-decision is the procedure most often used in the area of transport 
policy. It applies, for example, for common rules on conditions under 
which non-resident carriers may operate transport and services within a 
member state, safety and other appropriate provisions (Article 71(1), ex 
Article 75). 
Provisions concerning the principles of the regulatory system for 
transport, the application of which would be liable to have a serious effect 
on the standard of living and on employment in certain areas, and those on 
the operation of transport facilities (Article 71(2), ex Article 75), fall under 
the consultation procedure. Rules to abolish discrimination, which take the 
form of carriers charging different rates and imposing different conditions 
(Article 75, ex Article 79), are adopted by the Council acting by a qualified 
majority. Deciding whether, to what extent and by what procedure 
appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport (Article 
80, ex Article 84) the Council acts by a qualified majority. 
Community competence is not exclusive in such areas as aviation 
where member states share competence with the EC, so-called shared or 
‘mixed competence’. The ‘open skies’ judgments of 5 November 2002, for 
example, have given the Commission ‘horizontal mandate’ to negotiate 
with third countries by resolving the question of shared competence 
between the member states and the Community. In practice, member states 
often cede their negotiating role to the EC negotiator, and the European 
Commission negotiates. The Commission therefore attends negotiations on 
behalf of the EC and its member states. The procedure for concluding an 
agreement with one or more states or international organisations (Article 
24) starts with the Council, which, when acting unanimously, may 
authorise the presidency or the Commission to open negotiations. Any 
agreement is then concluded by the Council acting unanimously.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
The normal procedure is for the Commission’s proposals to be submitted 
for consideration by one of the working groups on transport matters. Since 
the first meetings are often devoted to very technical issues of the 
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capitals attend the first rounds of working group meetings. Later on, 
negotiations are taken over by the regular middle-ranking officials attached 
to the permanent representations of the member states. Gradually, over a 
succession of meetings, the differences may be refined and whittled down 
to a few key issues – for example a debate between those favouring 
increased liberalisation and those demanding more harmonisation of 
competitive conditions – or important national considerations such as the 
protection of lifeline services to isolated communities (Stevens, 2004: 76). 
These in turn may be further refined and reduced in Coreper I before the 
dossier goes to the Council itself, where ministers may succeed in bridging 
the remaining differences in views, or alternatively may fail to do so and 
return the dossier to Coreper and if necessary to the transport working 
group for further consideration. 
It is worth highlighting here the role played by expert groups in the 
policy formulation phase and that of the comitology committees in the 
implementation phase. In transport, sixty-six expert groups were 
established by the Commission to help in the formulation of policy 
proposals. They also monitor whether or not competences are being 
overstepped. There are three consultative and scientific groups which have 
been formally established by a Commission Decision; twenty-seven 
permanent groups, the creation of which has been authorised by the 
Commission for a duration of more than five years and thirty-six 
temporary groups, the creation of which has been authorised by the 
Commission for a duration of less than five years. The comitology 
committees are involved in implementing legislative acts. In 2004, for 
transport, there were eighteen comitology committees, ranging from the 
‘Committee on application of the legislation on the minimum requirements 
for vessels bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous 
or polluting goods’, through to the ‘Committee on driving licences’ to the 
‘Advisory Committee on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport’. 
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
When a proposal has finally been adopted by the Commission and falls 
under co-decision, the European Parliament in general and its transport 
committee in particular can formally veto the legislative draft.  
Since EU transport policies are, despite the qualified majority voting 
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member states that can form blocking minorities with the help of other 
member states by calling on favours. Whereas the United Kingdom 
supported Germany on national weekend bans on lorries, it was Germany 
which endorsed the UK’s position on the EU/US open skies agreements. 
Furthermore, the preparation and implementation of EU transport 
policy by the Commission rely increasingly on expert advice. Expert 
groups made up of national and/or private-sector experts set up by the 
Commission provide it with specialist advice. They advise the Commission 
and its services on the preparation of legislative proposals and policy 
initiatives. The comitology committees deliver opinions on draft 
implementing measures submitted to them by the Commission pursuant to 
the basic legislative instrument and intervene within the framework of the 
advisory, the management and the regulatory procedure provided for that 
purpose. 
In addition, the Commission’s draft text is sent to the Economic and 
Social Committee (ECOSOC) and to the Committee of the Regions (COR). 
However, their role is advisory, with little direct impact on the outcome. 
6.  Development policy related input into the procedure 
The move to integrate development policy considerations into transport 
policy has not gained much momentum yet. At the moment, there are only 
initiatives, which are part of the Barcelona process, promoting cooperation 
with the countries of the southern Mediterranean to improve transport 
infrastructure and alert the public and private players concerned. Whereas 
safety and security issues became important in the Commission’s 
negotiations on an aviation agreement with Morocco, it is rather EU 
transport goals that influence development assistance: EU transport policy 
is ‘exported’ into the development sector. China, for example, received 
financial assistance to develop its aviation sector. Recently, however, 
member states and the Commission have become keen on linking the 
assistance closer to EU transport goals by requiring regulatory convergence 
from China. 
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
An important finding is that the effects of EU transport policy on the 
development process and vice versa are far less visible and identifiable 
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transport policies and reaching the MDGs (Millennium Development 
Goals) in developing countries does not appear to be problematic, it is 
difficult to envisage institutional changes to strengthen development inputs 
in the policy-making process on domestic EU legislation. However there 
might be issues that are less visible or issues that come up in the future and 
in that case development experts would need to be involved.  
Moreover, the technical knowledge and regulatory framework in 
place in the EU could contain lessons for infrastructure projects and 
transport policies in developing countries. Development specialists could 
consider building stronger contacts with the relevant European transport 
specialists in other to ensure their expertise can be used for EU 
development policy.  
Overall it might be helpful to start with the role played by expert 
groups and comitology committees. Formally, their role is limited to either 
the policy formulation stage or the implementation stage. Informally, 
however, the Commission is advised by expert groups and comitology 
committees over the entire policy-making cycle. Here, the input of 
development specialists next to transport experts could help to frame 
Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) issues in terms of relevance for 
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8.  Organigram of Transport Policy-Making in the Council of 
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12. Fiche on EU Energy Policy 
Louise van Schaik 
1.  Origins 
The EU Treaty does not assign an explicit horizontal EU competence in the 
area of energy.1 For almost 30 years, EU energy policy has in principle been 
confined to the narrow field of nuclear energy and coal based on the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic 
Community (Euratom). Periodic attempts to extend the EU’s jurisdiction to 
affect the choice of energy supply remained largely unsuccessful, since a 
majority of member states were not willing to give up real or perceived 
authority over the economically important issue of energy. Nevertheless, 
there have been a series of broad horizontal goals, such as promoting the 
rational use of energy, championing renewable energy, reducing Europe’s 
dependency on oil import and notably liberalising energy markets. The 
policies were justified on the basis of internal market, competitiveness, 
environment or other EC competences and in general were politically 
acceptable when supported unanimously by all EU member states or at 
least by a qualified majority.2  
Recently the draft Constitutional Treaty proposed to include an 
energy chapter, which merely resembles the current situation and stops 
short of providing the EU with any real power on the core issues of energy 
policy, namely member state energy choices, such choosing between 
nuclear, coal or gas and ultimately security of supply. In the absence of real 
EU power in energy policy, EU energy policy orientations will continue to 
rely on competencies other than energy, notably internal market and the 
environment. This is reflected in current EU energy policy priorities: 
                                                      
1 For an overview of EU energy policy and competences, see Egenhofer (2001) 
available at http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=14  
2 Also article 3§1(u) of the TEC on activities of the Communities (within the context 
of its tasks/goals as defined in art. 2) includes a reference to “measures in the field 
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completion of the internal market in electricity and gas and the promotion 
of energy efficiency and renewables.  
2.  Main Council bodies involved 
The leading Council formation on energy issues is the Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council, which is composed of 
ministers covering energy when this is the agenda item being discussed. 
Moreover, as a combined result of rapidly increased oil prices, the 
forecasted growth in import dependency on oil and gas and an increased 
importance attached to the climate change problem, energy has rapidly 
gained political momentum at the highest political level. It was discussed 
by the European heads of state and government in an informal summit at 
Hampton Court in the autumn of 2005 and in the Spring European Council 
in 2006 (on the basis of a green paper prepared by the Commission3). They 
decided to launch an Energy Policy for Europe with competitiveness, security 
of supply and environmental sustainability as its main themes. Because 
energy was on the agenda of the European Council, other Council 
formations also discussed energy issues as far as they were relevant in 
order to provide input, including the GAERC (security of supply, Russia, 
external relations and development issues), ECOFIN (energy markets), 
Competitiveness and Agriculture Council (biofuels). 
In general, however, the European Council becomes only involved in 
highly political and strategic issues or in cross-border issues such as the 
Lisbon and Sustainable Development Strategies. On energy it has 
occasionally also been involved on liberalisation of electricity and gas 
markets. The March 2006 discussion on energy can therefore be considered 
quite exceptional, although it is likely to be continued in the future, as 
energy and particularly security of supply, are likely to remain issues high 
on the political agenda.  
In order to prepare TTE Council meetings, energy issues are first of 
all discussed by the Working Party on Energy, which meets about once a 
week. There is also a High-Level WP on Energy, but this group seldom 
meets and in fact is actually the same as the energy WP, but with different 
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participants (see section 4). It convened last in London, following the 
Hampton Court Summit. The issue of nuclear energy is covered in a 
separate Working Party on Atomic Questions with an Ad Hoc WP on 
Nuclear Safety, as well as in the Joint Working Party on Research/Atomic 
Questions.  
Sometimes energy-related topics are discussed as well in other WPs, 
notably research, agriculture (biofuels), environment (climate change), 
competitiveness and growth and the political and security committee 
(security of supply, geopolitical energy issues). CODEV has been involved 
with regard to formulating the Council Conclusions on “integrating energy 
interventions into development cooperation” that were adopted by the 
GAERC on 10 April 2006 (see also point 6). Although energy issues are thus 
discussed in several WPs, when it comes to core energy issues for the EU 
internal market and energy legislation, the WP on energy is clearly in the 
lead.  
Coreper I functions as the clearing house between the WP on Energy 
and the Council. Coreper II is involved with foreign policy, development 
and nuclear issues, which are decided upon by the GAERC formation of 
the Council of Ministers. 
3.  Applicable policy-making procedures 
The competence areas on which energy policies are usually based such as 
internal market and environment are generally subject to the co-decision 
procedure with QMV used as the voting rule in the Council. EC Treaty 
articles on which energy legislation is based include 175 (environment), 95 
(internal market), 156 (trans-European networks) and 133 (external action). 
Concerning energy, there are some important exceptions enshrined in the 
Treaty. For instance, Art. 175 stipulates that “measures significantly 
affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply” are subject to the consultation 
procedure with unanimity. Usually policy proposals are framed in such a 
way by the European Commission that this exception to co-decision does 
not apply.  
For nuclear energy, the Euratom Treaty provisions apply, meaning 
that the vast majority of decisions are taken by unanimity. The EP is 
usually consulted, but there is no obligation to do so, implying that the EP 
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theoretically it could do under the normal consultation procedure that 
applies under the TEC.  
Bilateral and international relations on energy are either a shared 
competence between the EC and the EU member states or have remained 
within the domain of the member states (e.g. with regard to choices of their 
energy mix). In international fora where the EU acts in concert (e.g. the EU 
Energy Dialogue with Russia, the EU-OPEC Dialogue, the Energy Charter 
Treaty), either the Commission or the presidency is the EU’s main 
representative speaking on behalf of the EC and the member states. It 
operates on the basis of what has been agreed upon in the Council or in EU 
coordination meetings in which the representatives of the member states 
and the Commission participate.  
4.  Principal parties involved in developing the policy: 
Background and level of seniority 
Proposals for energy legislation are drafted by the European Commission, 
where DG TREN has the lead. Also other services follow energy dossiers 
closely, such as DG Environment, ENTREPRISE, SANCO, ECOFIN, and 
Competition. For implementation issues there are several comitology 
committees, such as the cross-border electricity committee. Perhaps more 
important is the role of the advisory committee of European Energy 
Regulators, ERGEG, which is composed of national energy regulators. In a 
different setting, but composed of the same people, the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) is taking care of stakeholder 
consultations with affected industry and other organizations, providing 
substantial input on technical energy issues (e.g. interconnection of the 
grid).  
There are also more informal events where Commission officials, 
member states’ representatives, industry and NGOs meet, such as the 
Florence (electricity), Madrid (gas) and Amsterdam (sustainable energy) 
Fora.  
The participants in the Council WP on Energy are energy attachés 
from the Permanent Representations usually second by a national expert 
working for the Ministry in the home country. The participants of the High-
level group are senior energy officials of the EU member states based in 
their home country (energy directors). The Atomic Questions and Nuclear 
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Representations. They meet less often, the atomic questions about every 
two to three weeks and the nuclear safety WP only when relevant issues 
are at hand.  
In most of the other WPs where energy issues are occasionally 
discussed the permanent representations are also in the lead staffing, but 
especially with regard to international issues it can also be the case that 
officials from national Ministries are the main representatives, as external 
representation is a sensitive issue for the EU member states touching upon 
their statehood and sovereignty.  
In the European Parliament the Committee on Industry, Research and 
Energy is in the lead, with other committees following the work depending 
on the issue at stake (e.g. environment committee, foreign affairs 
committees).  
With regard to sensitive pieces of energy legislation Presidencies 
have at times delayed or accelerated decision-making. As is highlighted 
under point 7 respective Presidencies have especially played a large role in 
putting the energy-development interface on the agenda.  
The support of member states policies for energy policies is diverse 
and relates to their energy mix, energy import dependency and on whether 
energy is seen primarily as a tradable commodity for liberalised markets or 
as a product or service where state interventions should play a role. These 
differences also underlie problems encountered with the implementation of 
the internal energy market in the EU member states as is most clearly 
illustrated by the current energy sector enquiry by the Competition 
authority of the EU and the infringement procedures started up by DG 
TREN towards several Member States regarding insufficient 
implementation of EU energy regulations.  
5.  Consultation and approval processes 
Energy has been a sensitive issue for cooperation between the EU member 
states. There are differences in interests between energy producers and 
non-producer countries, as well as different structures of national energy 
sectors. Member states are moreover foremost concerned about their own 
security of supply position, i.e. that there is enough energy for their 
country. The sensitivities are perhaps most clearly illustrated when 
discussions on energy competences in the light of Treaty revisions are 
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initiatives have been driven by the Commission, which has exploited 
institutional rules to take the initiative, to redefine the energy sector to the 
internal market, environmental policy and foreign policy (Andersen, 2000).  
6.  Development policy input into the procedure 
A reliable and affordable energy supply is far from commonplace in the 
developing world, where over 2 billion people rely on biomass (wood, 
waste, etc.) as their primary energy source and 1.6 billion lack access to 
electricity4. Affordable energy is obviously an important condition for 
economic development. The current high prices of oil are having larger 
effects on developing countries with comparatively weak economies and 
often high losses in power production, transmission and distribution as 
well as in transportation and different end-uses of energy. To a certain 
extent they moreover compete with the EU and other energy importers for 
conventional energy sources and therefore it seems in the interest of all to 
improve energy efficiency, renewable energy and local energy systems in 
developing countries. It is important for the EU to ensure that new energy 
investments both in OECD and in developing countries are clean in order 
to achieve the drastic cuts in greenhouse gas emissions that are projected to 
be needed to reach the EU’s climate change objectives. 
A special case rises with developing countries where energy is 
produced. Although revenues from oil, gas and minerals in these countries 
could be very well used to foster economic growth and to reduce poverty 
this requires adequate governance systems which are often not in place or 
corrupted. This issue is addressed in particular by the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, which is supported amongst others by France and 
the UK and aims to improve transparency and accountability over revenue 
allocation.  
Recent years have witnessed a remarkable increase in the attention 
paid to energy issues in EU development policy. The overall framework for 
this attention has been provided by the EU Energy Initiative (EUEI) that 
was launched at the World Summit for Sustainable Development organised 
in Johannesburg in 2002. Its progress was catalysed by a Commission 
Communication published in 2004 (711) and by Conclusions of the GAERC 
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(8566/04). In order to ensure ownership and effectiveness in 
implementation, an extensive dialogue with the ACP countries was set up 
to consider the definite shape of the EUEI. The Energy Facility is funded 
from the 9th European Development Fund (conditionally). It is 
accompanied by a structure (modelled after the Water Initiative) in which 
member states coordinate their activities and financial investments on 
energy in developing countries. The secretariat is hosted within DG 
Development.  
Key decisions included the approval in June 2005 of a 220 million 
euro ACP-EU Energy Facility5 and the priority to energy in policy 
documents such as the European Consensus on Development (2005) and 
the EU Strategy for Africa (2005). In April 2006 the GAERC moreover 
adopted Council Conclusions integrating energy interventions into 
development cooperation, which are to be used as a reference point for the 
EU in many international meetings that will discuss energy and 
development; notably the ones taking place in the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD), where energy is the key issue in 2006 and 
2007. The Council Conclusions are based to a large extent on a senior 
officials seminar, organised by the Austrian presidency on Energy in the 
Context of Development Cooperation6. The seminar participants looked 
forward to upcoming international meetings where energy and 
development are on the agenda and took stock of the discussions in many 
meetings, seminars, conferences7, organised internationally and in the EU, 
and notably referred back to the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002, that still 
sets the main political framework for EU cooperation with developing 
countries on energy issues. An important driver for the EU’s activities 
                                                      
5 In addition to these resources, some of the 250 million euro allocated to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects within the context of the Intelligent 
Energy for Europe programme go to projects in developing countries.  
6 See for further information: 
http://www.ada.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=8969&LNG=en&version=   
7 E.g. the renewable energy conferences organised in Beijing (2005) and Bonn 
(2004), the Energy for Development Conference organised under the Dutch 
presidency (2004), the G-8 discussions on climate change and Africa (2005), the 
UNFCCC conference in Montreal (2005), the international energy technology 
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“back then” has been the Commissions Communication “Energy 
cooperation with developing countries, published in 2002. The Council 
conclusions, as adopted in the GAERC, were prepared by CODEV.  
The ACP-EU Energy Facility is part of the EU Energy Initiative. The 
Energy Facility is funded from the 9th European Development Fund, and a 
first call for projects was launched in June 2006. 
Most resources and activities for energy investments are still coming 
from national development agencies, the IFIs and multilateral development 
banks. Policies to ensure that these energy investments are in line with the 
EU’s poverty reduction, energy security and sustainable development 
objectives are still rather piecemeal, but in progress. The IFIs increasingly 
seem to realise the importance the EU attaches to this issue. The Presidency 
Conclusions of March 2006 mention moreover explicitly that in order to 
facilitate the access of developing countries to sustainable energy and 
related technologies, synergies with international organizations, including 
IFIs, should be fully exploited.  
7.  Strengthening the process to secure a better development input 
In order to achieve more policy coherence for development improved 
(national) coordination between national experts working on development, 
energy, international finance, environment and foreign policy is essential. 
The recent processes towards an explicit and coherent EU position on 
energy and development cooperation seems to be a good example in this 
respect. It took several years of discussions, meetings and notably 
intensified efforts by the Commission and respective EU Presidencies, 
though, to get the relevant sectoral interests involved. And still many 
energy specialists do not consider development cooperation as an issue of 
their concern. One could also wonder whether they should, given the 
limited impact of EU internal energy legislation on development 
cooperation.  
The internal side only matters indirectly as it influences the total 
amount of energy the EU is consuming from the world markets. Measures 
to increase energy efficiency and domestic energy production, notably by 
increasing the production of electricity from coal based in the EU, nuclear 
and renewable energy, diminish the energy demand and therefore could 
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However, perhaps the international side is indeed more relevant and 
of more direct influence. It includes the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), which will focus on energy issues in 2006 and 2007, 
the upcoming St. Petersburg Summit of the G-8, where energy is the key 
agenda item, meetings of the IFIs and multilateral development banks 
affecting conditions for grants and loans for energy investments in 
developing countries, the post-2012 climate negotiations taking place in the 
context of the UNFCCC, and negotiations on standards of expert credit 
agencies (financial guarantee to many FDI flows targeted towards the 
energy sector), as taking place in the OECD.  
It is essential that there is broader coordination between the above-
mentioned sectoral interests to prepare for these meetings and to set clear 
policy priorities on energy in relationship to development cooperation. As 
the developments towards the April 2006 Council conclusions demonstrate, 
this does not necessarily have to take place in Council WP meetings, where 
important matters as internal EU legislation, etc are also on the agenda. The 
debate could indeed receive continued attention in the form of targeted 
informal initiatives (e.g. conferences, seminars), for instance initiated by the 
Commission or respective EU Presidencies; as occurred during the Dutch 
and Austrian presidencies. A potential topic for a future initiative could be 
biofuels, undoubtedly an issue covered in many international discussions. 
Another topic could be the development perspective on the EU energy 
White Paper that is due at the end of 2006. Finally, an issue where 
continuing coordination between member states’ and Community efforts 
would seem worthwhile is the financing of energy investment in 
developing countries, where already a good start is being made in the 
context of the EU Energy Initiative.  186 | REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING 
 
8.  Organigram of Energy Policy-Making in the European Union 
with a focus on the Council  
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@LIS 
 
The Alliance for the Information Society, a partnership 
between Europe and Latin America to promote dialogue on 
regulatory issues, demonstration projects and connections 
between researchers and communities. 
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
AIDCO  Europe Aid Coordination Office 
AmCham  American Chamber of Commerce  
CAN  Climate Action Network  
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism (one of the flexible 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol) 
CFSP  Common foreign and security policy 
CIA   Committee on Immigration and Asylum  
CIREFI   Centre for Immigration, Discussion and Exchange on the 
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration 
CIVCOM  Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
CMO  Common Market Organisation 
COARM  Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports 
COCON  Working group on consular services 
Co-decision  Under the co-decision procedure (Art. 251 of the EC Treaty) 
the European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt 
instruments. The procedure comprises two readings. 
CODEV  Council Working Party on Development Cooperation  
COGEGA General  Confederation  of Agricultural Co-operatives 
CONUN  Working group on the United Nations 
COPA  Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations 
COPS  Comité de politique et sécurité (Political and Security 
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COR  Committee of the Regions 
Coreper 
(I & II) 
Comité des représentants permanents [Committee of 
Permanent Representatives]; Coreper I consists of deputy 
heads of mission and deals largely with social and economic 
issues; Coreper II consists of heads of mission and focuses 
on political, financial and foreign policy issues 
COTER  Council Working Group on Terrorism 
Council 
(of Ministers) 
Officially the Council of the EU, usually referred to as 
Council or Council of Ministers, consists of the portfolio 
ministers of the EU member states. The Council adopts laws, 
often in co-decision with the European Parliament.   
CREST  EU Scientific and Technical Research Committee 
CSD  Commission on Sustainable Development 
DFID  Department for International Development 
DG Directorate  General  (of the European Commission) 
DG AGRI  Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development 
DG BUDGET  Directorate General for Budget 
DG DEV  Directorate General for Development 
DG ECFIN   Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
DG ENV  Directorate General for Environment  
DG FISH  Directorate General for Fisheries 
DG INFSO  Directorate General for Information Society and Media 
DG REGIO   Directorate General for Regional Policy 
DG RELEX  Directorate General for External Relations 
DG SANCO  Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection 
DG TRADE  Directorate General for Trade 
EC  European Community, the pillar of the European Union in 
which the Community policies are placed. The EC has legal 
personality and falls under the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice, i.e. EU “supreme court”.  
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ECCP  European Climate Change Programme 
ECOFIN  Economic and Finance Council  
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Committee 
ECTA  European Competitive Telecommunications Associations 
EDCTP  European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials 
Partnership 
EDF  European Development Fund 
EEA  European Economic Area (adds Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland EU activities) 
EES  European Employment Strategy 
EFMA  European Fertilizer Manufacturing Association 
EMCO Employment  Committee 
EPSCO  Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
Council  
ERA  European Research Area 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ERG European  Regulators  Group 
ERGEG European  Regulators  Group for Electricity and Gas 
ESDP   European security and defence policy 
ESPRIT  European Strategic Programme for Research and 
Development in Information Technology 
ETNO  European Telecommunications Network Operators’ 
Association 
EU European  Union,  a sui generis polity, with 
intergovernmental and supranational characteristics. The 
EU is currently composed of 25 member states. Its activities 
are grouped in three pillars: the EC pillar, the CFSP pillar 
and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. 
EU Council  Officially the Council of the EU, also referred to as Council 
or Council of Ministers, consists of the portfolio ministers of 
the EU member states. The Council adopts laws, often in co-200 | GLOSSARY 
 
decision with the European Parliament.   
EU ETS  EU Emissions Trading Scheme (for carbon dioxide of large 
industrial plants) 
EUMC EU  Military  Committee 
EUMEDIS  Funding for the development of the Information Society in 
the Mediterranean area. 
EUMS EU  Military  Staff 
European 
Commission 
The EU’s executive body, it proposes legislation, looks after 
implementation of legislation and is the guardian of the 
treaties. It is composed of 25 independent members, i.e. the 
European Commissioners, one from each EU member state. 
European 
Council 
Consists of the heads of government and state and the 
European Commission President. It meets four times a year 
to provide guidance on the day-to-day management of the 
EU and to take strategic decisions. 
EUTC  European Trade Union Confederation 
FP  Framework Programme (for Research) 
FPA  Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
GAERC   General Affairs and External Relations Council  
GCIM   Global Commission on International Migration  
HLWG   High-Level Working Group 
HR  High Representative of the CFSP 
ICC  International Chamber of Commerce 
ICT  Information and Communications Technologies 
IEI  International Environmental Issues 
IFI  International Finance Institution 
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference. Negotiations between the 
member state governments with a view to amending the 
treaties. 
ILO International  Labour  Organisation 
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INTUG  International Telecommunications Users Group 
IOM  International Organisation for Migration 
IPCC International  Panel on Climate Change 
IRG Independent  Regulators  Group 
ITRE  Industry, Trade, Research and Energy Committee (of the 
European Parliament) 
JHA  Justice and Home Affairs 
JI  Joint Implementation (one of the flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol) 
LDC  Least Developed Countries 
LUFPIG  Land use and Food Policy Intergroup 
MEA Multilateral  Environmental  Agreement 
MEP  Member of the European Parliament 
NGO Non-governmental  organisation 
OMC  Open Method of Coordination 
PMG  Political and Military Group 
Presidency  The Presidency of the EU is held in turn on a six-monthly 
basis by each member state. The Presidency chairs the 
meetings of the European Council and Council of Ministers 
and represents the European Union externally in many 
international organisations. 
PROCIV  Working group on rescue operations 
PSC  Political and Security Committee 
QMV  Qualified majority voting, indicates the number of votes 
required in the Council for a decision to be adopted. 
Member states’ votes are weighted on the basis of their 
population and corrected in favour of less-populated 
countries. A proposal is accepted if it is supported by 71% of 
the votes and represents at least 62% of the population. 
RELEX   Directorate-General for External Relations in the European 
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RFO  Regional Fisheries Organisation 
RTD  Research, Technology and Development 
SANCO  Health & Consumer Protection Directorate General  
SCA  Special Committee on Agriculture 
SCIFA   Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
SPC  Social Protection Committee 
TCNs  Third country nationals 
TEC  Treaty establishing the European Community 
TENs Trans-European  Networks 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TREN  Directorate-General for Transport and Energy in the 
European Commission 
TTE  Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
UN United  Nations 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNICE  Union of European Employers Associations 
WBCSD  World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
WP Working  Party 
WSIS  World Summit on the Information Society 
WWF  World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
WWF  World Wildlife Fund 
 